唯識二十論述記 2.361

2.361

又前有難：若無漏心不能親取境，應不知無者，此亦不然。佛知諸法皆性離言，非無、非有。疎所緣中以所執境為其本質，增上力故，心變為無，體實是有，相似無法，知此離言法，非如凡夫假智，及言二法所取。對凡夫說此離言法上，凡境為無，名為知無，非是親以無為相分。《佛地論》云：心所變無，依他起攝；真如理無，圓成實攝。遍計所執體既非有，若非前二攝，智何所知？由如是等所說理趣，護法為勝。此中但說除佛無漏智，猶自身中有法執種，凡夫之身或有現行，竝言不如佛，非佛此智親取他心。說緣過去諸無法等，皆准此知。此前七段，一、四事難議境無，却徵境實執；二、釋現量證境有，返破憶持執；三、釋以夢例覺時，應知境無失；四、釋二識成決定，外境非無失；五、釋難夢覺心不異，無造行果差失；六、釋無境殺無罪，返詰他宗失；七、釋不照他心，智識不成失。

Furthermore, concerning the earlier objection that if the uncontaminated mind cannot directly grasp an object, it should not know non-existence: this too is not so. The Buddha knows that all phenomena are in their nature beyond words, neither non-existent nor existent. Taking the grasped object in the remote perceptual condition (dūra-ālambana) as the underlying referent (maula-dravya), through predominant force the mind transforms into non-existence; its substantial essence is truly existent, yet it resembles a non-existent thing. He knows that this ineffable phenomenon is not grasped in the manner of ordinary persons' conceptual knowledge and verbalization—these two dharmas. Stated with respect to ordinary persons, the presence of the ordinary object upon this ineffable phenomenon is non-existent, and this is called 'knowing non-existence'; it is not that non-existence is directly taken as the objective aspect. The Buddhabhūmi-śāstra states: 'Non-existence transformed by the mind is subsumed under the other-dependent nature; non-existence as the principle of suchness is subsumed under the consummate nature.' Since the substantial essence of the imagined nature is not existent, if it were not subsumed under the previous two, what would knowledge know? Based on reasoning and approaches such as these, Dharmapāla's view is superior. Here, it is only stated that aside from the uncontaminated knowledge of a Buddha, the seeds of grasping at dharmas still remain in one's own stream, and in the person of an ordinary being they may even be active; all are declared to not be like the Buddha—it is not that this knowledge of the Buddha directly takes another's mind. The statements regarding perceiving past non-existent dharmas and the like are all to be understood accordingly. The preceding seven sections are: first, refuting the grasping at real objects by raising the difficulty of the four matters against the non-existence of objects; second, explaining that direct perception validates the existence of objects, and conversely refuting the grasping at memory; third, explaining the error that waking should be known to lack objects by analogy with dreaming; fourth, explaining the error that the two consciousnesses' mutual determination entails external objects are not non-existent; fifth, explaining the objection that since dream and waking minds do not differ, there would be the error of lacking distinctions in karmic deeds and retribution; sixth, explaining the error of the other school by retorting that without objects killing incurs no fault; seventh, explaining the error that cognition is unestablished because it does not perceive another's mind.