成唯識論了義燈 2.160

2.160

In refuting sabhāga, recounting the opponent's rescue that external dharmas are not realms of rebirth, hence sabhāga is not posited [for them], one should challenge: 'Rebirth realm' (gati) means 'tending towards'; external dharmas may not be rebirth realms, but since sabhāga is not explained through 'tending towards', how can one use rebirth realms as a parallel for sabhāga? If rebirth realm means 'tending towards', external dharmas have no sabhāga; but if sabhāga means 'similarity', then on the basis of external dharmas being similar, sabhāga should be posited. Furthermore, I challenge your original premise: internal dharmas are rebirth realms, so sattvas have sabhāga posited; external dharmas are not sentient rebirth realms, so external dharmas have no sabhāga. Your original premise held that because there is common cognition, internal dharmas have sabhāga; external dharmas also have common cognition, so how can they lack sabhāga? How can you rescue it by saying external dharmas are not rebirth realms, and therefore sabhāga is not posited? The above challenges the ancient [masters]; below challenges the Nyāyānusāra masters. The rest of the alternating challenges and rescues are all as recounted in the Commentary. In stating the correct view, it is asked: does the Mahāyāna posit sabhāga on the basis of external, insentient things or not? Answer: Based on the meaning of similarity, sabhāga is nominally posited; thus it applies to both internal and external. The ten-door analysis is as explained in the Pivot. Question: If sabhāga is posited across all things, why do the cited sūtras say 'this deva-sabhāga, this human-sabhāga', and do not speak of the rest? Answer: The sūtra speaks of sattvas based on what is prominent and superior. Since it is nominally designated based on similarity, what fault is there in extending its positing to the external? By this, having refuted the other school, conversely to them, it is nominally posited externally.