成唯識論了義燈 3.3

3.3

Regarding the statement that "it is not the sixth case (genitive) that indicates a distinct substance, and so forth": The opponent establishes the inference: "The term 'characteristics of the conditioned'; definitely has a distinct substance; because there is the word of the sixth grammatical case; just like Devadatta's clothing, etc." According to this inference, there are three fallacies: First, the fallacy of contradiction with inference within the thesis (pratijñā-viruddha). The fallacy is stated: "The term 'characteristics of the conditioned'; does not definitely have a distinct substance; because there is the word of the sixth case; just like the solidity of earth, etc." The thesis does not say that it definitely has no distinct substance, but merely contradicts their assertion of definitely having a distinct substance; hence there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). Second, their inference has the fallacy of inconclusiveness, as can be understood from the text. Third, it also has the fallacy of contradiction with the essence of the locus (dharmisvarūpa-viparītasādhana). Does this inference not only establish a distinct substance, but also reveal that it is separate from that which is characterized and is a conditioned characterizing mark? If it is clothing or the like, it is not a conditioned characterizing mark, and therefore it becomes contradictory. Outside of these four characteristics, there is no other similar example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta). All the rest are not conditioned characteristics and thus become dissimilar instances (vaidharmya). Because the word of the sixth case applies to dissimilar instances, it is like the inferences establishing existence, non-existence, substance, quality, action, etc., in the *Nyāyapraveśa*.