成唯識論了義燈 2.2

2.2

In stating the Sāṃkhya and other theories of self, it says: "The self grasped by you, etc." Stating the thesis, setting up the syllogism (prayoga), and identifying their fallacies are as in the Commentary and the Shuji / Shuyao. However, in the Shuyao, the first syllogism is assigned the fallacy of a reason contradictory to the special property of the subject (dharmi-viśeṣa-viparīta-sādhana); an alternative explanation also gives the fallacy of a reason contradictory to the essential nature of the subject (dharmi-svarūpa-viparīta-sādhana). The subject of the grasped self is precisely what is disputed, because space is not a self. The syllogism runs: "The self grasped by you should not be a self; because it is accepted to have no beginning or end; like space." Another explanation: Although one debates with the opponent over the existence or non-existence of a self, there is still no concordant example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta); hence one skillfully reveals the self to be permanent, pervasive, etc. If one accepts it to be permanent and pervasive, it exists apart from consciousness. Following this, there is the fallacy of contradicting the essential nature of the subject, and the rest may be inferred accordingly. In the third syllogism, the Shuyao states: "The reason 'conforming to the body' has the fallacy of being unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha); on the concordant example of space, it is absent, and thus it is an inconclusive reason that is too exclusive (asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika). For the thesis of being permanent and pervasive, space is the concordant example, and a pot is the discordant example (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta). The reason 'conforming to the body and performing action, etc.' is absent from both the concordant and discordant examples." The Yaoji says: "The character of this inconclusive reason that is too exclusive is difficult to understand. Since space is universally accepted to be pervasive and permanent, one cannot reduce it to a discordant example." That [author], because of misreading the character "pot" (瓶) in cursive as the cursive character "difficult" (難), supposed that the Shuyao reduced space to a discordant example. Thus he challenged the Shuyao, saying: "One cannot take space as a concordant example and then challenge it as a discordant example. Furthermore, the two examples are not juxtaposed; how could one say it is absent from both? Therefore, one should say this is the fallacy of unestablished predicate in the example (sādhyavikala). Taking this as certain," he did not reflect: not knowing that the character was a copyist's error, he labored in vain. He also says: "Or perhaps, space is the concordant example, and other dharmas such as form are the discordant example. The reason 'acting and experiencing according to the body' is present in some and absent in other discordant instances; hence it becomes contradictory." Now I say this is not so: regarding the Sāṃkhya, one should say 'experiencing pleasure and pain according to place'; one cannot say 'performing karma', because the other school does not accept it. Apart from the self, nothing else experiences pleasure and pain. For the Vaiśeṣika, only the self performs karma and experiences pleasure and pain, while form and the like do not either. How could one say it is present and absent among discordant instances? He also says: "The former Shuyao's explanation of the special property of the subject represents one master, but according to another master, the explanation is slightly different: namely, if the property (dharma) and subject (dharmin) are explicitly stated in the thesis, both are called essential nature (svarūpa); what is intended in the thesis and whose character extends to other dharmas is called the special property of the predicate (dharma-viśeṣa); what resides solely in one dharma and does not extend to other dharmas is called the special property of the subject (dharmi-viśeṣa). For instance, when Dharmapāla confronted Nanda and others, intending to prove that the eighth consciousness uses the seventh consciousness as its simultaneous support (sahabhū-āśraya), he did not explicitly state that the seventh is the support. He expediently formulated: 'The ālayavijñāna must have a simultaneously born distinct support; because it is of the nature of consciousness; like the six consciousnesses.' This reason contradicts the special property of the subject. The counter-syllogism runs: 'The ālayavijñāna should not receive perfuming and hold seeds; because of being of the nature of consciousness; like the sixth.' Receiving perfuming and holding seeds resides solely in the eighth; hence it is a special property of the subject." Now I say this is not so. Consider the syllogism concerning 'having an object-support' (sālambanatva): is it contradictory to the special property of the subject? Does one take solely 'having an object-support' as the special property, or does one also take 'not having an object-support' as the special property? If one also takes 'not having an object-support' as the special property, 'not having an object-support' does not reside solely on the subject. If one takes solely 'having an object-support' as the special property, to what is it a special property, and what is contradicted? Moreover, 'not having an object-support' is also not explicitly stated; why would it not be a special property? If one says that what is specified resides solely in one dharma, like 'the true use for another' (parārthatva) which also resides solely in one dharma, then it should not be a special property of the predicate. Furthermore, as when the Sāṃkhya establishes that thought (cetanā) is the self: 'self' is explicitly stated and is termed the essential nature. Is the self that experiences fruition or the self that does not experience fruition, which is implicitly intended, called a special property of the subject or a special property of the predicate? If it is called a special property of the predicate, its character does not extend to others. If it is called a special property of the subject, it resides on the currently present dharma; further, one cannot claim that the Sāṃkhya may only establish that the self is thought and cannot establish that thought is the self—there is no distinct justification. Moreover, the Nyāyamukha says: 'Observing what is established by them, one establishes dharma and dharmin, non-quality and quality.' The intent here is that the self-nature and the special properties of all dharmas are named dharma or dharmin according to what is established; it is not fixed that the self-nature is always called the subject and the special properties of dharmas are always called the predicate. Furthermore, the example of the six consciousnesses also contradicts the essential nature, since they are not the ālaya; thus it should contradict both, not merely the special property. He also says: 'For example, when a Mahāyāna master confronts a Hīnayāna master, intending to establish the seventh consciousness, he does not explicitly state that there is a seventh consciousness. He expediently formulates: 'The definitively established manovijñāna must have a simultaneously born adhipati distinct support; because it is included under any of the definitively established six consciousnesses; like the five consciousnesses.' This reason is contradictory to the special property of the predicate (dharma-viśeṣa-viparīta-sādhana). The counter-syllogism runs: 'The definitively established manovijñāna does not use the seventh as its simultaneous distinct support; because it is included under any of the definitively established six consciousnesses; like the five consciousnesses.' Not taking the seventh as a distinct support extends to the eighth; hence it is a special property of the predicate.' If one examines this according to the hetuvidyā refutation of 'use for another', this also fails. One should say: 'Because it takes what is not the seventh consciousness as its simultaneous distinct support; because the five sense faculties such as the eye are not the seventh consciousness.' If one says: 'Not taking the seventh consciousness as its simultaneous distinct support merely negates and does not affirm, and there is no distinct dharma contradicting the seventh,' then for what is it a reason? Only after deep reflection will this be understood.