成唯識論了義燈 2.9

2.9

The treatise says: "Furthermore, the various views of a self do not take a real self as their object," and so forth. The Yaoji says: The Śataśāstravaipulya formulates the syllogism: "The view of a self definitely does not take a real self as its object; because it is commingled with marks of male, female, and so forth; like the mind that, apprehending the body and so forth, gives rise to commingling with marks of male and so forth. Furthermore, the view of a self does not take a real self as its object; because it possesses an intentional object; like other minds and so forth. Furthermore, the object of the view of a self is not a real self; because it is the intentional object of a mind with marks of male and so forth; just like the body and so forth." From this, it is known: none of the views of a self have a real self as their intentional object, but take only the unreal body and so forth as their object; because they arise following the conceptual awareness of one's own false discrimination; like the inverted understanding of a snake when observing a rope in the dark. Inheriting the original explanation, it says: "Furthermore, the various views of a self do not take a real self as their object"—this does not mean a view of a self that forms the understanding of a self. If framed in terms of the view of a self not apprehending it, that would incur the fallacy of proving what is already accepted. Now, saying "does not take as object" is framed in terms of the view that apprehends a self being afflicted wisdom (kliṣṭa-prajñā); framing it around this as the view, it challenges them so that it does not take [a real self] as its object, and therefore there is no fallacy of proving what is already accepted.