成唯識論了義燈 3.34

3.34

[Regarding] the text of the Śāstra: “If it is claimed that on sound…,” the other’s saving inference is: “The inflection of tone upon sound cannot be an expressive designator; because it is an inflection of sound; like the sound of strings and pipes.” The inflection of tone upon sound is the subject (dharmin), and cannot be an expressive designator is the predicate (dharma). The Shunyao states: The author of the treatise constructs an incompatibility with a particularity of the subject (dharmisvarūpa-viparītasādhana) for him. Internal sound's inflection can produce names and so forth, or cannot produce names and so forth—this is the particularity. Therefore the Śāstra states: “This [internal sound] should, like that sound, not distinctively produce names and so forth.” First it adduces the similar example, and then it adduces the thesis property. Thus the syllogism is constructed: “Your internal sound's inflection cannot produce names and so forth; because it is an inflection of sound; like the sound of strings and pipes.” This is from the standpoint of the other tradition, because in their view the sound of strings and pipes does not produce names and so forth; taking internal sound to be like that sound of strings and pipes. There is another explanation that makes it a reason incompatible with the particularity of the predicate (dharmaviśeṣa-viparītasādhana). Refuting: “Internal sound's inflection cannot distinctively produce real names and so forth; precisely because it is an inflection of sound; like the sound of strings and pipes.” This explanation is incorrect. According to the text of the other’s syllogism, “inflection” is the subject, not the predicate; how could it be called a particularity of the predicate? The Yaoji says: This refutes the branch; positing inflection as having two kinds. As for the reason incompatible with the particularity of the predicate: distinctively producing names and so forth is not an expressive designator, and not distinctively producing names and so forth is not an expressive designator. Therefore it is a particularity of the predicate. This too is incorrect. The other tradition says that sound is not the expressive designator, whereas names and so forth are the expressive designators; distinctively producing names and so forth or not producing names and so forth resides in sound, not in non-expressiveness. How could one say that distinctively producing names and so forth is non-expressive, and not distinctively producing names and so forth is non-expressive? If non-expressiveness were the particularity of the predicate, the Śāstra ought to say, “This, like that expressive designator, does not distinctively produce names and so forth.” Why does it say, “like that sound”? Ximing says: The Miśrakābhidharma-hṛdaya permits sound born of both causes (mahābhūta), like strings and pipes, etc. The Kośa refutes this. The Nyāyānusāra defends: “Who says that a single paramāṇu is created by two kinds of great elements? It is only in terms of assisting conditions that sound born of both causes is asserted.” Here it directly refutes what is stated in the Miśrakābhidharma-hṛdaya. This statement is inaccurate. The “born of both causes” in the Miśrakābhidharma-hṛdaya refers precisely to strings and pipes, etc., which appear to have expressive capacity, but are not real expressive designators. The Nyāyānusāra is also the same; why say that it solely refutes the Miśrakābhidharma-hṛdaya and not also the Nyāyānusāra? Why is that? The original Commentary states: “I also do not say that inflection on strings cannot express; it is merely like your created persons whose bodily and vocal karmas are neither of a good nor evil nature. Now, in our [view, sound] being born of both causes…” The meaning of this is: previously conforming to your school, inflection of sound was said to be like strings and pipes, which do not produce names and so forth and are neither good nor evil in nature. It is also like what you say of a created person whose bodily and vocal actions are neither good nor evil. In our [view], the sound of strings and pipes is born of both causes; thus, nominally it extends to good and evil, and it is also accepted as being capable of expressing. Like sounds from a forest preaching the Dharma, manifestations detached from physical substance, etc., all extend to good, etc.