成唯識論了義燈 7.104

7.104

The second states: In the former four stages, there are the appearances of the emptiness of grasper and grasped, which are neither identical to nor different from the appearance of emptiness in the objective aspect (nimittabhāga): because there is no separate substance, they are not different; because there is the distinction of existence and non-existence, they are not identical. However, that appearance of emptiness is solely an object of cognition and not an act of cognition, because it has no substance. That which appears directly to the mind is produced from conditions and is thus an objective condition (ālambanapratyaya); therefore it is said that the contemplating mind carries the appearances of existence and non-existence. I now maintain: Both explanations are transmitted in error. Why so? First, the initial explanation says, "The first two contemplate the emptiness of the grasped, and the latter two contemplate the emptiness of the grasper." This is unreasonable. If the mundane supreme dharmas confirm both of the two emptinesses, they simultaneously contemplate both emptinesses; how could they confirm the two emptinesses without contemplating them? In the second explanation, when taking the emptiness of the two graspers as an object, the transformed appearance of emptiness is called existent; how could one wish only to eliminate this appearance of existence belonging to the objective aspect, and not eliminate the objective aspect of the nature of consciousness? If not, how could it say: "Establishing a slight object before the mind, considering it to be the nature of vijñapti-mātra, because there is something attained, one does not truly abide in vijñapti-mātra"? Furthermore, how could it say that later one touches the non-attainable? Therefore, we know that contemplating the two graspers as empty and contemplating consciousness and its nature as existent still carries both of these, and thus one does not realize the truth. One cannot say that it is called existent solely because it takes the objective aspect of emptiness as an object.