成唯識論了義燈 3.3

3.3

言非第六聲，便表異體等者。外立量云：有為相言；定別有體；有第六囀言故；如天授之衣等。准此量中，有其三過：一宗中比量相違過。過云有為相言，非定別有體，以有第六囀言故，如地之堅等。宗不言定無別體，但違於彼定別有故，無不定過。二者彼量有不定過，如文可解。三者亦有有法自相相違過，此量不但立別有體，即顯離所相，而是有為能相耶？若之衣等，非有為能相，故成相違。離此四相之外，更無同喻。餘皆非有為相，即成異法。第六囀言，因於異轉故，如《入正理論》，立有、非、實、德、業等量。

Regarding the statement that "it is not the sixth case (genitive) that indicates a distinct substance, and so forth": The opponent establishes the inference: "The term 'characteristics of the conditioned'; definitely has a distinct substance; because there is the word of the sixth grammatical case; just like Devadatta's clothing, etc." According to this inference, there are three fallacies: First, the fallacy of contradiction with inference within the thesis (pratijñā-viruddha). The fallacy is stated: "The term 'characteristics of the conditioned'; does not definitely have a distinct substance; because there is the word of the sixth case; just like the solidity of earth, etc." The thesis does not say that it definitely has no distinct substance, but merely contradicts their assertion of definitely having a distinct substance; hence there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). Second, their inference has the fallacy of inconclusiveness, as can be understood from the text. Third, it also has the fallacy of contradiction with the essence of the locus (dharmisvarūpa-viparītasādhana). Does this inference not only establish a distinct substance, but also reveal that it is separate from that which is characterized and is a conditioned characterizing mark? If it is clothing or the like, it is not a conditioned characterizing mark, and therefore it becomes contradictory. Outside of these four characteristics, there is no other similar example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta). All the rest are not conditioned characteristics and thus become dissimilar instances (vaidharmya). Because the word of the sixth case applies to dissimilar instances, it is like the inferences establishing existence, non-existence, substance, quality, action, etc., in the *Nyāyapraveśa*.