成唯識論了義燈 3.33

3.33

When the Treatise says: "If it is claimed that on sound..." and so forth, it quotes and refutes, which is readily understood. However, the inference in the original Commentary states: "The modulation of sound should not be apart from that on which it relies, possessing a distinct real substance subsumed under the dharma āyatana; because it is a modulation on the form aggregate; or because it is a modulation on either of the two forms, form or sound; like length on the form āyatana." The Yaoji states: "This inference has a distinction of the subject. The inference with the distinction of the subject states: 'The modulation of sound should not be apart from sound; being nominally subsumed under the dharma āyatana.' The reason and example are as before." This is also not so. Who accepts that the substance of sound is subsumed under the dharma āyatana? It is because name and so forth are accepted as being in the dharma āyatana. Name and so forth rely on sound, yet are not identical to sound. Now, in counter-refuting the other position, they posit that modulated sound is itself name and so forth, existing apart from sound and subsumed under the dharma āyatana; hence, length and so forth are cited to construct an inference to refute them. However, Ximing states: "Your long and short on form should be distinct from the form āyatana, having a distinct intrinsic nature of the dharma āyatana; because they have modulation; like modulation on sound." This inference is also faulty. One should say: "Your long and short on form should be distinct from the form āyatana and subsumed under the dharma āyatana; because they are modulations on form; like modulation on sound." Now stating that long and short should be distinct from the form āyatana and possess a distinct intrinsic nature of the dharma āyatana means that the various dharmas such as arising on long and short, being subsumed under the dharma āyatana, are themselves long and short, distinct from the form āyatana and possessing this intrinsic nature of the dharma āyatana of arising and so forth—this phrasing is faulty. Furthermore, the inference says: "The modulation on sound should lack a distinct substance that is an intrinsic nature of the dharma āyatana; because it is modulation; like modulation on form." The fault of this phrasing should be understood as identical to the previous one. If one follows that phrasing, there is also the fault of contradicting the property of the subject. Question: If one says that modulation on sound, because it can reveal meaning, possesses the nature of teaching, and is cognized by mental consciousness, is nominally established in the dharma āyatana as name and so forth, and the opponent says "my school also holds this"? The Mahāyāna resolves it: name and so forth are not nominally established merely relying on sound, but generally rely on multiple dharmas, and thus are subsumed under the dharma āyatana, which is not the case for length and so forth. Question: This is based on cognizing the nominal versus cognizing the real. If based on the school where the five consciousnesses only cognize the real, length and so forth, being cognized by the mind, should be subsumed under the dharma āyatana. If one says that although they are cognized only by the mind, they are clearly grasped based on the eye, and therefore are not in the dharma āyatana, then the clear grasping of modulated sound is also like this and should be in the sound āyatana. If based on cognizing the nominal, modulated sound is also cognized by the ear consciousness, so it should be subsumed under the sound āyatana. Furthermore, the ear consciousness should also cognize name and so forth, because they are just the modulation. Now, the correct explanation says: for the Mahāyāna master, although the substance of modulation on sound is not real, it is still subsumed under the dharma āyatana and spoken of as name and so forth based on subsuming the nominal under the real. It does not directly take the substance of modulated sound itself as name and so forth; rather, taking the expressive function on modulation, it is called name and so forth, like the mindless samādhi and so forth. One merely takes the function on the seed that can prevent mental activity, not the seed substance itself; the same applies to characteristics and so forth, hence it is subsumed under the dharma āyatana. Long and short forms lack an expressive function like modulated sound. In terms of their intrinsic natures, both are subsumed under their own āyatanas; the Mahāyāna does not accept that the substance of modulated sound is in the non-concurrent formations, because the latter is neither matter nor mind, whereas this is matter. Even if the five [consciousnesses] cognize the nominal, the ear consciousness merely grasps the substance of modulated sound and does not grasp the expressive function; therefore, the āyatanas that subsume them are distinct. In the Commentary, merely drawing an analogy between modulated sound and long, short, and so forth is temporarily following the other school as an inexact explanation. And subsuming the nominal under the real to say that sound can express is not the separate approach of defining intrinsic nature and function. Taking the substance of sound as name, phrase, phoneme, and so forth is therefore correctly explained below. However, nominal establishment of the collections of names, phrases, and phonemes based on the distinctive states of spoken sound has many more questions, answers, and divergent interpretations, which are omitted here to avoid prolixity.