成唯識論了義燈 3.4

3.4

論若有為相異所體等者。量云：汝無為相，應離體別有；說之相言故；如有為相。然有解云：此量有他不定失。云：堅等異品，說之相言，是不定過。此亦無過，在宗中故，以許有之。言總難令別有此。又云：汝無自違過。西明量云：無為相體，應異所相；為無為中隨一攝故；如有為相。有解云：此量有兩俱不成，以為無為中隨一攝因；於所相有，於能相無。此亦不爾。有為能相是有為，無為能相亦是無為，豈無為能相，在有為中，云於能相？無要集隨此云有解勝，又破他言。汝有為相體，不異所相。或應無別實相為相；為無為相中，隨一攝故；如無為相。《要集》云：有說有釋，但為此量，此量因中，有法差別相違過。量云：有為相體，應非假不相應；為無為中隨一攝故；如無為相。由此但以道理例破，不應立量者，此說非理，所以者何？以立宗言，汝有為相體，即就他宗，破他比量，不立自故，如何得與論主作法差別相違？又假不異所相，實不異所相，別實有，不別實有，是差別故。然准作違，即是有法差別，即應脫一有字。若作有法差別，是差別故。又，設若爾彼立違量，亦有此過，以實有不相應，非實有不相應，是差別意。立量實有不相應，今與作有法差別違。量云：汝實有為相，應非實有不相應；為無為中隨一攝故；如無為相。故不得成有法及法差別違，即顯彼立異，有為外別立能相，如耶若之衣等。量有法自相相違決定，及法差別相違決定。又過如前，由此有說，有釋無愆。

The treatise says: "If the conditioned characteristics are distinct from the substance of that which is characterized, etc.": The inference states: "Your unconditioned characteristics; should exist separately from substance; because of the expression 'characteristics of [it]'; just like conditioned characteristics." However, someone explains: "This inference has the fallacy of inconclusiveness for the other (parānekānta). It says: for dissimilar instances such as solidity, the statement of 'characteristics of [it]' is an inconclusive fallacy." This also has no fault, because it resides in the thesis; for since they accept its existence, the general challenge forces it to have this distinct existence. Moreover, it says: "You have no fallacy of self-contradiction." The inference of Ximing states: "The substance of the unconditioned characteristic; should be distinct from that which is characterized; because it is subsumed under either the conditioned or the unconditioned; just like conditioned characteristics." Someone explains: "This inference has [the fallacy of the reason being] unestablished for both (ubhayāsiddha), because the reason 'subsumed under either the conditioned or the unconditioned' exists in that which is characterized, but is absent in the characterizing mark." This is also not so. The conditioned characterizing mark is conditioned, and the unconditioned characterizing mark is also unconditioned; how could the unconditioned characterizing mark be among the conditioned, so as to say it is absent in the characterizing mark? The Yaoji follows this by saying that this explanation is superior, and further refutes the other, saying: "The substance of your conditioned characteristics is not distinct from that which is characterized, or there should be no distinct real characteristics serving as characteristics; because it is subsumed under either conditioned or unconditioned characteristics; just like unconditioned characteristics." The Yaoji says: "Some say and some explain that solely for this inference, there is the fallacy of contradicting the property of the subject (dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana) in the reason of this inference." The inference states: "The substance of conditioned characteristics; should not be a designated non-concurrent formation; because it is subsumed under either the conditioned or the unconditioned; just like unconditioned characteristics." Hence, one should only refute them by analogy through principle, and should not formulate an inference—this statement is incorrect. Why is that? Because in setting up the thesis it says "the substance of your conditioned characteristics", which refutes the opponent's inference in terms of the opponent's own tenet and does not establish one's own [position]; how could it formulate a contradiction of the property of the subject against the author of the treatise? Furthermore, designated not being distinct from that which is characterized, real not being distinct from that which is characterized, having distinct real existence, and not having distinct real existence—these are distinctions. However, according to formulating a contradiction, it is a contradiction with the property of the subject (dharmiviśeṣa), so it should omit the word "having". If formulated as a contradiction with the property of the subject, it is a distinction. Moreover, even if it were so, the contradictory inference they establish would also have this fault, since real-existent non-concurrent and non-real-existent non-concurrent are the intended distinctions. Formulating the inference as real-existent non-concurrent, now one formulates a contradiction of the property of the subject against it. The inference states: "Your real conditioned characteristics; should not be real-existent non-concurrent formations; because they are subsumed under either the conditioned or the unconditioned; just like unconditioned characteristics." Therefore it cannot constitute a contradiction with the essence of the locus or a contradiction with the property of the subject; that is, it demonstrates that their setting up a distinct characterizing mark apart from the conditioned, like Yajñadatta's clothing and so forth, has the inference's decision of contradiction with the essence of the locus (dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana) and decision of contradiction with the property of the predicate (dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana). Furthermore, the faults are as before; thus what was said and explained is without fault.