成唯識論了義燈 2.3

2.3

In the chapter 'Refuting the Self', it says: 'Grasping the self as permanent and pervasive, its inference is like space; it should not experience pleasure, pain, etc. conforming to the body.' If this were a syllogism accepted by both (saṃbhāṣā / ubhayasiddha), both thesis and reason would be unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha), for Buddhism does not accept a permanent, pervasive self. If it were Buddhism's own inference (svānumāna), the thesis would have self-contradiction, the reason would be unestablished for oneself (svayam-asiddha), and it would also have an unestablished locus for oneself (svāśrayāsiddha). Space lacks substantial entity, so it lacks both-unestablished; taking the unconditioned space as the support is permissible. Here, it is an inference for the opponent (parānumāna), framed to refute the opponent; the setting aside of fallacies is as in the Commentary.