成唯識論了義燈 3.77

3.77

The Treatise says: 'Because consciousness takes discernment as its mental aspect (ākāra).' The basic commentary explains: 'The self-substance division of consciousness takes discernment as its mental aspect (ākāra); therefore, the mental aspect is the seeing division (darśanabhāga). By analogy, the substance is also like this.' According to the view that the seeing division is named the mental aspect, xíng ('operating/proceeding') should be read in the level tone (píngshēng), because the seeing division can operate upon the aspect of the object (xíng yú jìngxiàng); thus this seeing division gets the name 'operating on the aspect' (xíngxiàng). Evaluating and accepting the first explanation, it says: 'However, the original [meaning] is simply the meaning of operating upon the aspect. That "by analogy the substance is also like this" means that since the mental aspect is unknowable, by analogy the substance is also like this.' However, Ximing's commentary, in clarifying 'having the same object of cognition but different mental aspects', proposes three interpretations altogether and evaluates the third as superior. The third explains the word 'mental aspect' (行相, xíngxiàng) as: discernment, reception, etc., are each different, hence they are called 'not having the same mental aspect'. In this sense, xìng is read in the departing tone (qùshēng), which is precisely the cognitive understanding (xíngjiě) of the cognizing consciousness. Another explanation says: Because it operates upon the aspect, or because it proceeds carrying the aspect, it is called xíngxiàng. This is in the level tone. 'Aspect' (相) applies to both reflex image and archetype. This agrees with the basic commentary. However, the Yaoji evaluates and accepts the third explanation, agreeing with Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva, who both took the appearance of cognitive understanding as the mental aspect (ākāra), and this treatise also states that the functions of discernment, reception, etc., are each different. [The Yaoji claims that] if one takes 'operating upon the aspect' as the meaning of xíngxiàng, it is feared this is not the treatise's intention; furthermore, one should not say that the mental aspects are different, as this contradicts both teaching and reason, since the operating of the mind and mental factors upon the aspect of the object is without difference, so how could one say they are different? Now I say this evaluation is mistaken. Why? Generally speaking, there are three kinds of 'aspect/operation' (xíngxiàng): 1. The object is called xíngxiàng, namely the sixteen aspects of the truths; 2. The cognizing operation is called xíngxiàng, namely the twelve aspects of the Dharma-wheel; 3. Operating upon the aspect is called xíngxiàng, namely non-conceptual wisdom, and so forth. The first two are restricted, while the latter is comprehensive. Here the word 'discernment', though a cognizing operation, is explained from the comprehensive perspective. The third transforming [consciousness] is distinguished according to the restricted [sense], saying that it discerns object aspects coarsely. The Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says that that consciousness cannot discern, so it does not apply to non-conceptual wisdom. The second transforming [consciousness] is also explained from the comprehensive perspective, because it constantly deliberates upon the aspect of non-self; or the aspects mutually imply each other, as appropriate to cause or fruition. Therefore, the basic verse of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'The mental aspect of the bodhisattvas / Furthermore, regarding the cognitive object, / Is non-conceptual wisdom; / Its cognizable object is without aspect.' Asvabhāva's commentary explains: 'Because it operates similarly regarding the cognitive object, it is called xíngxiàng.' This explains the xíngxiàng of the first line: since it says 'it operates similarly, hence it is called xíngxiàng', it clearly should be read in the level tone, not in the departing tone. But the subsequent treatise says: '"Its cognizable object is without aspect" means stating the mental aspect produced by this wisdom regarding the realm of tathatā.' This means that non-conceptual wisdom cognizes the realm of tathatā with a mental aspect of mental orientation free of all marks; taking this as the mental aspect explains the fourth line. It re-clarifies that when the mental aspect of non-conceptual wisdom operates within the aspect of the object, it does not produce the appearance of cognitive understanding; this is not the direct explanation of the term xíngxiàng. Question: 'Aspect' is the object, and 'operating' is the mind; how can one say that discernment is called xíngxiàng? Answer: That which is capable of operating upon the aspect is called xíngxiàng. This is a bahuvrīhi compound, or [if interpreted as] 'the operation of the aspect', a tatpuruṣa compound. One cannot object: 'If taking operating upon the aspect of the object as the name xíngxiàng, it contradicts teaching and reason, because the operating of the mind and mental factors upon the aspect of the object is without difference.' This objection means: The treatise says that the functions of consciousness, sensation, conception, etc., are each distinct, so [your view] contradicts the teaching; since the functions of the mind and mental factors are each distinct, if one takes operating upon the aspect of the object, then since the primary mind and mental factors cognize the same [object], how could they be distinct? This objection is incorrect. When the Treatise says that the functions of discernment, reception, etc., are each distinct, it speaks in terms of the capable-of-operating, not in terms of that which is operated upon. Consciousness is capable of discerning, operating upon the aspect of the object; sensation is reception, operating upon the aspect of the object. When it says the functions are each distinct, it refers to the difference in the function of grasping the object. It does not refer to a difference in the function of cognitive understanding grasping various object aspects at the time of cognizing an object. This is because non-conceptual wisdom does not produce distinct mental aspects of various objects. Although subsequently attained wisdom and discriminatory mind produce various cognitive understandings at the time of cognizing an object, this is not taken to explain the mental aspect of consciousness, because it is not pervasive. Now, the intention of the basic treatise is simply to take the arising of the mind operating upon the aspect of the object as the meaning of xíngxiàng, which applies comprehensively to all. It does not take cognitive understanding as the meaning of xíngxiàng, because that is not comprehensive to all. Furthermore, this directly explains the word 'discernment' of the fundamental consciousness: if one were to take the appearance of cognitive understanding as the mental aspect, it would profoundly violate the treatise's meaning, because the fundamental consciousness functions spontaneously without cognitive understanding. If one restricts the explanation of mental aspect to subsequently attained [wisdom] and discriminatory mind, one may designate it as mental aspect in terms of cognitive understanding.