成唯識論了義燈 4.93

4.93

Regarding the Śāstra's statement: "If [it is] an intensely prominent object," and so forth: Ximing says that here there is a single proposition: the object is superior while the mind is not superior, which refers to the abrupt mind. Here there should also be [a case where] both the mind of equal outflow and the object are superior, which is already subsumed within the preceding mind of equal outflow. Now I say this is not so. To prove that the five are continuous, it says that upon encountering a superior object, by principle it must be continuous, definitely not abrupt. An abrupt mind cannot endure for many kṣaṇas; if one allowed that the abrupt mind is continuous with its own kind, one should cite the Yogācārabhūmi: "From the abrupt mind, it proceeds even up to continuation." Why does it say "after the determinate mind," and so forth? The previous text has already proven that the equal outflow overturns the preceding abrupt [mind]. From "encountering a superior object" onward, it overturns the preceding non-superior object, not saying it is solely abrupt. The previous text provisionally referred to a generic mind of equal outflow, where the mind is superior and the object is not superior; here, the refutation refers to both the mind and the object being superior. Alternatively, the former refutation was in terms of the continuity of the mind proceeding toward the object, whereas this refutation is in terms of the continuity of the object, which is superior and presses upon the mind together with it, causing the mind to be continuous. Thus the two passages are distinct. Now, according to this text, it corresponds to the latter two minds, and is therefore subsumed under the proposition where both are superior.