成唯識論了義燈 3.31

3.31

In refuting name, phrase, and phoneme, it says: if name, phrase, and phoneme were substantially existent apart from sound, this refutes the non-Buddhist position. The Yaoji hypothetically sets forth the opponent's counter-objection: "Should the nominal, non-concurrent name and so forth not be expressors, because they are nominal?" Or: "Do you accept that, apart from the sound āyatana, they are subsumed under the dharma āyatana of non-concurrent nominal dharmas, like other nominal dharmas?" Ximing explained: "Your name, phrase, and so forth cannot be established as real substances, as refuted previously. If one does not accept that sound is an expressor, there would be the fault of lacking the pramāṇa of authoritative testimony among the pramāṇas." This explanation is inadmissible, because it was not refuted previously. Furthermore, the opinions of Mahāyāna masters differ: Dignāga did not establish the pramāṇa of authoritative testimony, because others accept it as real. The Yaoji states: "The opponent constructed an inference with contradiction, yet that inference incurs the fault of establishing what is already accepted by the thesis." We now say this is not so. If the inference stated "not real expressors," there could be the fault of establishing what is already accepted; but it merely states "not expressors." How could that be called establishing what is already accepted? We now say: that inference has the fault of contradictory decisiveness in the reason, because nominal and real as reasons, as well as being subsumed under the dharma āyatana apart from the sound āyatana, are mutually accepted by each side, so there is no fault for the Mahāyāna. If the opponent says that nominal name, phrase, and phoneme are not nominal expressors and regards this as a contradiction, this is also not a fault. Why? The Mahāyāna inference refutes them, saying: "Your name, phrase, and phoneme are definitively incapable of expressing; because they are distinct from sound; like form and so forth." Now, if one constructs an inference against the Mahāyāna stating: "Nominal name, phrase, and phoneme are not nominal expressors," among the contradictions in pramāṇa, what kind of contradiction is it? With respect to the Mahāyāna inference, it is entirely without fault. Moreover, because Mahāyāna names and so forth are not distinct from sound, subsuming the nominal under the real, sound is indeed the expressor. If the opponent objects that it cannot express, that contradicts worldly convention. Therefore, the text below states: "Speech is not distinct from expressors, as is commonly understood by gods and humans."