成唯識論了義燈 6.37

6.37

《論》：「三熏習義。」疏有五門。然西明釋云：眼等五識見、相能熏，亦名表義，表義第六之所引故。又眼識等相分，所熏為三因緣，第八、第六，及自相分。今謂不爾，為二識因自及第八，如何與六作因緣耶？第六相分自能熏故，眼等不緣第六相故。又云，第七相但顯境，從顯境生，第七見分體即顯境，亦前念生，而名顯境，而無表義，亦非意識緣名引故。今謂此釋義猶有餘，依有漏說義則可爾，表義名言，得通無漏，平等六引，豈不緣名，許隨六引隨緣何境，通亦為勝。西明云：二執現惠不俱故無兩惠，斷有前後，以能斷道，有差別故，一現熏成兩種。今謂不爾，若以斷有前後，一現熏成兩種，種子、現行性相同故，何不生於兩現？又後現、種俱說斷故，又前自斷熏習雖三，隨義分三，而能熏一，故成一種，二執現一，何故熏二？又前自云：眼識所熏相分，既生三現，為成一種，為三種耶？答：有二解，一云生三；一云生一。引三藏判一種為勝，三識既不恒俱，界地有無復別，許熏成一。二執斷雖前後，依識界地無差，如何即令別種？由此應知，所有我執及煩惱障，必與法執及所知障，同種而生，然有法執及所知障，不與我執及煩惱障同種，如二乘無學所起執障，現熏成種，餘有同異准此類知。

Regarding the treatise's "The meaning of the three perfumings": The commentary has five sections. However, Ximing explains: The seeing and object components of the five consciousnesses such as the eye [consciousness] are capable of perfuming and are also called expressional (adhivacana), because they are induced by the sixth [consciousness] that expresses meaning. Furthermore, the perfumed object component of the eye consciousness, etc., acts as a cause-condition (hetupratyaya) for three: the eighth, the sixth, and its own object component. Now I say this is not so. It acts as a cause for two consciousnesses—itself and the eighth; how could it act as a cause-condition for the sixth? Because the object component of the sixth consciousness is itself capable of perfuming, and the eye [consciousness] and the others do not apprehend the object of the sixth. Furthermore, he says that the object component of the seventh only makes the object manifest, arising from making the object manifest; the seeing component of the seventh is essentially that which makes the object manifest, also arising from the previous moment, and is called making the object manifest, yet it lacks expressional capacity, nor is it induced by the mental consciousness apprehending names. Now I say that this explanation still has shortcomings. If explained according to the sāsrava, the meaning is acceptable; however, expressional nominal perfuming can extend to the anāsrava: when induced by the sixth in the state of equality, how could it not apprehend names? It is superior to allow that whatever object it apprehends in following the inducement of the sixth is also applicable. Ximing says: Because the active wisdoms of the two grasps do not occur simultaneously, there are not two wisdoms; their severing has a prior and posterior because the paths capable of severing differ, so one active [state] perfumes to produce two seeds. Now I say this is not so. If, because their severing has a prior and posterior, one active [state] perfumes to produce two seeds, since the nature and characteristics of bīja and samudācāra are identical, why would it not produce two active states? Furthermore, later active states and seeds are both said to be severed. In addition, previously he himself concluded that although the perfumings are three, divided into three according to meaning, the perfumer is one, and therefore establishes one seed; if the active state of the two grasps is one, why should it perfume two? Furthermore, he previously asked himself: Since the object component perfumed by the eye consciousness produces three active states, does it form one seed or three seeds? The answer gives two explanations: one says it produces three; one says it produces one. He cited the Tripiṭaka Master as determining that one seed is superior. Since the three consciousnesses are not always concurrent, and their presence in realms and stages also differs, it is accepted that they perfume to form one [seed]. Although the severing of the two grasps is prior and posterior, their reliance on the consciousnesses, realms, and stages has no difference; how could they be made distinct seeds? From this one should know that all ātmagrāha and kleśāvaraṇa must arise from the same seed as dharmagrāha and jñeyāvaraṇa; however, there is dharmagrāha and jñeyāvaraṇa that does not share the same seed with ātmagrāha and kleśāvaraṇa, as in the grasps and hindrances arisen in the aśaikṣas of the two vehicles, where the active state perfumes to form seeds. The other similarities and differences can be inferred by analogy to this.