成唯識論了義燈 3.31

3.31

破名、句、文中云：若名、句、文，異聲實有，此破外計。《要集》假敘，外人反難云：假不相應名等，應非能詮，以是假故？或云：許異聲處，不相應假法處攝故，如餘假法？西明釋云：汝名、句等，實體不成，義如前破。若不許聲是能詮者，便有量中闕，至教量失，此不成釋。前未破故。又復大乘諸師計別，陳那不立至教量故，他許實故。《要集》云：外人作比量相違，然彼量有宗相符失故。今謂不爾。量中云：非實能詮可相符失，但云非能詮。何名相符？今云：彼量是因中相違決定失，以假實因，及異聲處法處所攝，各自許故，大乘無過。外人若云假名、句、文非假能詮，為相違者，此亦非過。何以故？大乘量破，彼云：汝名、句、文，定不能詮；以異聲故；如色等。今與大乘作量云：假名、句、文，非假能詮，於因明相違中，是何相違？望大乘量總非是過。又大乘名等不異聲故，以假從實，即聲能詮。外難不詮，違世間故。故下文云：語不異能詮，人天共了。

In refuting name, phrase, and phoneme, it says: if name, phrase, and phoneme were substantially existent apart from sound, this refutes the non-Buddhist position. The Yaoji hypothetically sets forth the opponent's counter-objection: "Should the nominal, non-concurrent name and so forth not be expressors, because they are nominal?" Or: "Do you accept that, apart from the sound āyatana, they are subsumed under the dharma āyatana of non-concurrent nominal dharmas, like other nominal dharmas?" Ximing explained: "Your name, phrase, and so forth cannot be established as real substances, as refuted previously. If one does not accept that sound is an expressor, there would be the fault of lacking the pramāṇa of authoritative testimony among the pramāṇas." This explanation is inadmissible, because it was not refuted previously. Furthermore, the opinions of Mahāyāna masters differ: Dignāga did not establish the pramāṇa of authoritative testimony, because others accept it as real. The Yaoji states: "The opponent constructed an inference with contradiction, yet that inference incurs the fault of establishing what is already accepted by the thesis." We now say this is not so. If the inference stated "not real expressors," there could be the fault of establishing what is already accepted; but it merely states "not expressors." How could that be called establishing what is already accepted? We now say: that inference has the fault of contradictory decisiveness in the reason, because nominal and real as reasons, as well as being subsumed under the dharma āyatana apart from the sound āyatana, are mutually accepted by each side, so there is no fault for the Mahāyāna. If the opponent says that nominal name, phrase, and phoneme are not nominal expressors and regards this as a contradiction, this is also not a fault. Why? The Mahāyāna inference refutes them, saying: "Your name, phrase, and phoneme are definitively incapable of expressing; because they are distinct from sound; like form and so forth." Now, if one constructs an inference against the Mahāyāna stating: "Nominal name, phrase, and phoneme are not nominal expressors," among the contradictions in pramāṇa, what kind of contradiction is it? With respect to the Mahāyāna inference, it is entirely without fault. Moreover, because Mahāyāna names and so forth are not distinct from sound, subsuming the nominal under the real, sound is indeed the expressor. If the opponent objects that it cannot express, that contradicts worldly convention. Therefore, the text below states: "Speech is not distinct from expressors, as is commonly understood by gods and humans."