成唯識論了義燈 3.47

3.47

問：疏中立量，如第六識緣張人時，張人身中餘一切法皆應緣著，雖就他宗為此比量，大乘自宗定心緣時，得張人身一切法不？若不得者應非現量，不得自相故。若許得者。人是假法，共相無體，現量證智如何得緣？答：現量心緣，得自相者，各附己體，而分明得知和合法，假說為人。非作一解，名得自相。釋燒心口，外人返難：如汝定心及五、八識得法自相，緣火之時何不燒心？答：宗計有別。汝執言說得自相者，如似身根得火自相，即覺燒熱，火以燒熱為自相故，心等亦然。既得自相，何不燒熱？此就外道難，非大乘宗。大乘宗者，根非所燒，而言得自相者，各附己體，分明而得，非分別貫通餘法名得自相，不同外道。若外道餘乘，各執言說，得法自相，亦同身根，故作此難。大乘不爾，故自無過。言今緣青作青解者，此比量知不稱前法，如眼識緣色，稱自相故不作色解。後起意識，緣色共相，作青等解。問：前言緣瓶雖不堅執是非量收，非青青解何名比量？答：瓶依多法作一解，不稱法體非量收，青不依多順法體，由有分別比量攝。若爾定心作青等解不？若不作解，云何遍處勝處作青等觀？若作青等解，定心應比量。答：雖作青解，各附自體，不貫通餘。得是現量，不淨觀等，准此可知。問：言假智詮依共相轉，為緣故名轉，為行解名轉，若緣故名轉，共相體無，智緣何起？答：共相雖依本質自相增益似有，假智緣時還依本質以變相分。質、相俱無彼共相體。智但緣相，不能緣著彼之共相，義說共相以為所緣，顯詮緣不著，名依共轉。或於行解，亦得名轉，但生行解，無彼共相。若爾何故名依共相轉？答：依共相解轉。若爾行解緣用有何差別？答：如我執心所緣無我，而自執情妄作我解，即緣妄解能執心生。故《論》云：起自心相，分別許度，執為實我，起自心相。疏有兩解：此依後解。法執亦然。此假智詮，雖非堅執，行相似彼，若爾行解所取及以共相，俱無體性，何得成緣？答：假智緣時，隨其所應，必定質相，心方得生，故成緣義。非無相質，而心獨起。問：既論色體實非青、黃，然假智詮詮緣青時，為遮、為表，若但是遮，應無所詮緣。如何實色等，說有青、黃等？若亦有表，即詮緣青等，如何說言不得自相？答：如似色言依法假立，非體如言，即實是色，青等亦爾，但遮於餘，意欲表此。說通遮、表，非以有表，即得自相，五、八緣時，不作色非色、青非青等解，但證相緣，故得自相。

Question: In the commentary, an inference is established: when the sixth consciousness cognizes a person named Zhang, all other dharmas within Zhang's body ought to be cognized. Although this inference was formulated with respect to other schools, when the concentrated mind (samāhitacitta) in our own Mahāyāna school cognizes, does it grasp all dharmas in Zhang's body or not? If it does not grasp them, it ought not to be direct perception (pratyakṣa), because it does not grasp the individual characteristic (svalakṣaṇa). If one admits it does grasp them, a person is a conceptual dharma and the common characteristic has no real entity; how could the verifying wisdom of direct perception cognize it? Answer: When the direct perception mind cognizes, grasping the individual characteristic means that each adheres to its own substantial entity and distinctly knows the aggregated dharmas, which are nominally designated as a person. It is not that forming a single conceptual understanding is termed grasping the individual characteristic. In explaining the burning of heart and mouth, the non-Buddhist raises a counter-objection: "If your concentrated mind and the five and eighth consciousnesses grasp the individual characteristic of dharmas, why does cognizing fire not burn the mind?" Answer: The doctrines of our schools differ. You hold that verbal designation grasps the individual characteristic; just as the body faculty grasps the individual characteristic of fire and immediately feels the burning heat—since burning heat is the individual characteristic of fire—the mind and so forth should be likewise: having grasped the individual characteristic, why is it not burned? This objection applies to non-Buddhists, not to the Mahāyāna school. In the Mahāyāna school, faculties are not what is burned; and as for saying that it grasps the individual characteristic, each adheres to its own substantial entity and grasps it distinctly; it is not that a conceptual discrimination runs through other dharmas to be called grasping the individual characteristic, unlike the non-Buddhists. If non-Buddhists and other vehicles each hold that verbal designation grasps the individual characteristic of dharmas, it would also be identical to the body faculty, and hence this objection was raised. Mahāyāna is not like this, so it is inherently without error. Regarding the statement that now cognizing blue produces the understanding of blue: this is inferential knowledge and does not match the preceding dharma, just as the visual consciousness cognizing visible form does not produce an understanding of "visible form" because it conforms to the individual characteristic. The subsequent mental consciousness, cognizing the common characteristic of visible form, produces the understanding of "blue" and so forth. Question: It was previously said that cognizing a vase, although not a firm clinging, is subsumed under non-valid cognition (apramāṇa); why is producing the understanding of blue upon non-blue termed inference? Answer: A vase relies on multiple dharmas to form a single understanding; because it does not match the substantial entity of the dharmas, it is subsumed under non-valid cognition. Blue does not rely on multiple dharmas and conforms to the substantial entity of the dharmas; because it possesses conceptual discrimination, it is subsumed under inference. If so, does the concentrated mind produce an understanding of blue and so forth or not? If it does not produce that understanding, how could the totality-bases (kṛtsnāyatana) and mastery-bases (abhibhvāyatana) cultivate the contemplation of blue and so forth? If it does produce an understanding of blue and so forth, the concentrated mind ought to be an inference. Answer: Although it produces the understanding of blue, each adheres to its own substantial entity without running through others. It succeeds in being direct perception; the contemplation of foulness (aśubhabhāvanā) and so forth can be known following this principle. Question: It is said that metaphorical cognition (prajñapti-jñāna) and verbal expression operate reliant on the common characteristic; do they operate because of cognizing it as an object, or do they operate because of active understanding (ākāra)? If they operate because of cognizing it, the common characteristic has no real entity; upon what does the cognizing wisdom arise? Answer: Although the common characteristic is superimposed as a seeming existence based on the individual characteristic of the archetype, when metaphorical cognition cognizes, it still relies on the archetype to transform the objective aspect. Neither the archetype nor the objective aspect has the entity of that common characteristic. Wisdom merely cognizes the aspect and cannot grasp that common characteristic; figuratively we speak of the common characteristic as the cognitive object, revealing that verbal expression and cognition do not reach the reality, which is called "operating reliant on the common characteristic." Alternatively, it may also be termed operating with respect to active understanding: it merely produces an active understanding, but lacks that common characteristic. If so, why is it called operating reliant on the common characteristic? Answer: It operates reliant on the understanding of the common characteristic. If so, what difference is there between active understanding and cognitive operation? Answer: Just as the mind that clings to a self has no real self as its cognitive object, yet out of its own clinging disposition it falsely produces an understanding of a self, and the clinging mind arises by cognizing this false understanding. Hence the treatise states: "Arising from its own mental aspect, it discriminatively supposes and clings to it as a real self." Regarding "arising from its own mental aspect," the commentary has two interpretations; this follows the second interpretation. Attachment to dharmas is also like this. Although this metaphorical cognition and verbal expression are not firm clingings, their mental mode resembles them. If so, if that which is grasped by active understanding and the common characteristic are both without substantial entity, how do they become an objective condition (ālambanapratyaya)? Answer: When metaphorical cognition cognizes, according to what is appropriate, there must be an archetype and an objective aspect before the mind can arise; therefore, the meaning of condition is established. It is not that the mind arises alone without an objective aspect or archetype. Question: Since the substantial entity of visible form is genuinely neither blue nor yellow, yet when metaphorical cognition and verbal expression express and cognize blue, is it by exclusion (apoha) or by affirmation (vidhi)? If it is solely exclusion, there should be no expressed or cognized object; how could real visible form and so forth be said to have blue, yellow, and so on? If there is also affirmation, when expressing and cognizing blue and so forth, how can it be said that one does not grasp the individual characteristic? Answer: Just as the word "visible form" is metaphorically established based on dharmas and its substantial entity is not literally as the word suggests—being real visible form—so it is with blue and so on: it merely excludes the others with the intention of affirming this. The explanation applies to both exclusion and affirmation; it is not that because there is affirmation, it thereby grasps the individual characteristic. When the five and eighth consciousnesses cognize, they do not produce an understanding of form or non-form, blue or non-blue, but merely verify the aspect and cognize it, and therefore they grasp the individual characteristic.