成唯識論了義燈 5.61

5.61

The specific characteristics of each of the eleven wholesome dharmas are stated individually in the treatises. For instance, faith takes purity as its characteristic; though shame and so forth are wholesome, they do not take purity as their characteristic, but shame takes veneration and embarrassment takes disdainful avoidance, and so forth. However, the Yaoji says: 'The three—truth, virtue, and ability—are the specific characteristics of faith; or perhaps they are the object, while the characteristic of ascertainment is the specific characteristic of faith.' Now I say: this is not so. Truth, virtue, and ability are definitely the objects of faith, there is no need to say 'or perhaps'. The Śāstra states: 'Mental purity regarding truth, virtue, and ability is its essence.' If truth, virtue, and ability were the specific characteristics of faith, could faith generate faith in its own specific characteristics? If ascertainment were the specific characteristic of faith, how would it differ from resolve (adhimokṣa)? If it is said: 'This speaks of the perceived objective characteristic, not the subjective self-characteristic,' how could one say: 'Or perhaps these three are the objective essence of faith, not the specific characteristic of faith'? Furthermore, it says: 'What should be shamed and what should be embarrassed are the two objects of focus; following this, one should say: faith should take what can be trusted, feeling should take what can be experienced, shame takes what can be venerated, embarrassment takes what can be avoided—these are the specific characteristics, and the rest should all be known accordingly.' This is also difficult to understand: truth, virtue, and ability are precisely the objects of faith; agreeable, disagreeable, and neither are what is apprehended by feeling, shame, embarrassment, and other dharmas. Since the text below says 'whatever object it cognizes', could it be that regarding suffering and origination it is to be venerated, while cessation and the path are to be avoided? If it is said that the treatises state all possess the meaning of veneration and avoidance, why was it said earlier that what should be shamed and what should be embarrassed are their two objects of focus—could it be that they do not cognize the essence of cessation and so forth? Now I explain it as follows: their self-natures are distinct, and their objects are either comprehensive or restricted, just as both shame and embarrassment, as well as non-greed and non-hatred, are said to 'cognize whatever object', while others may have distinctions, namely what is desired, ascertainment, and so forth. However, among mental factors, where the treatises above and below speak of the specific characteristics of the cognized object, this can be definitely known; where they do not speak of it, since no text is seen, it cannot be arbitrarily determined.