成唯識論演祕 5

English (machine translation) 5

Language: English

5.2

Regarding the Treatise's statement: "Always arising in dependence on the mind," and so forth.

One explanation objects: Sensation and so forth arise in dependence on the mind, and sensation and so forth are called mental factors (caitasika); the mind arises in dependence on sensation and so forth, so it should be called a "factor of sensation, and so forth." Moreover, sensation and so forth possess the four meanings, so sensation and so forth are called mental factors; the mind also possesses the four meanings, so it should be called a "factor of sensation, and so forth." As the Commentary excludes them by means of those two or three meanings, yet the Commentary states that [the mind] should be called a mental factor—this is not correct: since it is spoken of by setting the primary mind against sensation and so forth, how could it still be said to be called a "mental factor"?

5.4

Evaluation: The general designation "mental factor" (caitasika) is established because it depends on another and possesses the four meanings. The Commentary drew a parallel between the general designations of the primary mind and mental factors because the mind depends on another and possesses the four meanings; it did not make the objection based on individual sensation and so forth.

5.5

Question: Since the treatise itself states that always depending on the mind, etc., is called a mental factor, and the mind does not depend on the mind, how can one object that it should be called a mental factor? Answer: "Depending on the mind" indicates depending on what is not oneself; because it depends on what is not oneself, it receives the name "mental factor". The mind's dependence is also like this—why would it not be a mental factor? The Commentary censured it based on reason; otherwise, the mind is general, while sensation and so forth are specific. The specific and the general do not fit closely, so the objection would not be precise. Now I assist with an objection: sensation and so forth arise depending on the mind, and following their dependence, they are called mental factors; the mind arises depending on mental factors, so it should be called a factor of mental factors; the remaining objections correspond to this. This does not contradict the treatise, nor is there the fault of an unequal match between the specific and general.

5.6

Regarding the Treatise's statement: "That is, the particular characteristics grasped by the various mental factors."

5.7

Question: The Yogācārabhūmi only states that attention cognizes the characteristics not yet cognized by this [primary mind]; how is it known that "what is not yet cognized" refers to the particular characteristics grasped by the various mental factors?

5.8

Answer: The particular characteristics grasped by the various mental factors are all characteristics not yet cognized by the primary mind. Since it says that attention cognizes what is not yet cognized by this, one clearly knows that it can cognize all the particular characteristics grasped by the remaining mental factors.

5.9

Regarding the Commentary's statement: "The Prakaraṇāryavācā, fascicle eighteen, has a verse," and so forth.

5.10

According to that verse, it states: "Depending on the cognition of multiple objects, / each arises performing its own function; / the mental dharmas should not be deliberated upon, / because they operate on similar objects." The treatise states: Mental dharmas rely upon the eight kinds of consciousness that can cognize multiple objects, and arise each performing their own activity; existing in dependence on the mind, they are therefore called mental dharmas. One should not further deliberate upon their cognized objects, because they operate on equal objects together with the consciousness.

5.11

Explanation: Only by means of a single meaning is the designation "mental factor" established. The statement "operate on equal objects" shows that those mental factors also cognize the general characteristic.

5.12

Regarding the Treatise's statement: "In other passages it is further said, up to: 'characteristics of merit, defect, and so forth.'"

5.13

The Madhyāntavibhāga, fascicle one, merely states that mental factors also cognize particular characteristics; the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle three, merely states that particular mental factors cognize agreeable things, etc., without the character "also" (亦). Because the two treatises are cited together, it therefore says: "can also cognize agreeable things, and so forth."

5.14

Question: The mind grasps the general characteristic, while mental factors encompass both the general and the particular; how can it be said that they have the identical cognized object (ālambana)?

5.15

Answer: One explanation says: "Identical cognized object" discusses this object in general; it does not say that the particular characteristics of this object are also identical. Furthermore, regarding the meaning of the primary mind and mental factors grasping the general and the particular, there are four explanations in total: The first says: The mind grasps only the general, and mental factors grasp only the particular. All treatises state that consciousness cognizes the general characteristic, and the Yogācārabhūmi merely says that mental factors cognize the characteristics of this not yet cognized, without stating that they cognize the general. Although this treatise states that this indicates mental factors also cognize the general characteristic, the intention of the commentator does not rely upon it. The second says: The primary mind grasps only the general characteristic, while mental factors grasp both the general and the particular. The Great Treatise (Yogācārabhūmi) and the Madhyāntavibhāga are as explained by the treatise master; since there is an explicit statement, it must not be contradicted in principle. The third says: Mental factors are as said by the previous second master; the primary mind also cognizes both the general and particular characteristics. Therefore, the treatise below says: "Sensation can experience agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral objects, causing the mind and so forth to give rise to aspects of joy, sorrow, and equanimity." If it also did not cognize agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral objects, how could it give rise to aspects of joy, sorrow, and equanimity? Explanations of the remaining mental factors all have the meaning of causing the mind to grasp particular characteristics. In the treatise, the passages above and below are numerous, so one knows that the primary mind also cognizes particular characteristics. Statements in the Great Treatise and so forth are all spoken regarding the primary mind's own power; assuming there were no mental factors, its own power could not grasp particular characteristics. Just as a king knows particular affairs due to his ministers, if he did not rely on them, he would be unable to know them. The fourth says: The primary mind is as said by the previous third master; mental factors cognize not only their own particular characteristics, but just as the mind can cognize all particular characteristics, all associated dharmas by their very nature cognize identically, being only a single object. Otherwise, how could it be said to cause the mind and so forth to give rise to joy, sorrow, and so forth? Since it says the word "and so forth", one therefore knows that mental factors grasp all particular characteristics. Although there are four explanations, one should rely on the latter: all associated dharmas are equal in power with respect to one another; that some cognize and some do not is unreasonable. The treatise's statement that the particulars grasped by sensation and so forth are distinct is spoken provisionally with respect to what is grasped by their own activity; speaking realistically, through the power of association they mutually grasp the cognized object, none of which contradicts principle.

5.16

Question: If through the power of association they mutually grasp the cognized object, then also through association mental modes (ākāra) would mutually arise, so sensation and so forth should give rise to modes such as grasping images?

5.17

Explanation: The object of the mind and so forth is the same, grasped through the power of association; but their mental modes are described as distinct, and sensation and so forth are not the same. Another explanation: through the power of association they can give rise to various modes; because sensation causes the mind and so forth to give rise to joy, etc., provisionally following the predominant it merely says "causes the mind", but in reality it also causes sensation and so forth to remember clearly.

5.18

Question: If so, then within the same conjunction the modes of the mind and mental factors would all be identical—should they not become conflated and disordered?

5.19

Answer: Mental modes and objective appearances differ in terms of primary and secondary, so there is no contradiction in principle. Fascicle two states: the mental modes through which the mind and mental dharmas grasp things are distinct; fascicle three states that the five beginning with contact are not those capable of full discernment; both are spoken in terms of primary modes, and do not contradict each other at all.

5.20

Evaluation: Now we rely upon the second, because the passages in the Yogācārabhūmi, the Madhyāntavibhāga, and this Viṃśikā/Cheng weishi lun are clear and explicit. Since the other three explanations lack explicit statements, they are certainly difficult to rely on; ordinary thinking should not forcefully reconcile the holy intention. The text below itself states that sensation can experience agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral objects, not stating that the mind grasps agreeable and disagreeable objects; the remaining mental factors saying "causing the mind, and so forth" will be reconciled when coming to that text. Furthermore, based on what would one know that it refers to their primary modes, when fascicles two and three earlier say that the modes of the primary mind and mental factors are distinct, and that the five such as contact are not those capable of discernment? There is no statement in the foundational teaching—is this not merely subjective conjecture? Please examine this carefully, and do not mislead future students.

5.21

Regarding the Treatise's statement: "Experiencing the characteristic of an agreeable object, up to: 'neither painful nor pleasurable.'"

5.22

Question: When the bodily consciousness simultaneously experiences agreeable and disagreeable objects, with which sensation is it associated?

5.23

Answer: Traditionally there are two explanations: First, it is said: There is no single moment in which it can experience two objects, therefore it is accompanied by whichever one occurs. Second, it is said: Precisely in a single moment it can experience two objects, because the objects arrive simultaneously; following the stronger object, it is accompanied by only one sensation, just as the mental consciousness accompanying the five senses is accompanied by a sensation following whichever object is stronger; therefore, this should also be like that.

5.24

Question: There are five sensations—for what reason are they combined?

5.25

Answer: Joy and pleasure, sorrow and pain, are similar in gladness and distress, and are therefore combined into three.

5.26

If so, why does it not say joy, sorrow, and equanimity?

5.27

Answer: By subsuming the light under the heavy, and subsuming the narrow under the broad, because pleasure and pain extend across consciousnesses of multiple stages.

5.28

Regarding the Commentary's statement: "The Abhidharma, up to: 'accumulating the physical support,'" and so forth.

5.29

According to that treatise, it states: "Accumulating the physical support establishes bodily sensation; accumulating the non-physical support establishes mental sensation."

5.30

Explanation: Both body and mind have accumulation as their meaning, so both the material and non-material are said to be "accumulating"; they receive the designations body and mind from the two supports.

5.31

Question: The sixth relies on the seventh; why is the seventh called "mind", given that it lacks the meaning of accumulation?

5.32

Answer: Because moment after moment continues in succession, earlier and later being numerous, it obtains the name "accumulation"; or based on the foundational consciousness; or because within the mental faculty it encompasses the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, it is called the accumulated mind.

5.33

Regarding the Commentary's statement: "Sensation is broad while the faculties are narrow."

5.34

As in the section on the three sensations, the two sensations of pain and pleasure contain sorrow and joy; but speaking of the faculties, it is not like this, because among the twenty-two faculties, joy, pleasure, sorrow, and pain are each established separately; therefore, the broad and narrow differ.

5.35

Regarding the Commentary's statement: "Because they do not arise together, they are not subsumed under the uncontaminated."

5.36

Question: An uncontaminated mind definitely has pliancy; pliancy is harmonious and smooth—how could the concurrent five consciousnesses have pain?

5.37

Answer: The associated consciousness is harmonious and smooth and lacks pain; the five consciousnesses are not associated [with it]—what fault is there in having pain?

5.38

Regarding the Commentary's statement: "If they elucidate each other, according to what is appropriate."

5.39

The seven material [faculties] and the life faculty are based on abandoning by non-arising, to elucidate that faith and so forth are also open to the objection of being abandoned by seeing: because the eight starting with faith prior to the bhūmis never arise again after the path of seeing, abandoning the bond of cognized objects of faith and so forth elucidates that the seven material [faculties] and life faculty are not called abandoned by seeing, because what binds them still exists.

5.40

Regarding the Commentary's statement: "One cannot say that six, up to: 'because they exist in the body of an aśaikṣa.'"

5.41

This restates what is explained by an opponent. What is explained means: in an aśaikṣa, learning is complete, so it receives the name "unabandoned"; since life exists in that person's body, what fault is there in being unabandoned?

5.42

Regarding the Commentary's statement: "The five faculties should also be like this," and so forth.

5.43

The author of the Commentary questions [this]: In an arhat (aśaikṣa) there are also the five physical sense faculties, matter and the rest; these five faculties should likewise be subsumed under non-severance. Since this is not so, why should that [vital faculty] be so?

5.44

Question: Regarding 'not to be severed,' in principle there are two meanings: first, what is sāsrava in nature within the person of an aśaikṣa, because it resides in an anāsrava person, is designated anāsrava and is also designated not to be severed; second, what is anāsrava in substance is also anāsrava and is not to be severed. If the physical faculties of an aśaikṣa are permitted to be subsumed under non-severance, what fault is there in this?

5.45

Answer: It is based on being anāsrava in substance that, in conformity with anāsrava, it is designated as not to be severed; it does not rely on the first meaning.

5.46

Question: Are the Buddha's physical [faculties] and vital faculty not anāsrava? Why do the eight faculties not admit of being not to be severed?

5.47

Answer: Because they are explained in common across the three vehicles, they are not [exclusively] non-severable.

5.48

Treatise: 'Furthermore, being of the trainee, of the non-trainee, and of neither constitutes the three.'

5.49

According to fascicle fifty-seven of the Yogācārabhūmi: How many are of the trainee? How many take the trainee as their object?

5.50

Explanation: Among the twenty-two faculties, how many are the three [categories], trainee and so forth? And which take trainee and so forth as their objective cognitive object? The treatise answers: Nine are of the trainee, of the non-trainee, and of neither the trainee nor the non-trainee, and take the three kinds as their object.

5.51

Explanation: The five faculties of faith and so forth, the mental faculty, joy, pleasure, and equanimity, also take the three kinds—trainee and so forth—as their object. One is common to the three kinds and takes neither the trainee nor the non-trainee as its object.

5.52

Explanation: 'One' refers to the pain faculty; because it is associated with the five consciousnesses, it does not take trainee and non-trainee as its object. Based on this, one therefore knows that the three feelings are common to the three.

5.53

Question: If pain and the rest are sāsrava in substance, why are they called trainee or non-trainee?

5.54

Answer: Because they are in the person of a trainee and so forth and have an orientation toward advancement, they are also called trainee and so forth. Thus fascicle sixty-six states: 'What are trainee dharmas? They are, for stream-enterers and other pugdalas who are trainees, either supra-mundane conditioned dharmas or mundane wholesome dharmas; these are called trainee dharmas. Why? Because relying on these dharmas, they vigorously practice and train in the three trainings of morality and so forth from time to time. What are non-trainee dharmas? They are, for arhats whose contaminations are already exhausted, either supra-mundane conditioned dharmas or mundane wholesome dharmas; these are called non-trainee dharmas. Excluding the previously explained trainee and non-trainee dharmas, the remaining dharmas of stream-enterers up to arhats, and dharmas subsumed under all ordinary persons—one should know that these are called dharmas of neither trainee nor non-trainee.' Furthermore, the second fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya states: 'All wholesome dharmas of those seeking liberation are the meaning of the trainee. All wholesome dharmas of those who have attained the culmination among the trainings are the non-trainee. Dharmas of the three natures belonging to all ordinary persons, the defiled and avyākṛta [dharmas] of trainees, the avyākṛta dharmas of non-trainees, and unconditioned dharmas, are neither trainee nor non-trainee.' The Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya broadly refers previously to 'seeking liberation,' whereas the Yogācārabhūmi, based on the superior, speaks of what is on the path of seeing; the treatises' intentions do not contradict one another.

5.55

Question: In what sense are the mundane dharmas within the person of a non-trainee also called anāsrava?

5.56

Answer: Based on being free from defilements. Thus fascicle sixty-six states: 'Question: For what reason are an arhat's mundane wholesome [dharmas] spoken of as anāsrava?'

5.57

'Answer: Because they fall within the three realms of existence, they are called subsumed [under existence]; because they are forever liberated from all contaminations and dormant tendencies, they are spoken of as anāsrava.'

5.58

Commentary: 'The remainder do not initiate bad conduct' and so forth.

5.59

That treatise merely states that the remainder are defiled-avyākṛta and do not initiate bad conduct; the mention of the view of selfhood, extreme views, and so forth in the Commentary is an explanation of that.

5.60

Commentary: 'Fascicle fifty-eight down to: they are inferred not to initiate karma.'

5.61

According to that treatise: 'Innate satkāyadṛṣṭi is exclusively of avyākṛta nature, because it frequently manifests, and because it does not extremely harm oneself or others.' The Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya states: 'The remaining avyākṛta dharmas are those that remain after those that initiate karma.' Since innate view of selfhood is avyākṛta in nature, it is clear that it is subsumed under the remainder and cannot initiate karma. As this is true of the view of selfhood, it is also true of extreme views, because they necessarily accompany it; therefore it does not discuss them.

5.62

Commentary: 'The mental consciousness at that time down to: unwholesome and undefiled [avyākṛta].'

5.63

Question: If the induced five consciousnesses must be of the same nature as the inducing sixth consciousness, how can the three moral natures be accommodated concurrently among the five consciousnesses?

5.64

Answer: The intention here is that the induced and the inducing mental consciousness cannot be entirely of different natures, not that they must necessarily be of the same nature; or it conforms to the doctrine of the masters who hold that the three natures do not occur concurrently.

5.65

Treatise: 'Because of having no conceptual discrimination down to: because of having conceptual discrimination.'

5.66

What is explained in the Commentary is meant to clarify that, based on the consciousness's degrees of oppression, gratification, and so forth, the distinctions of pleasure, joy, pain, grief, and so forth are formed; this does not preclude whether the mental consciousness has conceptual discrimination, or is slight, where only agitation is called pain and pleasure. Some who do not realize this rashly criticize it, saying: 'The later master explains that not only are the five consciousnesses extremely oppressive or gratifying because they are devoid of conceptual discrimination, but the pain and pleasure in the mind are also devoid of conceptual discrimination and are extreme, as explained in the treatise below; therefore one should generally say that conceptual discrimination and being extreme are called grief and joy, while being non-discriminative and slight are called pain and pleasure.'

5.67

I evaluate: When one examines the earlier Commentary's explanation, one knows that the later refutation is incorrect.

5.68

Treatise: 'Neither-pain-nor-pleasure down to: because it operates equanimously.'

5.69

Question: Equanimity involves agreeable and disagreeable [factors], which constitutes oppression or gratification; why say it is equanimous?

5.70

Answer: One opinion holds: In principle, it is not actually devoid of differentiation, but because its characteristics are subtle and hidden, it is not divided.

5.71

Commentary: 'Fascicle fifty-seven of the Yogācārabhūmi: eleven faculties in the unarrived stage.'

5.72

According to that treatise: Question: In the stage of unarrived [dhyāna], how many faculties are obtainable?

5.73

Answer: Eleven.

5.74

Explanation: Namely, the five beginning with faith, the three anāsrava faculties, and the mental faculty, joy, and equanimity. Some say: Excluding the mental faculty and taking pleasure, in principle it should actually be said that there are twelve faculties, because there is also the mental faculty; the reason it is not stated is that the mental faculty broadly indicates the self-nature of the eight consciousnesses, whereas in the unarrived stage there is only the sixth, and so it is omitted for brevity.

5.75

I evaluate: I now adopt the former explanation. Wherever there are caitasikas, there must be a citta; if the mental faculty is not mentioned, one might suspect that there are caitasikas without a citta. Even if there is no pleasure, in principle there is no obstacle.

5.76

Question: Why does it not mention the eye and other [faculties], as well as the vital faculty?

5.77

Answer: Because there is no rebirth relying on that [stage], it does not state that they exist.

5.78

Question: It only mentions eleven; how is it known that joy is counted among them?

5.79

Answer: That same treatise states: 'What scriptural authority proves that joy exists there?'

5.80

Answer: 'As the World-Honoured One said: "Such a monk permeates his body with joy and pleasure born of seclusion, thoroughly permeating it, suffusing and gratifying it all over, so that there is no part whatsoever that is unreached or unfilled; this is called joy and pleasure born of seclusion." Here, the first passage speaks of the unarrived stage, and the later passage speaks of the fundamental stage.'

5.81

Explanation: The sūtra explains both the unarrived and the fundamental: 'permeating his body with joy and pleasure born of seclusion' is the first passage; 'thoroughly permeating' and below is the later passage. Therefore we know that among the eleven, joy is one. The Prakaraṇāryavācā and the Abhidharmasamuccaya are largely identical and are not recorded here.

5.82

Question: In the first fundamental dhyāna, how is a single feeling divided into joy and pleasure?

5.83

Answer: It is fully distinguished in the Deng. One opinion holds that it should be due to temporal differences in their arising: that is, when gratification of the body is not pervasive, it is merely called joy; when it is pervasive, it is called pleasure.

5.84

I evaluate: This treatise itself states that based on gratifying the body and the mind, joy and pleasure are distinguished. Since [that opinion] contradicts what has been taught, it cannot be relied upon.

5.85

Question: In the first and second fundamental [dhyānas], both body and mind are gratified, dividing into joy and pleasure; in places of mixed painful feelings where both body and mind are oppressed, shouldn't they divide into grief and pain?

5.86

Answer: As the Yideng states, regarding the differences of disagreeable and agreeable, their seeds have commonalities and distinctions, which should resolve this doubt. Furthermore, another explanation is: in the first and second fundamental [dhyānas], the five consciousnesses are joyous and gratified, the faculties are stimulated, and the courageous mind divides into two; in mixed feelings, the five [consciousnesses] are completely oppressed and the mind is slight; because the mind has grief, it does not divide into two.

5.87

Treatise: 'The third dhyāna' and so forth.

5.88

Question: In the third fundamental [dhyāna], does it not gratify the faculties? If the faculties are gratified, why does it not say so?

5.89

Answer: Because the previous two absorptions involve agitation and boldness, it is only upon gratifying the faculties that it is pleasure, and therefore it is mentioned. In the third [dhyāna], it is tranquil and calm; it is not called pleasure only in relation to the faculties, so it is not mentioned; in principle, its gratification of the faculties actually surpasses the previous ones.

5.90

Commentary: 'Fascicle sixty-six contains this general discussion.'

5.91

Fascicle sixty-six also states that animals have continuous pain and grief. Thus that treatise says: 'Sentient beings born in Naraka, immediately after retribution, have retribution-born continuous pain and grief; one should know that if born among a portion of hungry ghosts and animals, it is likewise.'

5.92

Commentary: 'Fascicle fifty-seven says it is identical with the hells.'

5.93

That same treatise states: 'Because the remaining three are manifest, they do not possess [them]; because of their seeds, they do possess [them], just as beings born in the realm of Naraka experience exclusively painful [feelings], and one should know that animals and hungry ghosts are likewise.' Furthermore, fascicle sixty-six's 'immediately after retribution' and so forth are also identical across the three destinies, as cited previously.

5.94

Commentary: 'One faculty is wholesome or unwholesome' and so forth.

5.95

According to that treatise: 'Eight are exclusively wholesome, and take wholesome, unwholesome, and avyākṛta as their objects; five are wholesome, unwholesome, and avyākṛta, and take wholesome, unwholesome, and avyākṛta as their objects; one is wholesome and unwholesome, and takes wholesome, unwholesome, and avyākṛta as its object. Five are avyākṛta, and take avyākṛta as their object; two are avyākṛta, and take wholesome, unwholesome, and avyākṛta as their objects.'

5.96

Explanation: Eight refers to faith and so forth, and the three anāsrava [faculties]; five refers to the five feelings, excluding grief and taking the mental faculty; one refers to the grief faculty; another five refers to body, male, female, nose, and tongue; two refers to eye and ear; this is stated on the basis of unexpressed action; because the vital faculty is not associated [with consciousness], its object is not discussed.

5.97

Treatise: 'The treatise states that the grief faculty is not avyākṛta down to: animals are also like this.'

5.98

One opinion holds: I now assist the former master in rescuing against the first objection, saying: The treatise, following the provisional principle, says it is wholesome and unwholesome, but in reality it extends to avyākṛta. Rescuing against the latter objection, saying: Grief is the eighth and equanimity is the third; saying that grief is definitely possessed is stated on the basis of the majority, meaning that except for birth and death, in the other states the grief faculty is constantly continuous.

5.99

I evaluate: I now assist the later master in reproaching the former master, saying: Based on what fact does the treatise need to follow the minor opinion? Moreover, why is the primary [faculty of] equanimity discarded and not taken? How could it not follow the mental faculty as an analogy? Furthermore, the possession of the remaining seven is not based on the majority; why should the grief faculty alone be based on the majority? Therefore, the rescue is untenable.

5.100

Commentary: 'Eight faculties are possessed both in manifestation and as seeds.'

5.101

Question: The vital faculty is established relying on the seeds of that eighth [consciousness]; how can it be said that all eight are possessed in manifestation and as seeds?

5.102

Answer: The manifestation of the eighth is called life; the seeds of the eighth are called faculty; combined they are called vital faculty, so it encompasses both seed and manifestation.

5.103

Commentary: "Being eclipsed by pure suffering" and so forth.

5.104

According to that treatise: In the hells and so on, eclipsed by other [factors], neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant sensation occurs simultaneously with pure, unadulterated unpleasant sensation; you should know that because this sensation is eclipsed, it is difficult to perceive clearly, just as in the hells and so on, it occurs simultaneously with purely unpleasant sensation.

5.105

Explanation: The word "and so on" includes those hungry ghosts and animals of pure suffering. In their state, although the ālaya[-vijñāna] possesses neutral sensation, because the unpleasant sensation in the other consciousnesses is intense and violent, it eclipses [the neutral sensation] so that it does not appear; therefore it speaks of unpleasant sensation. Purely unpleasant sensation is spoken of in terms of capacity to receive; it simply omits mention of neutral [sensation].

5.106

Treatise: "Without pleasant retribution, it is called pure suffering."

5.107

This resolves a latent objection. The latent objection means: If there is flow-congruent (niṣyanda) pleasure, how can it be called pure suffering? Therefore it answers now: In view of the absence of pleasant karmic retribution (vipāka), it receives the name 'pure suffering.'

5.108

Commentary: "Therefore Yogācārabhūmi fascicle fifty-nine explains that in fascicle fifty-eight..." and so forth.

5.109

This shows that fascicle fifty-nine reconciles with fascicle fifty-eight, stating that malice and grief being associated in the mental stage is based on secondary occurrence and so on. According to fascicle fifty-eight: Furthermore, of the ten defilements, seven pertain exclusively to the mental stage; attachment, malice, and ignorance also extend to the five consciousnesses. Furthermore, in the desire realm, attachment is associated with pleasure, joy, and equanimity; malice is associated with suffering, grief, and equanimity.

5.110

Explanation: Suffering is based on the five consciousnesses, grief exclusively on the sixth, and equanimity extends to all six consciousnesses. Furthermore, fascicle fifty-nine states: If they arise spontaneously, all defilements can be found actively occurring in all three sensations; therefore, those extending to all conscious bodies are associated with all faculties; those not extending to all conscious bodies are associated with all faculties of the mental stage. If they do not arise spontaneously, all defilements are associated with the respective faculties as appropriate. The previous analysis of defilements associated with the faculties was established only in terms of coarse-aspect principles, in order that beginners may understand without confusion. Now it is established in terms of both coarse and subtle principles, in order that long-term practitioners may understand the various distinctions in practice and comprehension in their own and others' persons. Since the methods are extensively formulated and largely agree with what is explained in the sixth [fascicle] of this treatise, they are not recorded here. The Commentary refers to this passage in saying that what fascicle fifty-eight states is based on secondary occurrence and coarse aspects.

5.111

Commentary: "Fascicle sixty-six says that the hells also have food."

5.112

According to that treatise: Coarse solid food is found actively occurring in all five destinies of the desire realm; this is in a portion of the isolated hells, not the great hells.

5.113

Question: Since the text explicitly makes this distinction, what fault is there in accepting it?

5.114

Answer: Fascicle fifty-seven states: In the hells there is no solid food, and the same holds for the devas of the meditative stages. The hell beings mostly abide for a long time supported by the power of prior karma; although there are vast causes and conditions that harm the faculties and great elements, they cannot die; yet they also have subtle winds that enter their bodily parts in succession and serve as food, which is difficult to perceive clearly, and therefore it is not mentioned. Since this text says "the hell beings [in general]," we know that the later text is a metaphorical expression. If not, would there not be a contradiction between earlier and later? The mention of wind and so forth as food should be understood as a metaphorical expression.

5.115

Commentary: "Namely, the Mahāsāṃghika [view that] the consciousnesses arise simultaneously" and so forth.

5.116

Because consciousnesses arise simultaneously, the retributive suffering of the latter five consciousnesses and the grief of the mind-consciousness occur in succession. The rest may be inferred accordingly.

5.117

Fascicle Six of the Commentary

5.118

Commentary: "Generally rejoicing in the arising of the teaching."

5.119

The Treatise says: "Now it should be explained at length" is an exhortative phrase. Some commentaries say it reveals; both revealing and exhorting are acceptable.

5.120

Question: Since the treatise is self-authored, why would it exhort itself?

5.121

Answer: It provisionally sets up host and guest, or it encourages itself.

5.122

Treatise: "As the sūtra states, down to... the four are omnipresent."

5.123

There is an opinion: The original Qijin jing and what is cited here both say "down to extensive explanation." What is extensively explained? By this authoritative testimony we clearly know that the primary mind also grasps specific characteristics; otherwise, how could the primary mind apprehend proper causes and so forth by means of volition? From this it is definitively stated that it also grasps specific characteristics, but without mental factors it cannot grasp them on its own. Therefore the treatises say that it only grasps general characteristics while mental factors grasp specific ones; one should know accordingly that this is because of the word "and so forth."

5.124

Detailed analysis: The sūtra indicates an outline, citing the arising of eye-consciousness and not mentioning the other consciousnesses, hence it says "down to"; or the treatise cites it in summary, inserting the words "down to." Therefore, the first fascicle of the Xianyang lun also cites this sūtra, saying: "Thus it should be known down to the body-consciousness; the difference here is that each relies on its own faculty and each grasps its own sensory object, each distinctly discerning all; it should be cited like the previous two sūtras"; the words "down to" do not indicate that the primary mind grasps specific characteristics. Furthermore, characteristics include erroneous, proper, and both; therefore the word "and so forth" covers these. Hence the treatise itself says that when mind arises, not one of these is absent. Thus we know that the word "and so forth" does not indicate that the primary mind also apprehends specific characteristics; if it apprehended specific characteristics, earlier and later statements would be wide apart. Moreover, when mind arises, it is never without mental factors; how can one say that it grasps general characteristics on the basis of mind grasping without mental factors? If there were no mental factors, it would not even grasp general characteristics, let alone specific ones! In accordance with reason and teaching, that the primary mind grasps general characteristics can be well explained; erroneous, proper, and so forth are indeed general characteristics.

5.125

Treatise: "These sacred teachings establishing proof are not just one."

5.126

According to the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle fifty-five, these are also said to be called omnipresent (sarvatraga). That treatise states: Question: When the consciousnesses arise, how many omnipresent mental factors do they arise together with?

5.127

Answer: Five, namely attention (manaskāra) and so forth.

5.128

Treatise: "Reason means... down to... there must be volition" and so forth.

5.129

Question: How do we know that contact is the harmony of the three, down to volition making the mind act?

5.130

Answer: According to the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle fifty-five: "What is attention? It means being able to stimulate the mind. What is contact? It means being able to apprehend the object due to the harmony of the three. What is sensation? It means being able to experience the object due to the harmony of the three. What is perception? It means conceptualizing the intentional object and grasping it by nominal composite due to the harmony of the three. What is volition? It means causing the mind to act, and uniting with or separating from what is experienced in the intentional object, due to the harmony of the three."

5.131

Commentary: "The first fascicle of the Xianyang [lun] cites proof stating their existence."

5.132

To prove the existence of the omnipresent factors, that treatise states: As the sūtra says, "...attention to this suffering," and so forth. It also says that with attention generated by that properly arising, eye-consciousness and so forth arise accordingly; as the sūtra says, there are six classes of contact; it also says that with eye and form as conditions, eye-consciousness can arise, and the gathering and harmonious union of these three phenomena can produce contact; it also says that contact is the condition for sensation, as the sūtra says there are six classes of sensation; it also says that sensation is the condition for craving, as the sūtra says there are six classes of perception; it also says that as one perceives, one produces verbal expression, as the sūtra says there are six classes of volition; it also says: You should know that my present six sense-fields of contact are the past karma created by volition in previous lives.

5.133

Treatise: "Next, the object-determined [mental factors]..." and so forth.

5.134

Fascicle fifty-five of the Yogācārabhūmi and fascicle one of the Xianyang lun explain the five entities and activities, largely the same as this, and are therefore not recorded here. However, the Xianyang lun cites sūtras as proof, which are not present in this treatise, and are thus cited here: As the sūtra says, "Desire is the root of all phenomena"; as the sūtra says, "We now give rise to resolved determination (adhimokṣa) in our minds: these internal six sense-spheres are definitively without self."

5.135

Explanation: Using the contemplation of non-self to take the intentional object of non-self and give rise to resolved determination, definitively knowing that all six sense-spheres are without self. As the sūtra says: "All mindfulness, recollection, distinct mindfulness, memory and recollection, not forgetting and not losing phenomena, having the nature of clear mental retention."

5.136

Explanation: Recollecting a past intentional object is called recollection (anusmṛti); recollecting distinct intentional objects is called distinct mindfulness; or initially general mindfulness, and later specific mindfulness; memory, not forgetting, and so forth are different names for mindfulness. As the sūtra says: "All making the mind abide, abiding equally, remaining firmly, abiding closely, and abiding stably, non-distraction, non-scatteredness, collecting and pacifying, samādhi, the mind abiding in a one-pointed nature."

5.137

Explanation: Binding the mind to abide internally and not wander externally is called making the mind abide. Subduing the mind, making it gradually subtler than before, comprehensively collecting it to abide, is called abiding equally. However, due to loss of mindfulness, it scatters and moves externally; reining it back in to abide in the internal intentional object is called remaining firmly. First drawing close to the foundations of mindfulness, by means of this mindfulness one repeatedly directs attention to abide the mind internally, not letting this mind abide far away externally; this is called abiding closely. The appearances of the five sensory objects scatter the mind; beforehand one considers those appearances as marks of fault, and by the predominant power of those marks, subdues the mind and prevents it from straying; this is called abiding stably. Desire, malice, harm, and so forth agitate the mind; therefore, beforehand one considers them with notions of fault, and by the power of perception, with respect to initial inquiry, subsequent defilements, and so forth, makes the mind upright without straying; this is called non-distraction. Due to extreme tranquility, the mind is not scattered, which is correct containment, called collecting and pacifying. Holding the mind equally is called samādhi. Clarifying that all the preceding minds are bound to abide in a single intentional object is called abiding in the intentional object. As the sūtra says: "Discerning phenomena, most supremely discerning, discerning phenomena supremely, fully knowing, closely knowing, spot-knowing, penetrating, investigating, acutely hearing, awakening, brightness, action of wisdom, vipaśyanā."

5.138

Explanation: Being able to correctly deliberate upon pure intentional objects, skillful intentional objects, or both, is called discerning phenomena. Discerning the true nature of suchness within the preceding three intentional objects is called most supremely discerning; discerning the essence of all suffering in the sūtras with respect to the truth of suffering and the distinct marks of suffering is called discerning phenomena supremely. Thoroughly investigating the intentional object is called fully knowing. Inquiring into the previously fully known intentional object with fine detail, becoming gradually truer and closer, is called closely knowing. Discerning mind and mental factors is called spot-knowing. Knowing the intentional objects of mind and mental factors is called penetrating. Being able to definitively apprehend all that exists is called investigating. Not forgetting that meaning successively from first to last is called acute comprehension. Innate wisdom capable of discernment is called awakening. Acquired wisdom through cultivation is called brightness; that is, being able to recite, question, debate, and determine, thereby becoming increasingly lucid with respect to the meaning, is called action of wisdom. Vipaśyanā is translated here as contemplation (guan), as explained extensively in the Great Treatise.

5.139

Commentary: "If it is said that just as craving... is the root of all phenomena" and so forth.

5.140

Taking up that external objection to generate the subsequent text. The meaning of the external objection is: Since you use craving as an analogy to show that desire is not omnipresent, how does the sūtra say that desire is the root?

5.141

Treatise: "This would again have to depend on something else, resulting in the fault of infinite regress."

5.142

There is an opinion: Below, the treatise explains mindfulness as making the mind clearly retain; their school also says that what clearly retains is based on the mind and so forth, and what is clearly retained is all phenomena. If, because of this, the mind and so forth clearly retain, this would again have to depend on something else, resulting in the fault of infinite regress. Those who delight in the treatises of this school should deliberate carefully.

5.143

Detailed analysis: That superior activation is originally the activity of the faculty of attention; however, depending again on another, resolved determination, there is an analogy, hence there is no infinite regress. In our school, clear retention is not the original activity of mind; therefore, though it depends on another, mindfulness, there is no such class [of infinite regress], and there is no fault of infinite regress.

5.144

Commentary: "Mind accepts that establishing function upon substance existing previously..." and so forth.

5.145

Question: Establishing function upon mental substance is accepted by oneself, not by the other; how can it serve as proof?

5.146

Answer: It was already established at length earlier, so using it as proof is without fault.

5.147

Treatise: "Faculties, powers, enlightenment factors... are not identical to mind."

5.148

Question: Which doctrine is being refuted? If it refutes the fundamental master [Harivarman], the mental factors of the fundamental master are all substantially mind, so wisdom and so forth as similar instances would fail to prove the proposition. If it refutes the subsequent doctrine, there would be the fault of proving what is already accepted, since they do not grant that mental factors exist apart from mind.

5.149

Answer: Following what is explained in the Commentary, it refutes the teachers among the branch traditions who establish three, four, or more caitasikas. Because wisdom and the like depend on cetanā and are not identical with citta, the example is without fault. Another opinion holds: It only refutes the root tradition, yet the example is without fault, because earlier he established wisdom and the like as existing separately; thus it may serve as an example. Furthermore, they interpret that school as taking scripture as the authority, stating that samādhi is identical with citta, while the others have separate essences.

5.150

Detailed examination: Although earlier he repeatedly spoke of caitasikas such as wisdom, he has not yet established that they have an essence separate from citta; why would this not be an error in the example? Furthermore, we have not seen it taught that among Sautrāntika teachers they uniquely reject samādhi while accepting the other caitasikas. Both explanations face difficulties, so relying on the Commentary is best.

5.151

Treatise: "In this manner ... thirty-one combinations."

5.152

As for the words 'collective' and 'separate', tradition transmits two interpretations. The first says: from two, two up to five is called 'collective'; arising one by one separately is called 'separate'. The second says: arising from one to four is called 'separate', and all five arising together is called 'collective'.

5.153

Detailed examination: The latter explanation is correct.

5.154

Question: When taking an object collectively, the cognitive object would be two or four; would this not contradict the rule that mental factors of the same conjunction share a single cognitive object?

5.155

Answer: The mūla-dharmin object is one, but in relation to the cognizing factors, it is divided conceptually into four, called 'what is desired', etc.; thus there is strictly no contradiction. Take a single object: wanting to observe it is called 'what is desired'; adhimokṣa determining it is called 'determined'; smṛti remembering it clearly is called 'previously experienced'; and samādhi focusing while wisdom discriminates it is called 'what is observed'. By this, the mental factors of the same conjunction share a single cognitive object.

5.156

Commentary: "This master holds that the supernormal knowledges of the divine eye and ear are wisdom associated with the mental consciousness," etc.

5.157

Following this master's view, not only are the two supernormal knowledges so, but even the kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna is not wisdom associated with the five consciousnesses; the five consciousnesses at both the causal and resultant stages lack wisdom. Alternatively, it is only at the causal stage that they lack it, while at the resultant stage they are admitted to possess it; therefore the later master challenges him using the Buddha's five consciousnesses as kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna. The latter explanation is logically superior.

5.158

Treatise: "Because it excludes equanimity ... thus samādhi is incidental."

5.159

As for the distinctions of samādhi, there are many varieties, as fully differentiated in the Liaoyi deng; for further agreements and differences, consult the Yogācārabhūmi and the Chāo.

5.160

Commentary: "The Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa says: 'Excluding the supernormal knowledge of the extinction of contaminants,'" etc.

5.161

Examining fascicle 3 of that treatise, it says: "Thus, the remaining dhyānas, liberations, non-contentious samādhis, knowledge based on aspiration, supernormal knowledges, unobstructed knowledges, and the like are mostly subsumed under pratyavekṣā-jñāna; the supernormal knowledge of psychic powers is mostly subsumed under kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna. As for the knowledge of the extinction of contaminants and the power of the knowledge of the extinction of contaminants: if spoken of as being within the continuum of one who has extinguished contaminants, they are subsumed under the four jñānas; if spoken of as taking the nirvāṇa of the extinction of contaminants as an object, they are mostly subsumed under ādarśa-jñāna and samatā-jñāna."

5.162

Explanation: Pratyavekṣā-jñāna has powerful function and subsumes many virtues. The supernormal knowledge of psychic powers arises taking external dust as object, resembling the five consciousnesses, so it is mostly within kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna. 'Continuum' refers to the body; being within the body of one who has extinguished contaminants, it is termed 'extinction of contaminants', and therefore subsumed under the four jñānas. If taking the dharma of nirvāṇa with contaminants extinguished as its object, it is called 'extinction of contaminants', and thus is subsumed under samatā-jñāna and ādarśa-jñāna. These two have strong capacity in taking true reality as object, and furthermore these two jñānas possess complete nirvāṇa. The quotation examined in the Commentary contains an error; one should follow the present account.

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