成唯識論演祕 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.2

On the Commentary's statement: 'Saying here "separate from consciousness" eliminates the error of contradicting one's own tenets':

2.3

Question: Even if one said 'different from consciousness,' how would that contradict the tenets?

2.4

Answer: In the Mahāyāna school, matter that is different from consciousness is not non-existent.

2.5

On the Commentary's statement: 'Somewhat close':

Being similar is called 'close.' Both the Great and Lesser [Vehicles] state that mind is the grasper; the mind is consciousness. Some say: because its substance is consciousness, it speaks of that primary mind; because they are somewhat close, it speaks of those mental factors.

2.7

I examine [this and suggest]: This is not necessarily so. Why should mental factors alone be termed 'close'? If being similar is called 'close,' why not also include mind? If being close to the king is called 'close,' the intentional object is even closer; why then refute it first? Or, relying on one perspective, the principle certainly holds, but it becomes overly fragmented.

2.8

On the Commentary's statement: 'There are three kinds of resistance (pratigha)':

2.9

Question: What is the meaning of 'resistance' (pratigha)?

2.10

Answer: It means obstruction. Obstruction has two meanings: first, spatial obstruction is called obstruction; second, restriction is called obstruction. Among the three kinds of resistance, in obstructive resistance (āvaraṇa-pratigha), spatial obstruction is called obstruction; in cognitive resistance (ālambana-pratigha) and perceptual resistance (viṣaya-pratigha), restriction is called obstruction.

2.11

On the Commentary's statement: 'Perceptual resistance' and so forth:

2.12

Now, the restriction by perceptual fields of the faculties and consciousnesses that are able to illuminate them has many variations. Therefore, the Prajñaptiśāstra states: Some eyes are restricted by water but not by land, such as the eyes of fish; some eyes are restricted by land but not by water, generally speaking, such as the eyes of humans; some eyes are restricted by both, such as the eyes of piśācas, śiśumāra, and so on; some eyes are restricted by neither, namely, apart from the former forms; some eyes are restricted by night but not by day, such as the eyes of owls; some eyes are restricted by day but not by night, generally speaking, such as the eyes of humans; some eyes are restricted by both, such as the eyes of jackals; some eyes are restricted by neither, namely, apart from the former forms. Explaining the Prajñaptiśāstra: it is one of the six Pada treatises, composed by Mahākātyāyana. 'Piśāca' in Chinese means 'eater of blood and flesh,' an alternative name for a ghost. 'Śiśumāra' is a kind of animal, shaped like a gecko, the small ones being two zhang long, the large ones a hundred chi. Those 'restricted by neither' are the blind.

2.13

Question: The faculties and consciousnesses each apprehend and illuminate their own perceptual fields; why is this called 'obstruction'?

2.14

Answer: It is simply because one's own perceptual field restricts one's own faculties and consciousnesses, preventing them from operating upon other perceptual fields. Or, when operating in conjunction with their own perceptual fields, they cannot arise with respect to other perceptual fields; hence it is called 'obstruction.' Therefore, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya says: 'Why are the eye and other [faculties] said to have resistance when operating upon their own perceptual field and intentional object? Because they do not operate beyond it, upon others.' Or again, obstruction has the meaning of conjunction, meaning that phenomena such as the eye operate in conjunction with their own perceptual fields and their own intentional objects.

2.15

Explanation: This is a double question and double answer concerning both perceptual resistance and cognitive resistance. In the explanation there are two points, both taking restriction to be obstruction.

2.16

On the Commentary's statement: 'Mind and mental factors ... are termed intentional objects (ālambana)':

2.17

This reveals cognitive resistance, where grasping is like leaning on and reflecting upon [an object]. The nature of mind and mental factors is frail and weak; they do not arise without an object, just as a frail person does not rise without a cane. Therefore, those objects are what the mind reflects upon, and are called intentional objects. This is stated on the basis of their functioning only arising when there is an object, not that they must be functioning right now; therefore, past and future minds are also said to have resistance. Being obstructed in the function of cognizing an object is called cognitive resistance.

2.18

On the Commentary's statement: 'If with respect to that phenomenon' and so forth:

2.19

This reveals perceptual resistance: with respect to visible form and so forth, these eyes, ears, and so forth have the capacity to apprehend objects such as seeing and hearing. These forms are said to be the perceptual fields of the eye and so on, and that upon which the capacity relies is called a perceptual field; just as when a person has superior ability regarding something, one says it is 'my domain.' This is stated in terms of possessing the capacity, not necessarily the actual operation of functioning; hence their homologous elements (sabhāga) are still said to have resistance. Being obstructed in the function of apprehending an object is called perceptual resistance.

2.20

Question: What is the difference between apprehending (grahaṇa) and cognizing (ālambana)?

2.21

Answer: Apprehending means illuminating; cognizing means reflective consideration; hence the two are different. Furthermore, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya briefly distinguishes them by tetralemma: If a phenomenon has perceptual resistance, does it also have obstructive resistance? One should formulate four positions: the seven mind-elements and the associated phenomena that are part of the dharma-element are the first position; the five objects of form and so on are the second position; the five faculties of the eye and so on are the third position; the non-associated phenomena that are part of the dharma-element are the fourth position. If a phenomenon has perceptual resistance, does it also have cognitive resistance? One should answer according to the subsequent category: whatever has cognitive resistance definitely has perceptual resistance; there are some that have perceptual resistance but not cognitive resistance, namely the five faculties of the eye and so on.

2.22

On the Commentary's statement: 'However, the Sautrāntikas ... are subsumed under the ten āyatanas':

2.23

It is just as in the Mahāyāna, where the seeds of the eighteen dhātus, when cognized by the sixth and eighth consciousnesses as objects corresponding to faculties, are subsumed under the dharmāyatana as compounded entities, yet are subsumed under the eighteen dhātus according to the actual [dhātus] they produce; this is also similar.

2.24

On the Commentary's statement: 'The Nyāyānusāra states ... because there is separate matter':

2.25

Question: The Sarvāstivādins are also like this; why then do they dispute it?

2.26

Answer: The intention of the Nyāyānusāra's objection is: 'In our system both the coarse and the subtle are real, so it is admissible for the subtle to follow the coarse and be subsumed under the ten āyatanas. Since in your system the coarse is nominal, how can the real subtle follow the nominal ten āyatanas rather than the dharmāyatana?' The intention of the Sautrāntika is: 'Although the nominal and the real differ, following the coarse entity that is formed, they are located in the ten āyatanas and are not subsumed under the dharmāyatana.' Hence there is a dispute.

2.27

On the Commentary's statement: 'The Sarvāstivāda and others hold that both the coarse and the subtle are real':

2.28

The 'and others' refers to the Lokottaravāda and Prajñaptivāda schools. The Prajñaptivāda holds that the categories of the skandhas are all real; the Lokottaravāda states that the supramundane are entirely real. Thus coarse and subtle matter, being within the skandhas and supramundane, are all entirely real. Therefore, the word 'and others' in the Commentary refers to small fractions of these two schools, whereas other schools either agree entirely or differ entirely, and are therefore not grouped under 'and others.'

2.29

On the Commentary's statement: 'The five faculties and so on are also subsumed within':

2.30

Question: Against whom is this inference formulated?

2.31

Answer: There are briefly three explanations. First, against the Sarvāstivādins, the five faculties, objects, and so on are subsumed into the proposition (pakṣa), so there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika); if against the Sautrāntikas, there would be the fault of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana), because for the Sautrāntikas the faculties and so forth are all nominal. Although it is to refute the constituting [atoms], in order to preclude inconclusiveness, it also refutes the faculties and so on, which is also without fault. Second, against the Sautrāntikas, the five faculties, objects, and so on are subsumed into the positive example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta), because the intention of the treatise is solely to refute the constituting atoms. Third, it refutes both schools simultaneously, but by formulating distinct inferences; if one were to refute both schools with a single inference, there would be errors whether advancing or retreating, as can be known on reflection. The third explanation is complete, while the former two are logically viable.

2.32

On the Commentary's statement: 'Unconditioned ... there is no inconclusiveness':

2.33

The phrase 'non-material example' subsumes the unconditioned and so forth; the unconditioned is unobstructed and does not form cloth and the like, so it enters into the positive [example]; therefore, they cannot take it as inconclusive.

2.34

On the Commentary's statement: 'These two inferences refute the Sautrāntikas':

2.35

I examine [this and suggest]: Taking the property of the proposition being analyzed as the reason to establish that it is not substantially existent should also apply without fault to the preceding three inferences, because an already established property of the proposition can serve as a reason.

2.36

On the Commentary's statement: 'An atom having directional parts logically cannot be one':

2.37

Because a single atom faces six directions, it is said to have directional parts. Since the six directions it faces are not identical, how could the substance of the facing atom be one? One should formulate the inference: The posited atom should not be unitary in substance; because it can be divided and because it has directional parts; like all coarse matter.

2.38

On the Commentary's statement: 'Otherwise, the reason would have the fault of being unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha)':

2.39

If this text were addressed to the Sautrāntika, the reason 'lacking directional parts' would become unestablished for one party, because the Sautrāntika does not admit that they lack directional parts.

2.40

On the Commentary's statement: 'Formulating an inference as before':

2.41

It is the same as the previous inference concerning receiving light and casting shadow, pressing the atom so that it must have directional parts.

2.42

On the Commentary's statement: 'An aggregate should be like an atom':

2.43

If in the space of a single atom there were six atoms, all aggregated matter would have the measure of an atom, because relative to one another they would not exceed that measure; in that case, aggregated matter would also be invisible.

2.44

On the Commentary's statement: 'Whether touching or not touching, both should have parts':

2.45

If they touch, because they mutually resist each other, they logically have directional parts; even if they do not touch, when posited relative to the six directions they must also have parts. If not so, how could they be called resistant matter?

2.46

On the Commentary's statement: 'The aggregate is not different, lacking both':

2.47

The words 'the aggregate is not different' restate the defense of the Sarvāstivāda school, namely that aggregated matter is not different from atoms. The words 'lacking both' are Vasubandhu's objection to them: aggregated matter should lack both shadow and obstruction, precisely because it is the atoms, just like an atom.

2.48

On the Commentary's statement: 'This concludes the negation' and so forth:

2.49

Having already refuted atoms and established that they are not substantially existent, the previous inference—stating that external resistant matter is definitely not substantially existent—has a reason that is free from error.

2.50

On the Commentary's statement: "This is not the object of knowledge of another's mind, etc.":

2.51

The knowledge of another's mind cognizes only another's mind and does not cognize the sense faculties. Provisionally, relying on the ordinary person's six consciousnesses in a distracted state of mind, [the sense faculties] are not apprehended. Although the sixth [consciousness] cognizes them, it does not apprehend them directly; therefore, it must be excluded. In truth, the non-concentrated six consciousnesses of other noble ones also do not apprehend them. In its causal stage, whether for oneself or another, the seventh consciousness does not cognize the faculties, and in the fruitional stage, the other [schools] do not accept [its existence], so it also need not be singled out for exclusion.

2.52

On the Treatise's statement: "Because they can produce consciousness, they are known to exist by inference":

2.53

In general, inferences are explained as having briefly four kinds: 1. Inferring the effect from the cause, as when observing that a present phenomenon has the function of inducing what follows, one knows the effect that is induced; 2. Inferring the cause from the effect, that is, when observing that a present phenomenon has the meaning of repaying what came before, one knows the cause that can induce it; 3. Inferring the function from the essence, when observing the formed phenomenon, one knows the distinctions of the maker and the instruments; 4. Inferring the essence from the function, when observing the maker, etc., one knows the formed phenomenon. What the present Treatise clarifies is knowing the cause from the effect, inferring the essence by means of the function.

2.54

On the Treatise's statement: "External matter with resistance is logically unestablished, etc.":

2.55

The intent in the Treatise is to clarify that the five faculties are merely transformations of internal consciousness, in order to subsequently clarify of its own accord the five sense fields. However, the phrase "having resistance" and the meaning of "transformation of internal consciousness" apply across both faculties and fields. Because the author of the Commentary recounts the five fields of the various schools, he does not say that this passage clarifies the fields. Therefore, he concludes in general that what has resistance outside the mind has already been refuted previously; hence, these faculties are merely the transformations of internal consciousness.

2.56

If so, why cite the verse meaning of the Guan suoyuan yuan (Ālambanaparīkṣā) as proof?

2.57

Answer: The intent is to take the side of consciousness's transformation as proof. A certain opinion refutes this, saying: "The Commentary says that this passage states that the object cognized is transformed by consciousness and is not formed of external atoms; we do not rely on this now. If it has already shown that the object is transformed by internal consciousness, why does it then say below that the external objective condition of the eyes, etc., is logically non-existent? It is clear that this passage merely shows that the five faculties are transformed by consciousness."

2.58

Detailed analysis: How can one so easily dismiss and criticize? Where does the Commentary say "this passage states that the object..."? Is this not an addition of one's own? Furthermore, the preceding division of topics in the Commentary clearly points out the distinction between faculties and fields, etc., showing that the Commentary is not mistaken; this should be examined closely.

2.59

On the Commentary's statement: "Some take the nimitta-bhāga of the past five consciousnesses to be the five fields":

2.60

This refers to the nimitta-bhāga transformed by the five consciousnesses in past lives perfuming and generating subsequent actualities, which now serve as the objects of consciousness. Therefore, the Guan suoyuan lun (Ālambanaparīkṣā) states: "Or the nimitta of a prior consciousness serves as the condition for a posterior consciousness, inducing the potentiality in the fundamental consciousness to produce a likeness of its own fruit to arise, because this does not contradict reason."

2.61

On the Commentary's statement: "One does not see smell and taste having conventional [nature]":

2.62

Although there is no explicit text, speaking according to reason, there can also be conventional [forms], as composite incense may be allowed to be conventional. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle 54, says: "In the wind moving through the sky, there is no co-arising smell, only that which is conventionally combined." Since it says "conventionally combined," it clearly knows it is conventional; among tastes, there must also be composite tastes, which are analogous to smell and share in conventionality.

2.63

On the Commentary's statement: "Meaning matter that was previously seen or presently seen, etc.":

2.64

The explanatory treatise explains: "Matter previously seen" means capable of upholding the meaning of the past consciousness's enjoyment to reveal the nature of the dhātu; "matter presently seen" means capable of upholding the meaning of the present consciousness's enjoyment to reveal the nature of the dhātu.

2.65

Explanation: "Experiencing" (shou) means grasping, which explains the preceding "presently seen." "Meaning" (yi) refers to the object, clarifying that the preceding matter, by virtue of the faculty's capacity to uphold consciousness, then grasps the object; hence, it raises what is upheld to clarify the dhātu. This merely clarifies the dhātu, for dhātu means "capable of upholding," and does not speak of the meaning of "eye." Alternatively, upholding consciousness reveals the meaning of the dhātu, while the meaning of enjoyment clarifies the meaning of the eye.

2.66

On the Commentary's statement: "And its seeds":

2.67

The explanatory treatise says: "This refers to the seeds of the eye, which are either merely accumulated in order to induce the future eye, or are already accomplished in order to produce the present eye faculty."

2.68

Explanation: Because these seeds can produce the actual eye faculty of the two times, and because they are the causes of the eye faculty, they are also called the eye dhātu. Therefore, that treatise says: "Hence these two kinds are called the eye dhātu, because they are the cause of the eye's arising." The eye seeds of the two times are called the two kinds, and the meaning of "cause" is called dhātu; in general, it is named dhātu by the two meanings of "upholding" and "cause." However, in the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle 56, it is named dhātu by six meanings; fearing verbosity, they are not detailed here. The remaining faculties should be understood accordingly.

2.69

On the Commentary's statement: "Due to the original perfuming, etc.":

2.70

The faculties in reality are only seeds; when the seeds are perfumed, the mind transforms into a resemblance of matter. The Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya, relying on this resemblance to matter at the time of perfuming, names it actual matter. The same applies to the other faculties.

2.71

On the Commentary's statement: "In contrast to the fruitional consciousness that is produced, etc.":

2.72

The phenomena capable of producing an effect are named "potentiality" (śakti). The actual material faculties can produce the effect of consciousness; based on this, the actual material faculties are metaphorically called "potentialities," and potentiality is another name for seeds.

2.73

On the Commentary's statement: "Potentiality produces consciousness, etc.":

2.74

Both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna accept that faculties are called potentialities. Hence, the Treatise says that what generates the eye consciousness and the like is called the eye faculty and the like, citing potentiality to reveal them. Because there is dispute about their essence, the Treatise does not present the essence of the faculties.

2.75

Detailed analysis: Or it is that those who uphold only actual [faculties] harmonize with the intent of the Guan suoyuan lun calling them potentialities; its statement of potentiality relies on what is commonly established. Although actual matter in reality constitutes the eye and other faculties, because it is not commonly established, that [treatise] does not state it.

2.76

On the Commentary's statement: "Below, from refuting the objective condition down to the third part, concluding with the correct doctrine":

2.77

Detailed analysis: Examining the place where the text below arrives at the correct doctrine, it is the third major division within the general refutation of matter with resistance; apart from this, there is no other place where it arrives at the correct doctrine. After refuting the Sarvāstivādins, although it concludes by saying, "Even admitting that atoms exist, one still incurs this fault," there is no place where it arrives at the correct doctrine. Logically, it should refer to the subsequent general conclusion, that is, the text that repeats: "Admitting that atoms exist, etc." Or perhaps the textual statement, "How much less can there be real atoms outside consciousness," is the correct doctrine.

2.78

On the Commentary's statement: "Non-Buddhists grasp that the bodies and minds of others... down to... hence now it is rejected":

2.79

A certain opinion says: "This is also not so, for the text of the Treatise merely refutes real matter with resistance and does not refute mind. Furthermore, 'logically non-existent' points to the preceding refutational text, which previously only refuted matter and did not refute mind. It is only because the meaning is convenient that it summarizes the tenets in general; since it is not the text's intent, there is no fault."

2.80

Detailed analysis: Although the original intent was to refute external [matter] with resistance, the Treatise now refutes it by means of the objective condition (ālambanapratyaya). The objective condition is broad, while the meaning of resistance is narrow. Using the broad to establish the narrow, so as to refute another's mind, etc., as not being one's own immediate object—what fault is there in this? If one does not accept this, then the Treatise's heading of the term "objective condition" would not exhaustively subsume the meaning, and would again incur the fault of indefiniteness. The other party accepts that another's mind, though an object, is not transformed by one's own consciousness, because it is external to oneself. Hence, we know that the Treatise's intent generally encompasses all objective conditions; one must not say that it is not the text's intent. Moreover, the Commentary's intent is: another's mind, mental factors, etc., are not one's own immediate condition, not that they are non-objects, and it does not reject the meaning of mind. Why raise the objection that the Treatise only refutes matter and not mind? The objection misses the Commentary's purpose, but grasps the profound subtlety of the Treatise; the Commentary is truly worthy of contemplation.

2.81

On the Commentary's statement: "All stream-enterers, etc.":

2.82

Within a single instant, feeling and the other mental factors can in turn cognize themselves.

2.83

Question: Why only the first fruit [of stream-entry]?

2.84

Answer: All [noble ones] can do so. Because ordinary people are not clear about it, it is not mentioned. Stream-enterers are the first noble ones, so they are mentioned to exemplify the rest.

2.85

On the Commentary's statement: "This summarizes the commonly accepted meaning of objective condition":

2.86

A certain opinion criticizes: "If it summarizes what is commonly accepted, why call it 'your attachment'? Moreover, one's own school's doctrine was already stated immediately before; why must it be repeated? Now, in distinguishing the immediate condition, could it be that in Mahāyāna, what can induce one's own consciousness is the immediate object induced by this?"

2.87

Detailed analysis: An objective condition generates consciousness as its object. This name and meaning are accepted by both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna; hence it is called "commonly accepted." It does not mean that the substantial differences of this condition are entirely identical in all respects so as to be called "commonly accepted." It is also like the meaning of a shared inference (sādhāraṇānumāna) in hetuvidyā, where the contested thesis is in reality not identical. The previous section identified the object and distinguished the transformation of one's own consciousness, but had not yet clarified what meaning constitutes an objective condition; now, summarizing what the other party accepts within the commonly accepted objective condition, what contradiction is there in saying "attachment"? How is there any fault of repetition? The objection citing one's own consciousness as an analogy is thereby known to be incorrect.

2.88

On the Commentary's statement: "A phenomenon must have an essence... down to... is an object":

2.89

A certain opinion says: "That image resembling the object is not the object; it is subsumed under the cognizer. Therefore, to say that what resembles the object is called the object is necessarily unreasonable."

2.90

Detailed analysis: This is merely an apparent refutation, falsely finding fault where there is none. The Commentary discusses that on that mental consciousness there must be an image resembling the object, before that object of matter, etc., can be called an object; if not, it would not be so. Why? Because the cognizer would lack the function of grasping the object. Furthermore, when the eye consciousness cognizes matter, if there were no image resembling the object on the consciousness, and the material object were called the object of the eye, then matter must also be the object of the ear consciousness, because the ear consciousness also lacks the image resembling matter. If it were not so, it would contradict inference; if one accepts that it is so, there would be the fault of confusion. Therefore, there must be an image resembling the object. However, the Commentary's wording is concise while its meaning is rich; only by prolonged reading and careful reflection will the profound intent be realized. The Commentary does not decide that the image resembling the object belongs to the object. Moreover, the Commentary next says that the image resembling the object is the mental aspect (ākāra), differing between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna; in the section explaining the four parts, this will certainly become clear of itself.

2.91

On the Commentary's statement: "Now taking it as an example, the intention is to take a minor part":

2.92

Merely taking the one part that is not a condition as an example is called taking a "minor part."

2.93

On the Commentary's statement: "Because the five consciousnesses are subsumed under the subject (dharmin), etc.":

2.94

The reasons why there is no fault are detailed in the Liaoyi deng.

2.95

Question: Originally, what was established was that what is composite is not the condition of the five consciousnesses; now the intent is in the predicate (dharma), and the five [consciousnesses] in the subject would then form the composite, not being the condition of the mind—how does this relate to the five consciousnesses? If so, why does the verse speak of the five consciousnesses?

2.96

Answer: Although the five are the subject, they are also called what is to be proved (sādhya). Hence, as the Yogācārabhūmi states: "How are there two kinds of what is to be proved? They are self-nature and distinction." The Nyāyamukha also states: "Only by virtue of the predicate is the predicate established; in this way is the subject established."

2.97

Question: In the predicate it says 'even if' (she), showing it is not truly accepted; if the five [consciousnesses'] objects are hypothesized on the second moon, what fault is there logically, such that the five must be excluded from the predicate?

2.98

Answer: When the other party accepts it and one's own contradicts it, provisionally conceding to the other is called 'even if'; if the other party never accepted it from the beginning, how can it be called 'even if'?

2.99

Detailed analysis: Examining the various scriptures, 'even if' has two pathways: First, the other party accepts it while one's own school does not, hence there is the word 'even if'; second, although both self and other completely reject it, in order to refute something, one provisionally concedes to them and also says 'even if'. This is like the Mahāyānasaṃgraha provisionally conceding to the Sautrāntika meaning of matter and mind serving as equal and immediate conditions for each other, as will be explained below. In the analogy of the second moon, although the other party does not accept it as the object of the five [consciousnesses], in order to negate their condition, what fault is there logically in provisionally conceding it to be an object? Because it is identical to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Following this reasoning, having the five consciousnesses of that verse in the predicate would also not be amiss. This should be considered further.

2.100

On the Commentary's statement: "Nor is it the reality of phenomena, etc.":

2.101

Reality (xìng) means essence; because it lacks real essence, it is said not to be the reality of phenomena.

2.102

On the Commentary's statement: "In meaning, there must be addition or deletion":

2.103

Some versions of the Commentary say: "There is no need for addition or deletion." There are briefly two explanations: The first says that the meaning is correct, but the word "not" is an error. Although existent and non-existent objects are both objects, they are only objects of the mind and not the objects of the five consciousnesses; speaking in terms of meaning, there must be addition or deletion, not that the text is ungrammatical and requires addition or deletion. The second says that the word "not" is correct and the word "meaning" is mistaken, since that text is already correct. In the first explanation, there is no need to delete the five characters "even if the five consciousnesses' objects, etc."; merely treating the five as the subject as initially proposed avoids fault. Both explanations are plausible, but the latter is slightly more fluent.

2.104

On the Commentary's statement: "However, tangible objects... unlike length, etc.":

2.105

It is merely that an increase in earth, etc., is called rough, smooth, etc., unlike length and the like, which are established in mutual dependence.

2.106

Question: Why are length and shortness subsumed under aggregated [designations]?

2.107

Answer: If considered in terms of mutual relativity, they are relative designations (saṃketa-prajñapti); if based on being formed of multiple phenomena, they are called aggregate designations (saṃghāta-prajñapti); there is no contradiction.

2.108

The Commentary says: "Like life," and so forth.

2.109

According to the great school, the substance of the life-faculty is a designated phenomenon (prajñapti-dharma), an objective-condition (ālambana-pratyaya) of the mental consciousness, which proves that one's own five consciousnesses take designations internal to consciousness as their objective conditions.

2.110

The Commentary says: "Upon the five consciousnesses there is no aspect of those atoms, just like the visual faculty," and so forth.

2.111

Question: In the reason it is said that the five consciousnesses lack the aspect of atoms, while in the example the visual consciousness lacks the aspect of that faculty. Since the faculty and the atoms are not the same, how can the reason properly operate in the example?

2.112

Answer: Following the *Ālambana-parīkṣā*, the reason simply states: "because on the visual consciousness there is no aspect of that," omitting the word "atom"; thus there is no error. Because with faculties and the like as examples, the five consciousnesses also lack their aspects.

2.113

The Commentary says: "If they rescue their position by saying ... up to ... the inference is also the same," and so forth.

2.114

Detailed analysis: One can also use a formal inference to challenge the hidden aspect of the atom. The inference states: When not yet aggregated, the aspect of aggregation should also be manifest; because its substance is identical to the aggregated atoms; just like when already aggregated.

2.115

The Commentary says: "Although it has many aspects," and so forth.

2.116

For instance, upon a single material form there are aspects of suffering, impermanence, desirable, undesirable, down to atomicity, roundness, and all such aspects; hence they are called "many." The five consciousnesses cognize only the intrinsic nature (svalakṣaṇa) of form and the like, which is meant by "one part."

2.117

The Treatise says: "Some maintain that form and the like serve as this [objective condition]," and so forth.

2.118

Master Saṅghabhadra's doctrine is fully clarified in the Commentary. Furthermore, the *Nyāyānusāra* says: When the atoms of form and the like are dispersed and not yet aggregated, consistent with the Vibhāṣā and Sautrāntika masters, they are not the cognitive objects of the five consciousnesses, because upon consciousness there is no aspect of the atoms. When many atoms aggregate and are mutually related, upon each atom a gross aspect arises, and only then does it become an objective condition cognized by the visual and other consciousnesses. For example, when seven atoms gather together and mutually support one another, each gives rise to a gross aspect equivalent in measure to the seven atoms. However, this gross aspect exists only in the present; although having material obstruction, they mutually interpenetrate, like the derived matter (upādāya-rūpa) of the Sautrāntikas. Moreover, it necessarily occupies the same location as the subtle atoms that are its generating causes, just like the primary elements and derived matter of the Sautrāntikas mutually interpenetrate; therefore, cognizing the gross aspect necessarily involves cognizing the atoms, because they occupy the same location. Although this aggregated aspect is said to "arise," it has no distinct entity separate from that which generates it; it is just that the original atoms lacked the gross aspect. Now having gathered together, although their substance does not change, their aspect transforms into a gross one; hence the word "arise" is used. It is not like the original assertion that many atoms gather together to jointly produce a single aspect.

2.119

The Commentary says: "Question: The eye cognizing mental earth ... up to ... by what principle are they not identical?" and so forth.

2.120

The meaning of this challenge is: When cognizing an intrinsic nature, does it further project an image before cognizing it, or does it cognize it immediately without projecting an image? If it does not project an image, it would be identical to the Sammatīya, because the Sammatīya cognizes an object without projecting an image, and the Sarvāstivāda cognizes atoms also without an image. The rest should be understood accordingly.

2.121

The Treatise says: "However, when consciousness transforms, it suddenly manifests a single aspect," and so forth.

2.122

Question: Why is large-scale matter not formed by the combination of atoms, but rather transformed suddenly?

2.123

Answer: There are no real atoms capable of generating gross matter; therefore it transforms suddenly and is not formed of atoms. Hence fascicle three of the *Yogācārabhūmi* states: Within an aggregate of matter there have never been atoms; when arising from their own seeds, they arise solely as aggregations—whether subtle, middling, or gross; moreover, matter-aggregates are not formed by the accumulation of atoms. Therefore we know that gross matter simply transforms suddenly.

2.124

The Commentary says: "That which is large in shape and measure is substantially real in entity," and so forth.

2.125

Question: Jars and the like also transform suddenly and are not composed of atoms; why are they called designated?

2.126

Answer: Two explanations are traditionally transmitted. One says: Although aspects like jars and basins are transformed suddenly by consciousness, they are merely shape; hence they are said to be designated. Now, saying that the objective condition is suddenly transformed by consciousness refers to color-matter; hence it is substantially real and not designated. As for "a single aspect," in principle it is indeed shape; now by labeling the aspect of matter using shape-matter, there is certainly no contradiction. The second says: The sudden transformation of jars and the like is merely the aspects of the four objective domains; hence the four real domains are designated as jars and the like, and thus called designated. The latter explanation is superior.

2.127

The Commentary says: "The latter is like regret," and so forth.

2.128

Although the entity of regret exists, an increase in delusion is called regret; in dependence on non-delusion, delusion is called regret.

2.129

The Commentary says: "Unlike blue and the like, which remain real despite mutual dependence," and so forth.

2.130

Blue gets the name "blue" in contrast to yellow and the like, but blue cannot be called yellow. By contrast, as short depends on long, not only can it not be named long, it also cannot be definitively named short; therefore it is not like color-matter such as blue.

2.131

The Commentary says: "It does not cognize the designated separately," and so forth.

2.132

It must concurrently cognize the real; none is capable of cognizing the designated separately apart from the real.

2.133

The Commentary says: "Only the mental consciousness grasps it," and so forth.

2.134

The mental consciousness is able to grasp that separate designation.

2.135

The Commentary says: "Named cognizing the designated," and so forth.

2.136

It is simply called cognizing the designated, because the five consciousnesses are definitely capable of cognizing that designated status based on blue.

2.137

The Commentary says: "However, other-dependent ... is spoken in reference to the matter being broken down," and so forth.

2.138

As for calling this atom other-dependent (paratantra), it is spoken only in reference to the entity of the matter that is broken down; the substance of an atom does not truly exist, so it is not other-dependent.

2.139

The Commentary says: "Due to five reasons the Buddha spoke of atoms," and so forth.

2.140

According to that treatise (*Yogācārabhūmi*): Establishing atoms has five distinct benefits. Namely, by means of the provisional method of breaking down an aggregate of matter, one can cultivate pure and vast practice with respect to the cognitive domain; this is the first benefit. Again, one can gradually eradicate the view of individuality (satkāya-dṛṣṭi); this is the second benefit. Just as one can gradually eradicate the view of individuality, so one can surely gradually eradicate arrogance; this is the third benefit. Again, one can gradually subdue the entanglements of the afflictions; this is the fourth benefit. Again, one can swiftly eliminate all characteristics (nimitta); this is the fifth benefit.

2.141

Explanation: First, destroying permanence and realizing impermanence. Second, knowing impermanence, one does not conceptualize a self and so forth. Third, since there is no self, the arrogance concomitant with self can surely be eradicated. Fourth, having severed views and arrogance, one subdues delusion regarding those domains so that it does not arise. Fifth, because of subduing delusion, one does not grasp at characteristics and can remove attachment to dharmas. Alternatively, the five distinct benefits are just the three liberations: the first two are the emptiness gate of liberation; the third and fourth are the wishless gate of liberation; the fifth is the signless gate of liberation; their aspects are easy to deduce.

2.142

The Commentary says: "Having no further subtle parts," and so forth.

2.143

According to fascicle three of that treatise: However, an aggregate of matter has parts, but an atom does not. Why? Because the atom is itself a part; this belongs to aggregated matter, and there are no further atoms beyond the atom; therefore, an atom does not have parts.

2.144

The Commentary says: "Not the domain of the fleshly or divine eye," and so forth.

2.145

Question: What is the reason for this?

2.146

Answer: According to that treatise: Because that divine eye only grasps the middle, surface, above, below, front, back, two sides, light, or darkness of aggregated matter, it can never grasp the locus of an atom, because the entity of an atom is established through analysis by wisdom. The treatise specifically indicates the divine eye, and by analogy the fleshly eye is known; thus it does not explain them separately. That is, the other three eyes all cognize atoms.

2.147

Question: What is the entity of the wisdom eye and Dharma eye that enables them to contemplate atoms?

2.148

Answer: They have wisdom (prajñā) as their entity. However, fundamental wisdom and subsequent wisdom are divided into two explanations: One says both eyes are subsequent wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna), the wisdom eye contemplating emptiness and the Dharma eye contemplating existence; or both eyes generally contemplate both emptiness and existence.

2.149

If so, how does that which is empty cognize atoms?

2.150

Answer: It cognizes the emptiness of atoms; wisdom of emptiness can cognize it. The second says the wisdom eye contemplates suchness, being the fundamental wisdom (mūla-jñāna), and the Dharma eye contemplates emptiness, being subsequent wisdom.

2.151

If so, how does the wisdom eye cognize atoms?

2.152

Answer: Cognizing the suchness of atoms is called cognizing atoms.

2.153

Detailed analysis: We now rely on the latter explanation, as it has textual support. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya* states: "True suchness is solely the domain of the holy wisdom eye." Therefore we know that the wisdom eye cognizes true suchness.

2.154

Question: What is the entity of the Buddha eye?

2.155

Answer: There are two meanings. One says: In the causal stage they are distinct as Dharma and wisdom; in the fruition stage they are collectively the Buddha eye. Hence the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: Just as four rivers reach the great lake and are collectively called the ocean. The second says: Non-conceptual wisdom is its entity, because its entity differs from the wisdom and Dharma eyes; or it is called the Buddha eye on account of great compassion.

2.156

Detailed analysis: The former explanation is primary, because the text of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* is self-evident, and the latter explanation of great compassion is also too narrow.

2.157

Question: According to the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, the four eyes reaching Buddhahood are collectively called the Buddha eye; why then are atoms not the domain of the fleshly and divine eyes?

2.158

Answer: There are two explanations. One says: Although upon reaching the Buddha stage they can also cognize atoms, in the causal stage this is not so, unlike wisdom and Dharma which, in both cause and fruition, can take atoms as their domain. The second says: Saying that the Buddha eye can cognize them takes only the portion whose nature is wisdom; although the fleshly and divine [eyes] reaching Buddhahood are called the Buddha eye, since their entity is not wisdom, they do not cognize atoms. The latter explanation is superior.

2.159

Question: Can it be that the atoms of the Mahāyāna have no fundamental material basis (mūla-dharmin)?

2.160

Answer: Since the holy teaching says "established through analysis by conceptual wisdom," how could there be a fundamental material basis? Some say: Atoms are of two kinds: first, the intrinsic nature (prakṛti); second, the reflected image (pratibimba). As for the intrinsic nature, Buddhas and great bodhisattvas, through supernatural power, break down that great earth into atoms; hence it is called intrinsic nature.

2.161

Question: Treatises like the *Yogācārabhūmi* speak only of breaking down through wisdom to form atoms; this is just the reflected image, so how could there be a fundamental material basis?

2.162

Answer: When presenting the doctrine against opponents, it was omitted because it slightly resembles the non-Buddhists. Hence fascicle thirty-two of the *Nyāyānusāra* says: Atoms are of two kinds, first, real; second, designated. "Real" refers to the intrinsically established intrinsic nature of form and the like, acquired by direct perception at the stage of aggregation; "designated" refers to that known through inference by breaking down. Fearing confusion with the Sarvāstivāda school, it only spoke of the designated; in reality, Mahāyāna also has both. Saying that aggregated matter has no atoms is also to be understood in this way. How could our own school lack subtly obstructive matter? Furthermore, in Mahāyāna, aggregated matter is not formed by the accumulation of dispersed atoms; when it is said that aggregated matter lacks them, the principle of breaking down the aggregate into atoms is not contradicted. Furthermore, when bodhisattvas and others engage in the contemplation of water and the like, they transform the faculties, dusts, and other categories of the fundamental material basis into water, fire, gold, silver, ghee, and so forth; why then should contemplation of atoms alone not be able to transform that fundamental material basis into atoms? If one allows them to become atoms, why not allow that there is a fundamental material basis of atoms?

2.163

Question: Since there is a fundamental material basis, why is it called designated?

2.164

Answer: First, the fundamental atom is transformed by the eighth consciousness and is not outside consciousness; unlike other schools, it is therefore called designated. However, because it possesses material obstruction, it is said to be real; being an aspect of maturation (vipāka), the fundamental atom does not perfume to form seeds. The reflected image atom does not have the obstructive function like the fundamental material basis, and is therefore said to be designated; functioning as an objective condition to produce visual consciousness, it is said to be substantially real; the reflected image atom perfumes to form seeds. Were it not so, subsequent consciousness would lack an image.

2.165

Question: Among the bases (āyatana) of form and the like, by which base is it subsumed?

2.166

Answer: Both the fundamental and reflected atoms are subsumed only under the mental base (dharmāyatana), because they are exclusively objects of the mind. Furthermore, since they share the same seed as the image, if the fundamental is subsumed under the ten bases, the image must also be so.

2.167

Detailed analysis: Looking up at this conclusion, its logic is indeed rich! Yet scriptural proofs are scarce. Now, relying on the great school, I shall roughly distinguish right from wrong. The atom of intrinsic nature briefly has five faults: First, the fault of lacking doctrinal evidence. When the Great Dharma King governs the world, those who are confused resolve their doubts through his golden words; when superior beings conceal their light, the perplexed settle doubts through jade tablets. What is recorded in jade tablets may be held and honored on the crown of one's head; what arises from human opinion is inherently hesitant and untrustworthy. The doctrine now established is completely absent from the holy teachings; what should students rely on to believe and enter it? Second, the fault of contradicting the holy teachings. According to fascicle fifty-four of the *Yogācārabhūmi*:

2.168

Question: Why is an indivisible atom (paramāṇu) without origination and without cessation?

2.169

Answer: Because when aggregated forms first originate, they originate as wholes; and when they finally cease, they cease entirely mid-way without reaching the stage of an indivisible atom, just like a water droplet. Furthermore, based on five aspects, it should be known that this is called unmethodical contemplation (ayoniśo-manaskāra) regarding indivisible atoms: namely, asserting that within aggregated forms the intrinsic nature of indivisible atoms abides, or has origination and cessation; or asserting that indivisible atoms combine with or separate from other indivisible atoms; or asserting that various aggregated forms are accumulations of indivisible atoms; or asserting that indivisible atoms can produce distinct and numerous aggregated forms. Moreover, the eighteenth fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā states: 'All indivisible atoms are merely established through conceptual imputation; their real substance does not exist.' If one claims that there are indivisible atoms, how would that not contradict the above sacred teachings? If one says that the earlier teaching is based on the non-existence of scattered atoms forming aggregated forms and so forth, calling it 'having no indivisible atoms,' but that it does not preclude the atoms produced by analyzing coarse matter—this is not a good defense. The atom produced by analyzing coarse matter would be the final cessation, so how could it not have cessation? If this analyzed atom later combines into coarse matter, how could it not be called origination? Could it be that the analyzed atom never combines again? Furthermore, within aggregated forms there would be two components: the intrinsic nature of the indivisible atom analyzed by the Great Sage, and the analyzed atoms themselves, which in relation to one another would also have combination and separation; aggregated forms would also have accumulations of atomic measures, and could also be said to distinctly produce numerous aggregations. Why then did the Yogācārabhūmi judge them universally as 'without origination and without cessation' and as 'unmethodical contemplation'? Furthermore, since the substance of what is analyzed would not be non-existent, why do the treatises determine that they lack real substance and are merely established through conceptual imputation? If one says that in confronting opponents to present their own doctrine, the treatises briefly refrained from mentioning it for fear of conflating it with non-Buddhist doctrines, this too is not a successful defense: having originally completely omitted to state the real atom accepted by oneself, how could that be called presenting the doctrine? Since both nominal and real indivisible atoms are accepted, why would stating only the nominal constitute presenting the doctrine? Moreover, if one did not speak of one's own accepted atoms for fear of conflation, then because other schools possess the three categories [of skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas], the Mahāyāna should also fear conflation and not speak of them. If one says that they are spoken of because the three categories are the same, that is also inadmissible. If based on identity of name, the same applies to indivisible atoms; if spoken with respect to substance, the substances of the three categories in the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna differ in manifold ways as nominal or real, so how could they be called the same? Furthermore, if the intrinsic atom (mūla-dharmin) transformed by the eighth consciousness is called nominal merely because it is not external to consciousness, then the sense faculties, objects, and so forth directly cognized by the eighth consciousness would all be called nominal; and those directly cognized by the five consciousnesses such as the visual consciousness would similarly have to be so by analogy, because they are not external to consciousness. These are not so; why should that [atom] be so? Therefore, we know that because they originally do not exist, the teaching does not speak of them.

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