唯識二十論述記 2.361

2.361

Furthermore, concerning the earlier objection that if the uncontaminated mind cannot directly grasp an object, it should not know non-existence: this too is not so. The Buddha knows that all phenomena are in their nature beyond words, neither non-existent nor existent. Taking the grasped object in the remote perceptual condition (dūra-ālambana) as the underlying referent (maula-dravya), through predominant force the mind transforms into non-existence; its substantial essence is truly existent, yet it resembles a non-existent thing. He knows that this ineffable phenomenon is not grasped in the manner of ordinary persons' conceptual knowledge and verbalization—these two dharmas. Stated with respect to ordinary persons, the presence of the ordinary object upon this ineffable phenomenon is non-existent, and this is called 'knowing non-existence'; it is not that non-existence is directly taken as the objective aspect. The Buddhabhūmi-śāstra states: 'Non-existence transformed by the mind is subsumed under the other-dependent nature; non-existence as the principle of suchness is subsumed under the consummate nature.' Since the substantial essence of the imagined nature is not existent, if it were not subsumed under the previous two, what would knowledge know? Based on reasoning and approaches such as these, Dharmapāla's view is superior. Here, it is only stated that aside from the uncontaminated knowledge of a Buddha, the seeds of grasping at dharmas still remain in one's own stream, and in the person of an ordinary being they may even be active; all are declared to not be like the Buddha—it is not that this knowledge of the Buddha directly takes another's mind. The statements regarding perceiving past non-existent dharmas and the like are all to be understood accordingly. The preceding seven sections are: first, refuting the grasping at real objects by raising the difficulty of the four matters against the non-existence of objects; second, explaining that direct perception validates the existence of objects, and conversely refuting the grasping at memory; third, explaining the error that waking should be known to lack objects by analogy with dreaming; fourth, explaining the error that the two consciousnesses' mutual determination entails external objects are not non-existent; fifth, explaining the objection that since dream and waking minds do not differ, there would be the error of lacking distinctions in karmic deeds and retribution; sixth, explaining the error of the other school by retorting that without objects killing incurs no fault; seventh, explaining the error that cognition is unestablished because it does not perceive another's mind.