成唯識論了義燈 3.4

3.4

The treatise says: "If the conditioned characteristics are distinct from the substance of that which is characterized, etc.": The inference states: "Your unconditioned characteristics; should exist separately from substance; because of the expression 'characteristics of [it]'; just like conditioned characteristics." However, someone explains: "This inference has the fallacy of inconclusiveness for the other (parānekānta). It says: for dissimilar instances such as solidity, the statement of 'characteristics of [it]' is an inconclusive fallacy." This also has no fault, because it resides in the thesis; for since they accept its existence, the general challenge forces it to have this distinct existence. Moreover, it says: "You have no fallacy of self-contradiction." The inference of Ximing states: "The substance of the unconditioned characteristic; should be distinct from that which is characterized; because it is subsumed under either the conditioned or the unconditioned; just like conditioned characteristics." Someone explains: "This inference has [the fallacy of the reason being] unestablished for both (ubhayāsiddha), because the reason 'subsumed under either the conditioned or the unconditioned' exists in that which is characterized, but is absent in the characterizing mark." This is also not so. The conditioned characterizing mark is conditioned, and the unconditioned characterizing mark is also unconditioned; how could the unconditioned characterizing mark be among the conditioned, so as to say it is absent in the characterizing mark? The Yaoji follows this by saying that this explanation is superior, and further refutes the other, saying: "The substance of your conditioned characteristics is not distinct from that which is characterized, or there should be no distinct real characteristics serving as characteristics; because it is subsumed under either conditioned or unconditioned characteristics; just like unconditioned characteristics." The Yaoji says: "Some say and some explain that solely for this inference, there is the fallacy of contradicting the property of the subject (dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana) in the reason of this inference." The inference states: "The substance of conditioned characteristics; should not be a designated non-concurrent formation; because it is subsumed under either the conditioned or the unconditioned; just like unconditioned characteristics." Hence, one should only refute them by analogy through principle, and should not formulate an inference—this statement is incorrect. Why is that? Because in setting up the thesis it says "the substance of your conditioned characteristics", which refutes the opponent's inference in terms of the opponent's own tenet and does not establish one's own [position]; how could it formulate a contradiction of the property of the subject against the author of the treatise? Furthermore, designated not being distinct from that which is characterized, real not being distinct from that which is characterized, having distinct real existence, and not having distinct real existence—these are distinctions. However, according to formulating a contradiction, it is a contradiction with the property of the subject (dharmiviśeṣa), so it should omit the word "having". If formulated as a contradiction with the property of the subject, it is a distinction. Moreover, even if it were so, the contradictory inference they establish would also have this fault, since real-existent non-concurrent and non-real-existent non-concurrent are the intended distinctions. Formulating the inference as real-existent non-concurrent, now one formulates a contradiction of the property of the subject against it. The inference states: "Your real conditioned characteristics; should not be real-existent non-concurrent formations; because they are subsumed under either the conditioned or the unconditioned; just like unconditioned characteristics." Therefore it cannot constitute a contradiction with the essence of the locus or a contradiction with the property of the subject; that is, it demonstrates that their setting up a distinct characterizing mark apart from the conditioned, like Yajñadatta's clothing and so forth, has the inference's decision of contradiction with the essence of the locus (dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana) and decision of contradiction with the property of the predicate (dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana). Furthermore, the faults are as before; thus what was said and explained is without fault.