成唯識論了義燈 3.78

3.78

The Treatise says: 'Their objects of cognition are similar, but their mental aspects are distinct.' The basic commentary cites the first fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi, 'having the same object of cognition, but not the same mental aspect', for which there are three explanations; Ximing gives three interpretations. The third interpretation says: '"Having the same" has two senses: 1. Being singular, hence called having the same; this is the basic commentary's perspective regarding the archetype (bimbabhāga). 2. Being similar, hence called having the same; this is the basic commentary's perspective regarding the reflex image (nimittabhāga).' The Shuyao gives five explanations; later authors' numerous explanations do not go beyond these. Various schools do not understand this and rigidly cling to one explanation, pointing out faults in it. The Yaoji makes another judgment. A certain explanation refutes the basic commentary: 'If "having the same" is defined in terms of the archetype, then the manovijñāna that lacks an archetype should not be associated [with mental factors].' [The Yaoji] says this refutation is reasonable, and that this treatise refers solely to the reflex image and does not extend to the uncontaminated (anāsrava), because the treatise says: 'However, when contaminated consciousness arises in its self-substance, it manifests resembling the aspects of cognizer and cognized.' As for the first fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi applying to both contaminated and uncontaminated, this is also not so. Although it says that when contaminated [consciousness] arises it manifests resembling the two, below it extends to the rest; hence citing the sūtra verse, 'All is awareness alone,' in establishing the three divisions it says: 'However, when the mind and mental factors arise one by one, each possesses three divisions.' Thus it is not solely contaminated. If because the previous clause merely states 'when contaminated consciousness arises' one proves that it relies solely on contaminated consciousness, then likewise in the Yogācārabhūmi, where it says 'having the same object of cognition, not the same mental aspect', it would only apply to the eye consciousness and the manovijñāna and not extend to the other consciousnesses, since it is directly explaining the eye consciousness and the co-arising manovijñāna. Since that [treatise] allows it to extend [to all], why should this treatise be restricted? Therefore, we know that the basic commentary profoundly grasped the treatise's meaning.