成唯識論了義燈 5.61

5.61

十一善法所有別相，論各自說。如信以淨為相，慚等雖善非淨為相，慚以崇重，愧以輕拒等。然《要集》云：實、德、能三是信別相，或可是境，以決定相是信別相。今謂不爾，實、德、能三定是信境不勞說。或《論》云：於實、得、能心淨為體。若實、德、能是信別相，豈於別相自生信耶？若以決定為信別相，勝解何殊？若云：此說所取境相非，說能取自相者，如何說云或可此三是信境體，非信別相？又云：可慚可愧為二所緣，准下應云：信應可信，受應可受，慚即可崇，愧以可拒。此為別相，餘皆准知者。此亦難知，實、德、能三即信所緣，順、違、俱非是受所領慚、愧等法。下文既言隨緣何境，豈於苦、集可崇，滅、道可拒耶？若云論說皆有崇重及輕拒義，如何前云：可慚、可愧是二所緣，豈即不緣滅等體耶？今解之者，自性各殊境或通局，如慚、愧二及無貪嗔，皆云：隨緣何境，餘或有別，即所樂決定等。然心所中，諸論上下有說所緣境別相者，即可定知。有不說者，既未見文，不可臆定。

The specific characteristics of each of the eleven wholesome dharmas are stated individually in the treatises. For instance, faith takes purity as its characteristic; though shame and so forth are wholesome, they do not take purity as their characteristic, but shame takes veneration and embarrassment takes disdainful avoidance, and so forth. However, the Yaoji says: 'The three—truth, virtue, and ability—are the specific characteristics of faith; or perhaps they are the object, while the characteristic of ascertainment is the specific characteristic of faith.' Now I say: this is not so. Truth, virtue, and ability are definitely the objects of faith, there is no need to say 'or perhaps'. The Śāstra states: 'Mental purity regarding truth, virtue, and ability is its essence.' If truth, virtue, and ability were the specific characteristics of faith, could faith generate faith in its own specific characteristics? If ascertainment were the specific characteristic of faith, how would it differ from resolve (adhimokṣa)? If it is said: 'This speaks of the perceived objective characteristic, not the subjective self-characteristic,' how could one say: 'Or perhaps these three are the objective essence of faith, not the specific characteristic of faith'? Furthermore, it says: 'What should be shamed and what should be embarrassed are the two objects of focus; following this, one should say: faith should take what can be trusted, feeling should take what can be experienced, shame takes what can be venerated, embarrassment takes what can be avoided—these are the specific characteristics, and the rest should all be known accordingly.' This is also difficult to understand: truth, virtue, and ability are precisely the objects of faith; agreeable, disagreeable, and neither are what is apprehended by feeling, shame, embarrassment, and other dharmas. Since the text below says 'whatever object it cognizes', could it be that regarding suffering and origination it is to be venerated, while cessation and the path are to be avoided? If it is said that the treatises state all possess the meaning of veneration and avoidance, why was it said earlier that what should be shamed and what should be embarrassed are their two objects of focus—could it be that they do not cognize the essence of cessation and so forth? Now I explain it as follows: their self-natures are distinct, and their objects are either comprehensive or restricted, just as both shame and embarrassment, as well as non-greed and non-hatred, are said to 'cognize whatever object', while others may have distinctions, namely what is desired, ascertainment, and so forth. However, among mental factors, where the treatises above and below speak of the specific characteristics of the cognized object, this can be definitely known; where they do not speak of it, since no text is seen, it cannot be arbitrarily determined.