成唯識論了義燈 7

English (machine translation) 7

Language: English

7.1

Composed by Bhikṣu Huizhao of Dayun Monastery in Zizhou

Regarding the Śāstra's statement: "Relying precisely on the previously expounded three natures," and so forth: to explain this order of prior and posterior, there are briefly three interpretations. The first says that naturelessness was stated first, and the three natures were expounded later. Now resolving the external objection, it refers to the Śāstra's saying "relying precisely on the three natures clarified previously," in which the World-Honoured One in the sūtras subsequently explained the three kinds of naturelessness. Although previously he generally stated that all dharmas are natureless, he did not explicitly expound the three kinds of naturelessness. It was only later that he differentiated that what was called non-existent relies on the three natures, which is why it says "established in that subsequent teaching," not that naturelessness was expounded only after the three natures. Just as the first fascicle resolves an external objection: "If there is only consciousness, why do worldly people and the holy teachings speak of self and dharmas?" The author of the Śāstra answers: "The expounded self and dharmas are both transformations relying on consciousness." It does not mean that vijñapti-mātra was expounded first and self and dharmas later. This explanation also accords with the three periods of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra.

7.3

Question: Since the three natures were expounded later and naturelessness was stated first, why do this Śāstra, the Saṃdhinirmocana, and others clarify the three natures first?

7.4

Answer: Wishing to reveal that naturelessness necessarily relies on the three natures, they are therefore presented first.

7.5

Why is this? Because that which imagines everywhere necessarily relies on what is imagined in order to give rise to false grasping; therefore they are presented first.

7.6

Question: If so, why does the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra expound the three natures first?

7.7

Answer: There, Bodhisattva Guṇākara first asked: "In terms of what, and to what extent, are skilled bodhisattvas established?" The World-Honoured One answered him: "In terms of these three natures, and to the extent of these three natures, skill is designated." It was not the beginning of questions and answers regarding the expounded three natures. Just as in the Treatise on the Hundred Dharmas the questions and answers regarding all dharmas and non-self were not previously unexpounded.

7.8

Furthermore, in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata did not bring up the previously expounded three natures as his question, but merely cited the World-Honoured One's earlier teachings on skill regarding the aggregates, truths, and the like, asking why he again established that all dharmas are without self-nature. This clarifies that the three natures were not expounded earlier. Now an outsider cites the sūtra to object to the previous explanation here, so the author of the Śāstra answers that he does not contradict that teaching, having expounded naturelessness later.

7.9

Another explanation says that the sūtras earlier and later expounded the three natures and naturelessness, so the present Śāstra states "relying precisely on this prior." "This prior" encompasses both: relying on what is prior to this treatise, and relying on the prior expounding of the three self-natures in the sūtras; out of intention (abhiprāya) observing the inclinations of sentient beings, he later established naturelessness. Now this is reconciled to show that they do not contradict each other.

7.10

Question: Why were the three kinds of self-nature expounded first and naturelessness expounded later?

7.11

Answer: To accord with the inclinations of capacities, and wishing to reveal that naturelessness relies on the three natures. Therefore the Prakaraṇāryavācā (fascicle 16) states: "One should know that naturelessness is not separate from self-nature; therefore the meaning of the three self-natures is expounded first."

7.12

Question: If so, why is the teaching of the three natures called the third period? It should be the second period, because it precedes emptiness. Furthermore, according to the Saṃdhinirmocana, they occur in the same assembly of one sūtra and are not prior and posterior.

7.13

Answer: The sūtra's distinction of the three periods is not in terms of prior and posterior, but only by the characteristics of categories: proceeding from existence as the first, emptiness as the second, and both as the third. Since among the three self-natures the imagined is empty and the remaining two exist, it corresponds to the third. Furthermore, these three periods are expounded with respect to the class of bodhisattvas of gradual enlightenment, not in view of sudden enlightenment.

7.14

If so, why expound the definitive meaning first and state the non-definitive later?

7.15

Answer: The Avataṃsaka and other sūtras state: "Like the rising sun first illuminating the high mountains." In the Mahāyāna teaching, those of sudden enlightenment mature first, so the three natures are first; those of gradual enlightenment are accomplished later, so naturelessness is expounded later.

7.16

If so, this again contradicts the Lotus Sūtra and other teachings, which take emptiness as the second expounded for gradual enlightenment and emptiness and existence as the third; how can one say that for gradual enlightenment emptiness is expounded later?

7.17

Answer: In terms of the two natures of sudden and gradual, naturelessness is later. In terms exclusively of gradual enlightenment, the beginning, middle, and end are distinct, and emptiness is the second. In this treatise, both the prior and posterior of the teachings for sudden and gradual are covered; therefore it says that relying precisely on the three natures previously heard by bodhisattvas of sudden enlightenment, he later implicitly established naturelessness for those bodhisattvas of gradual enlightenment, so there is no contradiction. The meaning clarified in the fundamental commentary contains both interpretations, which accords with the sūtra text having existence first and emptiness later. Another explanation is: the two teachings are not fixed as prior and posterior; the Saṃdhinirmocana provisionally addresses a class for whom it is suitable to hear existence and emptiness as prior and posterior. When the Śāstra states "relying precisely on this prior" and so forth, this accords with the Avataṃsaka: the Tathāgata with a single voice pronounces an ocean of boundless sūtras. Each has a rationale, left to one's disposition to accept or reject. However, the second is superior, because it differentiates according to the text and capacities.

7.18

Regarding the Śāstra's statement: "Although the dependent nature is not the ultimate," and so forth: "not" means non-existence. Because it lacks the principle/meaning that is the object of non-conceptual wisdom, it is called "ultimate naturelessness" (paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā). Therefore the Prakaraṇāryavācā (fascicle 16) states: "Due to lacking an ultimate nature." The meaning here is: the dependent being called ultimate naturelessness has two meanings. First, because the entity of the dependent is not of an ultimate nature, it is called ultimate naturelessness; "lacking" means not being. Second, because the dependent lacks a nature of spontaneous arising, it is also called naturelessness.

7.19

If so, it should be called "naturelessness of ultimate arising" (paramārthotpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā); why is it merely called "ultimate naturelessness"?

7.20

Answer: The phrase "ultimate absence" means absence of that ultimate. If one said "absence of arising," one might fear that arising from conditions is also absent. Furthermore, because it does not lack the absence of arising, it merely says "ultimate absence." Furthermore, it would be confused with the two natures, being both ultimate and absent of arising. Since the absence of arising has already been expounded previously, now only ultimate absence is expounded, so it does not duplicate absence. Furthermore, the dependent not only lacks spontaneous arising, but its imagined characteristics are also absent; therefore it does not say absence of arising. Furthermore, lacking that ultimate absence does not mean it does not lack characteristics and arising; in terms of being the object-principle of non-conceptual wisdom, the dependent is not such, hence it says "not the ultimate."

7.21

Question: Why is it not called "non-ultimate naturelessness" (aparamārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā), but instead called "ultimate naturelessness" (paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā)?

7.22

Answer: To reveal the implicit meaning, it is called ultimate naturelessness: the ultimate is the nature revealed by the absence of characteristics and the absence of arising. Furthermore, it reveals that on the dependent, the ultimate nature is absent; that is, the nature of ultimate absence is also called ultimate naturelessness. Omitting the word "of" (zhī 之), it is collectively called ultimate naturelessness nature.

7.23

How is it known that there is the word "of"?

7.24

Answer: The Saṃdhinirmocana (fascicle 2) states: "Because it is revealed by naturelessness." If differentiated by confronting the four conventional and ultimate truths, the dependent is also the object-principle of the supreme subsequent wisdom. In terms of direct apprehension, the object-aspect (nimittabhāga) of subsequent [wisdom] can also be a pure object of cognition, called ultimate. The Saṃdhinirmocana and other texts only speak of the fundamental pure object of cognition, saying that the dependent arising is not a pure object of cognition. Furthermore, ultimate has three meanings: first, the principle of the supreme; second, having the supreme as its principle; third, the supreme that is itself the principle. These apply to both fundamental and subsequent [wisdom]. All four kinds of ultimate truth possess these three; only the first conventional truth does not possess these three and is not called ultimate.

7.25

If so, why is tathatā alone expounded?

7.26

Answer: Because of the desire to reveal the true nature of all dharmas. Therefore the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra states: "Because it is the ultimate truth of all dharmas, and because it is revealed by naturelessness." Thus the present Śāstra calls it the "real nature of consciousness." The Yaoji fails to understand this, claiming that what was originally expounded contradicts the sūtras and is an erroneous explanation.

7.27

Question: If the dependent is not the ultimate, and one also calls the dependent the ultimate naturelessness; then since the perfected is not dependently arisen, can one also call the perfected real the naturelessness of arising?

7.28

Answer: They are not analogous. If in terms of negative expression (apoha), it is not the naturelessness of arising, hence calling it "naturelessness of arising" means that the perfected is not the nature of the naturelessness of arising. If in terms of positive expression, it is the naturelessness of arising, so calling it "naturelessness of arising" reveals that it is the nature of the preceding two natures. Therefore they are not analogous. The Yaoji states that "they are analogous and all admissible," but based on this one knows it is wrong. Furthermore, the fundamental commentary states that the dependent is also subsequent [wisdom's] object, and the principle of the supreme is called ultimate, which immediately cuts off contradiction with the sūtra. Calling the dependent and the like the naturelessness of characteristics and so forth—from what sacred teaching does this derive? Thus it is not an error.

7.29

Regarding the treatise's statement, "Yet it would be confused with the second; therefore this is not stated": Ximing says, "It was feared that this ultimate truth of the dependent [nature] would be confused with the second, the naturelessness of birth; therefore, this is not stated." The Yaoji says, "[This explanation is] superior." Now I state that this is not so. That sūtra and treatise speak of two ultimate truths, the dependent being the first and the fully perfected the second; it was feared that the ultimate truth of the dependent would be confused with the second, the ultimate truth of the fully perfected. This is a qualification to eliminate confusion made by contrasting their explanations as ultimate truth; what relevance does it have to the naturelessness of birth? If one feared confusion and qualified that, why would qualification be necessary? What is meant here is: the ultimate truth of all phenomena is the true nature of vijñapti-mātra. Because the former is not the true nature, it is qualified for fear of confusion. If, because the dependent was feared to be confused with the naturelessness of birth, it is not spoken of as the ultimate naturelessness of nature, then it should also follow that the dependent is termed fully perfected, yet out of fear of confusion with the second, the dependent nature, it would not be spoken of as fully perfected. Since it is named ultimate truth based on a distinct meaning, its meaning does not generate confusion with the naturelessness of birth, so there is no need to qualify it; but since they share the name 'ultimate truth', confusion would arise, so qualification is necessary.

7.30

Question: Why are all three kinds called "the nature of naturelessness" (niḥsvabhāvatā)?

7.31

Answer: Take, first, the nature of the naturelessness of characteristics. The initial words "naturelessness of characteristics" refer to the original nature of the phenomenon: its characteristic lacks substantial essence. Repeating the word "nature" (tā) means that it is established by teaching as a nature. The intention is to show that with regard to the naturelessness of characteristics, it is spoken of as the naturelessness of characteristics; it is not meant that there is an existing nature called naturelessness. The other two should be understood accordingly.

7.32

Question: Why does the sixteenth chapter of the Xianyang only say "the naturelessness of characteristics" and so forth, without saying "the nature of the naturelessness of characteristics"?

7.33

Answer: That text abbreviates the original nature and merely presents the designation. Hence that treatise says: "It should be known that based on the three types of naturelessness, three types of naturelessness are taught: first, the naturelessness of characteristics, which refers to the parikalpita-svabhāva, because this nature lacks substantial entity and characteristics." The meaning is: to speak of the naturelessness of characteristics is to speak of the parikalpita-svabhāva; because its substantial entity is non-existent, it is called the naturelessness of characteristics. The others should be understood accordingly.

7.34

Question: Since all three natures are non-existent, why does the Saṃdhinirmocana speak only of the parikalpita and the pariniṣpanna as unborn, unceasing, and so forth, but does not speak of the naturelessness of birth as unborn, unceasing, and so forth?

7.35

Answer: It is not that the parikalpita-svabhāva arises from separately contemplating the three own-natures; rather, parikalpita-svabhāva is superimposition across both natures collectively, and it is said that the parikalpita nature is unborn, unceasing, and so forth. That is to say, it covers the parikalpa on both the dependent and the fully perfected, and it does not intend to state that those two, the dependent and the fully perfected, are non-existent. One cannot say that the nature of the naturelessness of birth is unborn, unceasing, and so forth, because it has arising and ceasing. The substance of the fully perfected is eternal, so it is unborn and unceasing; its nature is not defiled, so it is originally quiescent. This is fully explained in the second fascicle of the Saṃdhinirmocana and the seventy-sixth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi.

7.36

Regarding the treatise's statement, "meaning that one possesses the two kinds of gotra of the Mahāyāna", and so forth: The gotra of original nature explains the naturally endowed nature, and explains the presence or absence of the nature, primary and secondary, hidden and manifest, as extensively distinguished in the Nengxian zhongbian huiri lun. However, Yogācārabhūmi 35 says: For all bodhisattvas, the excellence of the six āyatanas has such characteristics, handed down successively from beginningless time and acquired naturally; this is named the gotra abiding in original nature.

7.37

Of the four explanations by Ximing, the second is correct: it takes the anāsrava innate seeds as primary to distinguish them from the absence of gotra, hence they are called "excellent"; one cannot adduce the stage of fruition and so forth to name the six āyatanas. The Shanjie jing says they refer to the skandhas, dhātus, and six āyatanas; thus we know the six āyatanas are the internal six āyatanas. Among the internal six āyatanas, the mental faculty āyatana subsumes the anāsrava seeds; it is [one of] the six āyatanas, but it is not the case that all six āyatanas across the board can hold seeds. Nor can one say that it fully manifests the internal and external six āyatanas of the stage of fruition, because the external six āyatanas do not hold seeds, and because causal nature is what is spoken of.

7.38

However, an objection is raised: If being in the internal six āyatanas is called "excellent", the innate [seeds] and the perfumed habituation from hearing of the two vehicles, as well as the seeds of persons without gotra, are also in the six āyatanas—how could they be called "excellent"? Therefore, the six stages are taken: the stages of accumulation, application, seeing, cultivation, virtual awakening, and wondrous awakening are named the six āyatanas. This too is incorrect.

7.39

Although Yogācārabhūmi 21 explains the śrāvaka with the same intent as this, saying, "Attached to the basis there are such characteristics, subsumed under the six āyatanas, handed down successively from beginningless time"—could it be accepted that the Hīnayāna also has these six stages? If one says this is spoken according to the undetermined [gotra], what about the determined gotra? Moreover, how could it say "subsumed under the six āyatanas, handed down successively from beginningless time"? Could the seeds of the six stages be naturally differentiated?

7.40

If so, and bodhisattvas are the same as the two vehicles, why are they called "excellent"? Answer: For now, in contrast to those without gotra, they are collectively called "excellent"; it is not solely by being distinguished from the small [vehicle] that they obtain the name "excellent". If one does not accept that the small [vehicle] is also called "excellent", it contradicts fascicle 21, which says: "Such seeds do not have distinct characteristics in the six āyatanas; within the excellence of the six āyatanas in such categories and stages, they are handed down successively from beginningless time and acquired naturally." Moreover, from this passage, "six āyatanas" refers solely to the six internal āyatanas, not to the stages of fruition and so forth.

7.41

Regarding the acquired gotra (samudānīta-gotra): The basic commentary says: Having heard the true Dharma, causing the anāsrava to increase is named the acquired gotra, manifesting the cause of attaining Buddhahood and entry into realization of vijñapti-mātra. Sāsrava is not the primary; it cannot genuinely awaken, nor is it the primary acquired nature, though what is secondary is also included. The second fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun says: Among the perfuming of hearing, those that are sāsrava in nature induce superior karmic maturation, but do not produce the path of seeing and so forth. Although there are innate seeds, because of the perfuming of hearing, they are also named hearing-perfuming. For instance, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the Yogācārabhūmi both say that the basis of extensive hearing-perfuming is a vāsanā not subsumed within the nature of the ālayavijñāna. If one were to take what is sāsrava as subsumed within the ālaya, why would they say it is not subsumed? Furthermore, Asvabhāva's commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "To increase the seeds capable of contacting the dharmakāya means to wish to increase all extensive hearing-perfuming of the Mahāyāna, because with this as precursor, one attains the dharmakāya."

7.42

Question: From which stage onward is it called the acquired nature?

7.43

Answer: From the stage of adhimukti-caryā onward, they are all called bodhisattvas of the acquired gotra. The gotra of original nature is based on the innate anāsrava seeds prior to generating the aspiration [for awakening]; the acquired gotra is based on the seeds perfumed and formed after generating the aspiration. The Bodhisattvabhūmi (Dichi lun) states: If it is obtained through previously cultivating wholesome [dharmas], it is named the acquired gotra. When Yogācārabhūmi 35 says, "It refers to what is obtained through previously habituating roots of wholesomeness; this is named what is accomplished through practice," this is spoken in terms of manifest characteristics to distinguish it from what has not yet been perfumed through habituation; it does not mean that initial practice is not called the acquired nature. Thus Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā 13 states that there are four [factors] conforming to liberation: first, conforming to liberation based on reliance, which means that from the desire for wholesome dharmas up to seeking liberation, all are called factors conforming to liberation. Since they are named "factors conforming to liberation", they are therefore the acquired gotra.

7.44

Ximing explains: Prior to the ten faiths is named the gotra of original nature; from the ten practices onward is named the acquired gotra. Another explanation states: In the first fascicle of the Renwang, the ten abidings, ten practices, and ten dedications are, in order, the acquired [gotra], the original nature [gotra], and the path [gotra]. The Pusa benye jing is also the same, not stating that the ten faiths are the acquired gotra. And when the Renwang speaks of the thirty persons of the noble womb of subduing forbearance, it tentatively adduces skillful means to speak of the ten faiths, not that the ten faiths themselves are the acquired gotra. Furthermore, faith is of two kinds: first, the ten faiths of the stages, which are prior to the ten abidings, so the Benye jing states: Before ascending to the ten abidings, there are bodhisattvas with the names of the ten abidings who constantly practice the ten minds of faith and so forth; second, the ten faiths of practice and understanding, which extend to the ten abidings and above, that is, the ten abidings, ten practices, and ten dedications, which correspond in sequence to the bodhisattvas of the three stages of acquired gotra, original nature gotra, and path gotra. It states that the faiths of the stages are not named the acquired gotra. Now I state: This is not so. If one initially determines that only from the ten practices onward is it named the acquired nature, would bodhisattvas of the ten abidings not be subsumed under the acquired [gotra]?

7.45

Furthermore, the statement that in the first fascicle of the Renwang the ten abidings, ten practices, and so forth are in sequence the acquired, the original nature, and so forth, and that the Benye jing is the same in not mentioning the ten faiths, is incorrect. In the first fascicle of the Renwang, there are no separate names for the ten abidings, practices, and dedications; rather, faith, stopping, and firmness correspond respectively to the acquired, original nature, and path gotras. One must not contradict the text and judge the ten faiths and so forth to be the three skillful means, not subsumed under the abidings and so forth. That the Benye jing and others do not mention the name of the ten faiths is because they speak according to the general stages without discussing distinct practices, on the basis that the ten faiths are subsumed under the ten abidings. Where there are separate descriptions, it is because the first abiding is difficult, so the ten faiths are separated out, just as the four roots of wholesomeness are difficult within the inner gate. In the tenth dedication stage, the roots of wholesomeness are separately opened; since they are subsumed under dedication, the ten faiths are definitely subsumed under the ten abidings. The Renwang, Avataṃsaka, Upāsakaśīla-sūtra, and so forth all speak of forty-two stages of worthy ones and nobles, not fifty. Furthermore, it is said that the ten faiths and so forth are skillful means for the ten abidings and so forth, and thus are subsumed under the abidings and so forth, just as the initial sāmantaka belongs to and is subsumed under the primary dhyāna. Moreover, if the stages of the ten faiths are prior, and in the Renwang jing there are additionally the ten wholesomeness bodhisattvas, could there be fifty opened prior to the bhūmis? Furthermore, that the ten faiths of the stages are prior to the ten abidings while the ten faiths of practice and understanding extend to the ten abidings and above has no scriptural authority. If one says that the Benye jing says that before ascending to the ten abidings there are bodhisattvas with the names of ten stages who constantly practice the ten minds of faith and so forth, proving that the ten faiths of the stages are prior to the ten abidings, how much time of cultivation is spent in this stage? Moreover, in the Renwang jing, one practices the bodhisattva path for ten thousand kalpas before entering the ten faiths; could there be another ten thousand kalpas prior to the faiths of the stages for the ten wholesomeness stage? Since this is not established, the ten faiths of the stages should not be separated either. Furthermore, even granted that they are separately opened, what prevents them from being the stage of the acquired gotra? The Renwang jing and other texts divide the stages of kings in the stage of the acquired gotra, stating that the bronze-wheel-turning king is of the acquired gotra; it does not say that what precedes is not, but only that up to this point it is the acquired gotra. It is just that the prior practice is not yet superior and does not obtain the bronze wheel; based on when practice becomes superior, one obtains the bronze wheel stage, and it says that the acquired gotra acts as a bronze-wheel-turning king. If so, the gotra of original nature and so forth should also extend to the prior stages. Answer: They are not analogous. It is in the stage of the acquired gotra that other distinctions are made based on earlier and later, superior and inferior. Furthermore, after explaining the gotra of original nature, the "Bodhisattvabhūmi" next explains the generation of the aspiration [for awakening], and the generation of the aspiration is precisely the stage of the acquired gotra. One cannot say that generation of the aspiration is named only after the stage of non-retrogression, for the lower text further states that both retrogression and non-retrogression are named generating the aspiration. In the Lotus Sūtra, Śāriputra and others had generated the great [aspiration] and retrogressed, yet the Buddha said: "What you have practiced is the bodhisattva path." It also says: "Causing you to generate the mind of omniscient knowledge still remains without being lost." Therefore, we know that collectively it is named generating the bodhicitta, and not only non-retrogression.

7.46

Furthermore, fascicle 47 explains the thirteen abidings, stating: The abiding of practice in adhimukti is from the initial generation of the aspiration up to not yet obtaining pure, noble resolve; this is named the abiding of practice in adhimukti.

7.47

Furthermore, fascicle 49 states that there are seven bhūmis, and the bhūmi of practice in adhimukti is precisely the second abiding.

7.48

It also says: "Beginning from the stage of adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi up to the stage of completion (niṣṭhā-bhūmi), among all these bodhisattva stages..." If the ten faiths are not in the stage of practicing lineage (śukla-vidarśanā-bhūmi / abhyāsa-gotra), then the practices subsumed by adhimukti-caryā and so forth would be incomplete; [these practitioners] would be neither those who have not aroused the mind nor of the nature lineage (prakṛti-gotra), and not being in the ten abodes they would not belong to adhimukti-caryā. If one says that although they are not in the ten abodes they are subsumed under adhimukti-caryā, then since it is conceded that they are subsumed under its practice, why are they not of the practicing lineage? Furthermore, from the desire for wholesome dharmas onward, one receives the name of "a learner" (śaikṣa), and conditioned wholesome dharmas are termed "dharmas of learning"; why would they not be of the practicing lineage? Based on having arisen actual manifestation (samudācāra) and generated the bodhicitta, and having perfumed their practice into seeds (bīja), they are named the practicing lineage. If it were not so, then when practitioners of the two vehicles turn their minds toward the Mahāyāna, after passing eighty thousand aeons down to ten thousand, what kind of bodhisattvas would they be? It cannot be said that they belong to the nature lineage. Why is that? Because the various wholesome [actions] they cultivate are not without discursive consideration, and they are not without striving toward great bodhi. Although they have not yet managed to enter the superior stage of provisions (saṃbhāra), they can be named the practicing lineage. Alternatively, those who have newly generated the mind, as well as those of the two vehicles who turn toward [the Mahāyāna] through eighty thousand aeons and the like, do not belong to adhimukti-caryā because their practice is not yet superior and they are not yet counted within an asaṃkhyeya. Although they cannot be numbered within an asaṃkhyeya or within the stage of provisions, they can be named the practicing lineage. There is no text that definitively determines that those prior to the ten abodes cannot be called bodhisattvas of the practicing lineage.

7.49

Question: Since within the ten abodes they are already capable of manifesting the eight aspects of attaining the Path, how do they differ from a Buddha? What are the eight aspects manifested by a Buddha? What are the eight aspects manifested by others?

7.50

Answer: I have not seen any text distinguishing this, but to offer one explanation: When a Buddha manifests the eight aspects, they are complete, endure for a long time, and remain unchanging from beginning to end. When a bodhisattva takes a transformational birth, they manifest them temporarily according to what is appropriate; they may not be complete, they may vary from earlier to later, or they may revert to their original form; therefore, they differ from a Buddha.

7.51

Question: As for the ten abodes, ten practices, and so forth, all ten are named "abodes" and so on; why is it that among the ten faiths only the first obtains the name [of faith], while the rest are not named faith?

7.52

Answer: The establishment of names is not uniform, just as among the three gates of emptiness, only the first is named "emptiness" while the remaining two are not. Moreover, because the ten abodes and so forth are each distinct stages, they are all named abodes and so forth; faith is not a distinct stage, so they are not all named faith.

7.53

Question: The various explanations concerning retrogressing and non-retrogressing are not consistent; which should be taken as correct?

7.54

Answer: Non-retrogression has four types: namely, faith, stage, realization, and practice. As usually explained, stage [non-retrogression] is spoken of after the ten abodes. The statement of retrogression is made in terms of the realized dharma; the statement of non-retrogression is made in terms of the stage and the vehicle. The rest are all analogous to this. Or, when it is said that generating the mind is in all cases non-retrogressing, it is spoken in terms of the superior grade. Or, it acts as a cause capable of bringing about non-retrogression later, not that having generated the mind one is immediately able to be non-retrogressing. A few examples can reconcile the many; one need not cite them exhaustively.

7.55

The Treatise says: "Regarding the latencies of the twofold grasping..." Question: In the tenth chapter of the Avataṃsaka-sūtra, when explaining the bodhisattvas of the ten abodes, it says: "They eradicate all afflictions, making them forever exhausted without remainder," and so on. Why then does it say here that they have not yet subdued the twofold grasping? Answer: It refers to the eradication of the accompanying afflictions associated with the unshared ignorance that arises due to perverse teachings and perverse masters; it does not mean the exhaustion of all self-discriminated and innate afflictions. Another explanation: It speaks of the efficacy of the Buddha-Dharma being capable of eradicating afflictions, not that they are all already subdued. Another explanation: Their own discriminated ones are subdued, while those arisen from perverse teachers and the like cannot be subdued or eradicated. The text of the Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra can be reconciled either way. However, since the commentary later concludes that in this stage one's own discriminated afflictions are not yet exhausted, the former explanation is correct. By analogy with generating bodhicitta: that which is generated through the power of conditions is called unstable, while that which is generated through the power of causes is called stable. The arising of delusions is also like this: those arising from perverse teachings are easy to eliminate, while those arising from one's own power are difficult to subdue. Another explanation: The sūtra relies on a partial sense of there being the ability to subdue, while the treatise relies on the complete sense of being unable to subdue. The first and last explanations are correct; the text of the commentary seems to have an omission, so one should check against an accurate exemplar.

7.56

The Treatise says: "Mostly dwelling at the outer gates..." The commentary reconciles this with the Avataṃsaka-sūtra by stating that it is because unshared ignorance is already subdued here. Question: Unshared ignorance arises from delusion regarding the truth and disbelieving in cause and effect; at the sixth faith of the ten faiths, faith does not retrogress, and one has already generated faith and understanding in the principle of cause and effect. That would mean unshared ignorance has already been eliminated in the ten faiths; why is it said that it is subdued in the fourth abode? Answer: At the sixth faith of the ten faiths, one deeply generates faithful mind and does not slander cause and effect, but this does not preclude one from still failing to understand the principle of the truths; therefore, only at the fourth abode does one subdue the unshared [ignorance]; though one has not yet realized and understood, one is able to have faith and understanding. Question: According to the previous explanation, when an ordinary person inside the Dharma is indolent, it is conditioned by three ignorances, and it does not say there is unshared [ignorance]; why does it say now that unshared ignorance is subdued at the fourth abode? Answer: This is spoken with regard to the unshared [ignorance] of not believing in cause and effect: although it arises prior to the sixth faith, it is temporarily subdued, and it is not because of it that one initiates actions toward the miserable destinies. Or, unshared [ignorance] arisen due to perverse teachings does not arise when one is indolent. If it is delusion regarding the principle of the truths that is termed unshared, then it is subdued at the fourth abode.

7.57

The Treatise says: "Because it arises concurrently with the category of dharma-emptiness wisdom." This refutes Sthiramati. However, the commentary says: "The seventh [consciousness] has dharma-grasping, and when dharma-emptiness wisdom arises, it immediately ceases to function; the eighth has dharma-grasping, and when dharma-emptiness wisdom arises, this ought to be eradicated." This refutes other masters, not Master Sthiramati. Or it is a scribal error. If refuting Sthiramati, it should say: "The seventh has self-grasping, and when person-emptiness wisdom arises, it immediately ceases to function; the eighth has dharma-grasping, and when dharma-emptiness wisdom arises, this ought to be eradicated."

7.58

The Treatise says: "Within the seven evolving consciousnesses, being many or few as described for the afflictions." Relying on the number and quantity of what is associated with the afflictions, it says "as described for the afflictions"; it is not a definitive judgment that all cognitive hindrances necessarily arise from the same seed as the afflictions. Furthermore, the graspings of the cognitive hindrance are necessarily prajñā, are associated with ignorance, or are doubt in the maturation mind (vipāka-citta). As for their names and numbers, the number that arises in the various consciousnesses is as described for the afflictions. However, when the commentary says, "Because there is no separate arising of grasping apart from the afflictions, their number and quantity are the same as the afflictions," this is spoken in terms of what arises concurrently and of the cognitive hindrances arising within the stream of one who has not yet severed the afflictions. If one asserted that they are necessarily identical, then as when the arhats of the two vehicles have already severed afflictions but still give rise to dharma-grasping and later perfume it into seeds, how could there be afflictions arising from the same seed with them? Moreover, the maturation mind doubting a person or a stump is a cognitive hindrance; how could it arise from the same seed as the afflictions? Question: Since grasping a stump and mistaking it for a person is a cognitive [hindrance], is it dharma-grasping or not grasping? Answer: It belongs to the category of dharma-grasping, but is not genuine dharma-grasping. Grasping is necessarily accompanied by delusion; that [doubt] is not accompanied by delusion because it is maturation. Another interpretation: It is grasping. If it is karmically induced maturation, it is not accompanied by delusion; but "arisen from maturation" is broader, so it does stand alongside delusion. Alternatively, the mind mistaking the stump may be either accompanied or unaccompanied by its ignorance: if accompanied, it is grasping; if unaccompanied, it is not grasping, but merely an outflow (niṣyanda).

7.59

The Treatise says: "This is within the nature of unhindered indeterminate..." Question: Within the cognitive hindrance there is aversion and craving toward dharmas; aversion toward dharmas is anger, so how can it be indeterminate? Answer: There are two explanations: One says: in contrast to the affliction [hindrance], anger is solely unwholesome; but in contrast to the cognitive hindrance, it is indeterminate. The second says: aversion toward dharmas is also unwholesome. If so, it should bind and be capable of karmically inducing maturation. Answer: Although it is unwholesome, viewed from this aspect it has a distinction; it is not termed a bond, nor does it karmically induce fruition. Between the two explanations, the former is correct; the Treatise says it is indeterminate and does not extend to the unwholesome.

7.60

The Treatise says: "Although the two hindrances are not yet subdued and eliminated in this stage..." and so on.

7.61

Question: What are the differences among the three kinds of tempering, and to which stages do they belong?

7.62

Answer: As for the three distinctions: First, timidity over the length of time, being difficult to reach; second, timidity over the vastness of practices, being difficult to cultivate; third, timidity over the wondrousness of the fruit, being difficult to realize.

7.63

Alternatively: The first generally speaks of vastness and profound wondrousness, which applies to both cause and fruit, because both are vast and both are profoundly wondrous, or because the cause is vast and the fruit is profoundly wondrous. Due to this, cultivation over a long time is required before completion; being profoundly wondrous it is difficult to accomplish, and only after a long time is it attained. Therefore this Treatise says: "First, hearing that unsurpassed, equal, and complete bodhi is vast, profound, and distant..." The latter two are specific. Furthermore, each of the three temperings applies to the three places: regarding that long duration, reflecting on others who have already reached it, one observes that oneself has the capacity. If coarse wholesome [deeds] can still induce the distant, wondrous fruits of the higher realms, why should I, possessing wondrous wholesome [deeds], not be able to attain the profound, distant, great fruit? And extending to the complete transformation of the basis: since they have already obtained it, I should also be like that; observing that oneself has the capacity, since one already possesses wondrous wholesome [deeds], why could one not realize it? Therefore the commentary says: the first merely raises bodhi, and the latter merely raises the transformation of the basis, but in truth they both apply.

7.64

Question: In which stage does this tempering take place?

7.65

Answer: In accordance with this Treatise's text, it says: "Although the two hindrances are not yet subdued and eliminated in this stage, when cultivating superior practices there are three kinds of retrogression and cowardice, yet one is able to temper one's mind with three matters." In the stage of provisions, it applies generally across the thirty minds and cannot be assigned separately. Otherwise, the ten abodes would not be able to cultivate the practices of the ten pāramitās, since they would not yet be able to give rise to the tempering of capability.

7.66

Another explanation: It also applies to the stage of preparations (prayoga) and before the seventh stage (bhūmi), excluding only the path of seeing (darśanamārga) because it is solely in meditative absorption and its duration is very brief. Although the stage of the four roots of goodness subdues the discriminated arisings of the two hindrances, the innate ones are not yet subdued. Because the text does not say that the discriminated ones are not yet subdued, it applies to the innate. Moreover, before the seventh stage, although afflictions are subdued, the cognitive [hindrance] is not completely [subdued], so preparations are necessarily required. Furthermore, the hindrance of taking pleasure in the parinirvāṇa of the lower vehicle is only severed at the fifth stage. Although prior to severing it one does not retrogress toward it, one might give rise to such thoughts. If not, how could it only be severed at the fifth stage? Even if actual manifestation is not arisen, the seed is eliminated only when reaching here; therefore, before it is severed, tempering is still needed. The Treatise merely cites the beginning to imply the subsequent, just as the severing of the four places is not confined to prior to the stages. Doubts, freedom from doubts, grasping, and discrimination still exist up through the seventh stage.

7.67

Another explanation: The three temperings and the severing of the hindrances of the four places occur only prior to the stages. This is because the treatise text does not state that they apply on the stages. On the stages, both hindrances—the category of affliction hindrances—can all be subdued. The four places eliminated are spoken in terms of discrimination. However, there is no textual determination; one may accept or reject this as one pleases.

7.68

Question: According to the eleventh fascicle of the Samuccaya, there are further five kinds of cultivating yoga: namely, holding (dhāraṇa), sustaining (udgrahaṇa), mirror (ādarśa), illumination (āloka), and basis (āśraya). "Basis" refers to the transformation of the basis (āśrayaparavṛtti), which is the path of seeing. Holding, sustaining, mirror, and illumination are the causes by which the fruit of transformation of the basis is obtained. In reliance on which stages do the four such as holding and sustaining arise? And what dharmas are they?

7.69

Answer: In accordance with that treatise, it says they rely on the stages of heat (ūṣmagata) and so forth, which means that all four roots of goodness possess these four. "Holding" is the wisdom of hearing (śrutamayī prajñā); "sustaining" is the wisdom of thinking (cintāmayī prajñā); "mirror" is the wisdom of cultivation (bhāvanāmayī prajñā); and "illumination" refers to what is observed, being free from grasper and grasped. Alternatively, "mirror" is concentration (samādhi), and "illumination" is wisdom (prajñā). Heat, summit (mūrdhan), and patience (kṣānti) each bring cultivation to fulfillment by relying on these four, thereby entering the worldly supreme dharmas (laukikāgradharma). Alternatively, there is no holding or sustaining, because with superior patience, in only a single moment one enters the worldly supreme dharmas; being solely in concentration and of brief duration, holding and sustaining are absent. They merely rely on these stages having holding and sustaining, etc., not that the four stages necessarily each possess all four kinds. Another explanation: The four stages each possess these four. The two practices of holding and sustaining are not [ordinary] hearing and thinking; because in concentration one relies upon the sacred teaching, this is taken as holding—the Treatise says: "Because in accordance with what has been widely heard, one establishes the objective sphere of tranquility and insight (śamatha-vipaśyanā)." Proper attention (yoniśomanaskāra) associated with concentration is taken as sustaining, because non-inverted reflection sustains the mind. The concentration that serves as the basis is named "mirror," saying that this samādhi still carries images (sa-nimitta). The wisdom capable of observing is named "illumination," saying it is the wisdom with nothing to be attained regarding grasper and grasped.

7.70

Another interpretation: Retention, application, and so forth apply to all remaining stages, excluding only genuine seeing (darśanamārga) and the stage of buddhahood; for in the stage of buddhahood there is no further fruit, and in the stage of genuine seeing there are no reflected images and the like. Therefore, the twentieth fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā says: "There are five phenomena that subsume all yoga grounds of the yoga practitioner." From the eighth stage upward, it is said nominally that hearing and thinking also focus on the teaching and so forth; thus it is correct that they apply generally. Furthermore, in the four roots of goodness, one also personally receives instruction from the buddhas. Hence, a verse in the seventh chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra says: "Thereafter, one receives instruction / From the buddhas through the stream of Dharma." The commentary explains: from this point forward, one receives instruction from the buddhas, the Tathāgatas, who expound phenomena such as the sūtras. Following the sense of this text, it may be that after receiving instruction, one cultivates retention, application, the mirror, and the light: "retention" refers to generating six types of mental dispositions toward the teaching; "application" means subsequently generating eleven mental orientations; "the mirror" means cultivating the nine states of resting the mind; and "the light" again means generating various supernormal powers based on wisdom. Or else, they need not be matched in this way.

7.71

However, the four roots of goodness, as well as retention, application, and so forth, are cultivated only at the completion of the first asaṃkhyeya kalpa. The seventh chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra says: "Having completed the practices of one asaṃkhyeya kalpa, one enhances faith, making it supreme," and so forth, after which it states that one gives rise to the four roots of goodness; all teachings are unanimous on this. Since ancient times, various masters have differed in their understanding and have selected different textual passages, failing to grasp the intent of the teaching. The intent of the teaching is that regarding the bodhisattva's cultivation of the four roots of goodness, there is the stage of proper cultivation and completion, and there is the stage of preparatory cultivation through emulation. Preparatory cultivation of contemplation extends through the thirty mental states; like the contemplation of vijñapti-mātra, its accomplishment lies in seeing, but learning it extends to what precedes. This should also be so: although learning extends to what precedes, proper cultivation and completion occur later; in the stage of provision and so forth, one may practice through emulation. Contemplating that the grasped object is nonexistent suppresses grasping at self and grasping at dharmas; contemplating that the grasping subject is nonexistent can suppress grasping at dharmas. Were it not so, how could one suppress the two graspings? The Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, this Cheng weishi lun, and others are based on the stage of proper cultivation and do not apply to [the stage of] provisions. When the Yingluo benye jing states that "dwelling in the ten abodes, one cultivates and learns the four roots of goodness," this refers to learning and cultivating through emulation. However, when the Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that "just as before the path of the srotāpanna there are four expedients, the bodhisattva likewise has four expedients, namely the forty mental states," it may be like the Hīnayāna's contemplation of the fivefold resting of the mind, the contemplation of specific characteristics of mindfulness, and the contemplation of general characteristics of mindfulness, which, combined with the four roots of goodness, make four expedients, corresponding to the forty mental states; it does not mean that the four roots of goodness are termed the four expedients.

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成唯識論了義燈 — Classical Chinese