成唯識論了義燈 7.104

7.104

二云前四位中有能、所取空相，與相分空相不一、不異：無別體故，不異；有無別故，非一。然彼空相唯是所緣，非緣，以無體故。當情現者，從緣生故，是所緣緣，故說觀心帶有無相。今謂：二釋俱傳為謬，何者且初解云「初二觀所取空，後二觀能取空」？不應道理。世第一法雙印二空，即雙觀二空，豈印二空而不觀耶？第二釋中緣二取空，所變空相名為有者，豈可唯欲除此相分之有相，不除識性之相分耶？不爾，如何言「現前立少物，謂是唯識性，以有所得故，非實住唯識。」復如何言後觸無所得？故知觀二取為空，觀識及性為有，猶帶此二，故不證真。不可唯說緣空相分說之為有。

The second states: In the former four stages, there are the appearances of the emptiness of grasper and grasped, which are neither identical to nor different from the appearance of emptiness in the objective aspect (nimittabhāga): because there is no separate substance, they are not different; because there is the distinction of existence and non-existence, they are not identical. However, that appearance of emptiness is solely an object of cognition and not an act of cognition, because it has no substance. That which appears directly to the mind is produced from conditions and is thus an objective condition (ālambanapratyaya); therefore it is said that the contemplating mind carries the appearances of existence and non-existence. I now maintain: Both explanations are transmitted in error. Why so? First, the initial explanation says, "The first two contemplate the emptiness of the grasped, and the latter two contemplate the emptiness of the grasper." This is unreasonable. If the mundane supreme dharmas confirm both of the two emptinesses, they simultaneously contemplate both emptinesses; how could they confirm the two emptinesses without contemplating them? In the second explanation, when taking the emptiness of the two graspers as an object, the transformed appearance of emptiness is called existent; how could one wish only to eliminate this appearance of existence belonging to the objective aspect, and not eliminate the objective aspect of the nature of consciousness? If not, how could it say: "Establishing a slight object before the mind, considering it to be the nature of vijñapti-mātra, because there is something attained, one does not truly abide in vijñapti-mātra"? Furthermore, how could it say that later one touches the non-attainable? Therefore, we know that contemplating the two graspers as empty and contemplating consciousness and its nature as existent still carries both of these, and thus one does not realize the truth. One cannot say that it is called existent solely because it takes the objective aspect of emptiness as an object.