成唯識論了義燈 4.3

4.3

The treatise says: "Attention means having the nature of being able to alert the mind." Does it alert in the state of seeds or in the state of manifest activity? Answer: In accordance with what various masters say, alerting extends across both states. The primary commentary holds that it is in the state of seeds, not in manifest activity. Both Ximing and the Yaoji disagree with the primary commentary, saying that the two explanations of the treatise apply across both seeds and manifest activity. As the Treatise on the Five Aggregates says: "It means having the nature of causing the mind to awaken." The first fascicle of the Xianyang says: "Arising reliant on the mind, operating together with and associated with the mind. Having the movement of mind as its substance, and directing the mind as its activity." According to the Sarvāstivāda, they themselves have two explanations: the Za xin relies on the manifest, hence that treatise says: "One who recalls awakens to the condition, one being in the characteristic of arising." The eleventh fascicle of the Nyāyānusāra says: "That attention is directly present means that it directly arises in proximity and makes its own object present." That is, at the very time of arising, about to enter the present, it grasps the meaning of its own object. The Mahāyāna also has two explanations. One relies on the Xianyang: present attention alerts the simultaneously associated mind, the text being as cited earlier. The second relies on this treatise: striking and stimulating the seed of the mind that is to arise into manifest activity, it directs the manifest mind to proceed toward the object of cognition. However, in explaining this treatise, there are themselves two interpretations: one holds that this future seed of attention alerts the future seed of the mind that ought to arise, thereby causing the mind to proceed toward its own present object; the second says that present attention alerts the present seed of the mind that ought to arise, directing that manifest mind to proceed toward its own object. This latter interpretation is superior. We now hold that this is not so. If one follows the Sarvāstivāda, the Nyāyānusāra is correct, that is, the Za xin lun has awakening toward what will be cognized as its nature; it agrees with the Nyāyānusāra. If it were like that, it would not be the correct view. If one follows the Mahāyāna, there is also only a single explanation. The Treatise on the Five Aggregates says: "It means being able to cause the mind..."—the seed of the mind can also be called mind, because it does not say "having the nature of causing the manifest mind to awaken." If one relies on the Xianyang, which says: "Born from the seeds of the ālayavijñāna, arising reliant on the mind, operating together with and associated with the mind, having the movement of the mind as its substance." The first two lines exclude the doctrines of other traditions; "arising reliant on the mind" shows the meaning of a mental factor; "operating together with the mind" excludes arising before or after; "associated with" excludes simultaneous material faculties, thereby explaining the meaning of association for mental factors. Only with "having the movement of mind as its substance" does it reveal its own entity. Moving the mind that ought to arise as its substance—this is precisely the seed-mind. If it were directly present, it would already have directly arisen; why call it "ought to arise"? Since it has already arisen into manifest activity, why would it need to be alerted further? If alerting means causing it to understand, this is the capability of discernment; if alerting means causing it to proceed toward an object, it is not different from activity. If alerting means causing it to arise, once it has arisen, why alert it? If it is said: Since a present cause is allowed to give rise to a present fruit, what is there to prevent alerting the mind in the present?—this is not so. Because when a seed in the present gives rise to a present mind, although both are in the present, it requires that which is able to give rise to that which has not yet arisen. If when the seed exists, that manifest activity already exists, why would the seed need to arise? If present faculties and so forth do not cause arising, they merely serve as a support. If they were able to cause arising, then whenever the faculties exist, consciousness should constantly arise, just as with attention: when there is a manifest factor capable of alerting, there must be a mind. If it is said: If it is capable of alerting in the state of seeds, then it belongs to the future, and since the future has no entity, how could it alert?—this is not so. Mahāyāna causality is profound, marvelous, and beyond words; viewing the manifest activity that is about to arise, the future is provisionally posited. Although it is in the state of seeds, together with the manifest activity it produces, it is also directly present. This is the tenet of Dharmapāla; there is no need for differing views. A coarse examination makes it seem like present alerting, but subtle investigation reveals the principle of alerting to be hard to see. However, the Yogācārabhūmi says: "What is attention? It means having the nature of turning around"—this is identical with the Xianyang. "Turning around" and "movement" are similar in meaning and intent, so they are reconciled as before. One should not posit a different master's view here. What is refuted by the treatise as turning toward merely refutes the Hīnayāna.