唯識二十論述記 1

English (machine translation) 1

Language: English

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Composed by the text-translating śramaṇa Kuiji.

The Viṃśikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi was composed by the Bodhisattva Vasubandhu. Its title states that the basic tenet is presented in twenty verses; it was given this name to distinguish it from the Triṃśikā. Formerly, Master Bodhiruci first translated it under the Wei dynasty, and the Tripiṭaka Master Guṇarata retranslated it under the Chen dynasty. Now, my preceptor, the Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang, compared various Sanskrit manuscripts and examined those two prior translations, recognizing that their translators had not mastered its profound principles, that their meanings contained many omissions and errors, that they did not comprehend linguistic science (śabdavidyā), and that their phrasing was exceedingly verbose and unpolished, in more than one respect, making it difficult to set forth completely. For this reason, scholars across generations opened it but could not reach its depth. Then, in the Great Tang, in the first year of the Longshuo era, the year Xinyou, on the first day of the sixth month, at the Qingfu Hall of Yuhua Palace, he commenced the translation of this treatise. I, Kuiji, received his instructions and took up the brush; on the eighth day of that month, the careful translation was brought to completion, eliminating and correcting additions and errors, and stitching together omissions and defects. Once this new version was seen, it finally resembled the work of Vasubandhu. The holy intent was newly revived in China, and the divine appearance was born anew in the semblant age; discerning gentlemen of wisdom should surely examine it for themselves.

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However, the basic text of this treatise is rich in principle yet concise in phrasing, and in the Western Regions there are more than several dozen commentaries upon it. Originally, there was the master Gopa, a disciple of Vasubandhu; at the very end, there was the Bodhisattva Dharmapāla. That which was composed by Dharmapāla, titled Commentary Guiding to Vijñapti-mātra, was treasured in India as a jewel of diction and meaning, so much so that even heterodox traditions savored, investigated, and discussed it. My master, not considering me crude and ignorant, commanded me to expound its purport; receiving his instructions as he translated, I compiled this Commentary. Whenever we reached points where the meaning was knotted and complex, or phrasing where the tenets were stated and unfolded, the essential meanings were noted and explained to serve as instruction, while awaiting another time when we might translate the commentary itself. But his labors fell short as his conversion work reached its end; before it could be realized, he passed away, so that the profound source met with obstruction without being laid open, and the subtle spirit remained in darkness and was obscured forever. One may truly say that a city-swapping jade is easy to entrust, but the Dharma-treasure is difficult to attain; the superficial glosses and rough phrasing have ended here.

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In Sanskrit, vijñapti means 'consciousness' (shi); mātratā means 'only' (wei); viṃśikā means 'twenty' (ershi); śāstra means 'treatise' (lun). In accordance with the language of this region, it is named Viṃśikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi. 'Only' has the meaning of sole, mere, and exclusionary; 'consciousness' has the meaning of discernment, expression, and distinction. Because there is only inner mind and no external objects outside the mind, the name vijñapti-mātra is established, as will be explained below. Consciousness is itself 'only', hence one says 'vijñapti-mātra', which is a karmadhāraya compound. Furthermore, saying 'twenty' is the designation of the number of verses; combining them as the Viṃśikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi is a compound carrying a number (dvigu). 'Treatise' is explained as usual; the exposition of its meaning and objections will be presented when we come to the text. The older treatise was called simply Treatise on Vijñapti-mātra because the translators abbreviated it.

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Treatise: Establishing the Mahāyāna [teaching that] the three realms are vijñapti-mātra.

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Commentary: About to explain the basic text, it is analyzed through three gates: first, revealing the time and capacities of the teaching, and the scope of its doctrinal classification; second, clarifying the fundamental tenet and essence of the treatise, and the reasons for composing the treatise; third, judging the text and separately explaining it according to what the treatise clarifies. Regarding the first, revealing the time and capacities of the teaching and the scope of its doctrinal classification, there are three points within it: first, distinguishing the times; second, distinguishing the capacities; third, distinguishing the classification. First, to distinguish the times: the Tathāgata's teaching in general has three periods. First, in the Deer Park, he preached the Āgamas, the teaching of the Four Truths, which refutes the grasping at the existence of a self. Next, on Vulture Peak, he preached the Great Prajñāpāramitā, the teaching of the emptiness of the two graspers, which refutes the grasping at the existence of dharmas. Although the teachings of emptiness and existence can transcend nihilism and eternalism, they did not yet exhaust the principle or accord with the middle path. Later, at the seven locations and eight assemblies, he finally preached that the three realms are mind-only, doubly transcending existence and emptiness and tallying with the teaching of the middle path; these are the Avataṃsaka, the Saṃdhinirmocana, and so forth, which empty the two graspers outside the mind.

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Refuting the initial grasping at existence, it affirms that there is the one mind of internal consciousness, thereby dispelling the later view of emptiness. Therefore, the present treatise stands squarely in the middle path, being the definitive teaching of the third period, as explained in texts such as the Saṃdhinirmocana and Yogācārabhūmi. The single-period or five-period teachings spoken of previously are all without scriptural basis and cannot be relied upon, as has already been broadly expounded in a separate chapter.

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Next, to distinguish the capacities: the faculties and dispositions of sentient beings generally comprise five kinds: the three determinate dispositions, one indeterminate disposition, and one entirely lacking in disposition. Among these five, it is heard and accepted only by those of the determinate and indeterminate dispositions of the Mahāyāna, and is not something upon which the remaining dispositions of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and so forth can rely with faith. The Cheng weishi lun states: 'Sentient beings lacking disposition cannot plumb its depths,' and 'Those of the lineage inclined to extinction cannot penetrate it,' because the doctrine and principles set forth belong to the unsurpassed vehicle, and because it teaches that there is only the one mind and no objects outside the mind. Śāriputra and the others were like the deaf and blind, as explained in the Commentary on the Meaning of the Cheng weishi lun.

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Finally, regarding the doctrinal classification: among the three piṭakas, it is subsumed under the Abhidharma-piṭaka; within the two piṭakas, it is included in the Bodhisattva-piṭaka; among the twelve divisions of teaching, it is subsumed under the upadeśa scriptures; among the five vehicles, it is subsumed under the Mahāyāna. These doctrines and principles are as explained in a separate chapter.

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Second, regarding clarifying the fundamental tenet and essence of the treatise and the reasons for composing the treatise, there are also three points within it: first, distinguishing the tenet of the treatise; second, distinguishing the essence of the treatise; third, distinguishing the reasons for composing the treatise.

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First, to distinguish the tenet: what it clarifies is vijñapti-mātra, so vijñapti-mātra is its tenet, because apart from what it clarifies, there is no other tenet.

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Next, to distinguish the essence: the essence is of four kinds, as explained elsewhere. Subsuming characteristics into their nature, tathatā is the essence; subsuming objects into consciousness, mind is the essence; subsuming the conventional into the real, sound is the essence.

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When discussing nature and characteristics separately, there are two kinds:

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First, as an adhipati-pratyaya: if it is accepted that the Buddha preaches the Dharma, the Buddha's untainted sounds, names, phrases, and so forth constitute the teaching's essence; if the Buddha does not preach the Dharma, his great samādhi, wisdom, and compassion constitute the teaching's essence.

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Second, as a direct causal condition: whether the Buddha speaks or does not speak, the sounds and so forth transformed upon the auditory and mental consciousnesses of the listener constitute the teaching's essence. The root of the present treatise is the Buddha's sūtras, so the presentation of its essence should be as explained for the sūtras. However, the author of the treatise merely preaches the Dharma, acting as an adhipati-pratyaya that causes the listener to transform [mental representations]. Taking together the indirect and direct ālambana-pratyayas to constitute the treatise, sounds, names, phrases, and phonemes all serve as its essence. The Daśabhūmika-śāstra states: 'Preaching and listening are both completed through two things: first, sound; second, correct syllables.' Later in this text it says: 'Through mutual sovereign power, the two consciousnesses are determined.' The Cheng weishi lun states: 'The two unobstructed knowledges of Dharma and expression have distinctions in their objects, and so forth.' Broadly citing scripture and reasoning, it clarifies this essence, as explained elsewhere.

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Finally, to distinguish the reasons for composing the treatise: although there is no explicit text here, it may be inferred from other treatises. It was composed to make the Dharma abide for long and to benefit sentient beings; or, this treatise was composed to make known the teaching of the third period and tally with the middle path; or because some hold that external objects exist just as the mind does, like the masters of the Sarvāstivāda and others; or because some hold that the internal mind is non-existent just as external objects are, like the heterodox who hold views of emptiness; or because some hold that the various consciousnesses differ in function but are identical in essence, like a certain class of bodhisattvas; or because some hold that apart from the mind there are no separate caittas, like the Sautrāntikas and others; or because some hold that hell wardens and so forth are real sentient beings, like the Mahāsāṃghikas and others; or because some say that hell wardens and so forth are not real sentient beings, but are primary elements born of karma, with distinctive characteristics among the primary elements, like the Sarvāstivāda and others; or because some say that although hell wardens and so forth are not sentient beings, they are produced by perfuming and are not transformations of consciousness, like the Sautrāntikas and others; or because some hold that the essence of external objects is a single entity, like the Vaiśeṣikas and others; or because some hold that objects endure for many moments while the mind lasts for only a single kṣaṇa, like the Saṃmatīyas and others; or because some hold that paramāṇus have the aspect of mutual support and serve as the objects of the five consciousnesses, like Master Saṅghabhadra and others. All these masters, due to the two kinds of wrong knowledge and ignorance, failed to understand the meaning, and consequently were obscured from realizing the two fruits. Now, in order to ward off these various deviant attachments and enable beings to attain real understanding within the profound and subtle principle of vijñapti-mātra, this treatise was composed. As these will be individually revealed in the refutations below, they are not explained in advance.

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Question: What is the difference in intent between this and the Triṃśikā, such that this treatise was additionally composed to clarify vijñapti-mātra?

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Answer: That Triṃśikā broadly reveals its own tenet, whereas the present Viṃśikā broadly refutes external objections; although both clarify vijñapti-mātra, the two treatises differ. Furthermore, that Triṃśikā broadly reveals the correct doctrine, whereas the present Viṃśikā broadly resolves external objections. Furthermore, that Triṃśikā was composed later by Vasubandhu and has verses without commentary, whereas the present Viṃśikā was composed earlier by Vasubandhu and has both verses and commentary. Furthermore, although the two treatises are identical in clarifying vijñapti-mātra, a thousand gates are opened to allow entry by any one of them; hence the two treatises had to be composed separately. Moreover, the marvelous principle is abstruse and profound, and becomes apparent only through repeated instruction; although the tenet and purport are one, the two treatises clarify it anew. This is why the occasions for the two treatises are distinct.

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Third, regarding judging the text and separately explaining it according to what the treatise clarifies: Bodhiruci—here translated as 'Joy of Awakening' (Jue'ai), previously translated as 'Delight of Awakening' (Juexi)—was the Dharma Master Bodhiruci of the Wei dynasty. Some say it was translated by a layperson of the Wei dynasty named Prajñāruci, which is translated as 'Love of Wisdom' (Huiai). At the end of the Liang and the beginning of the Chen, there was Guṇarata—here translated as 'Refuge of the Family' (Jiayi), or also 'Direct Refuge' (Qinyi)—who was the Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha. Both translated this Viṃśikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Master Bodhiruci had more prose and fewer verses; Tripiṭaka Master Guṇarata had less prose and more verses. What is translated now balances prose and verse. For instance, Master Bodhiruci had twenty-three verses and eighteen sheets; Master Guṇarata had twenty-four verses and nine sheets in total; the present new translation has twenty-one verses and eight sheets in total. The twenty-first verse translated by Bodhiruci, which cites a sūtra, is absent in the other two versions; the initial two verses of homage translated by Guṇarata are absent in the other two versions. From this we know that in both cases the translators added commentary text and translated it into the root treatise.

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Next, the initial verse establishing the tenet is found in the two older treatises, but is absent only from the new treatise. Examining the three Sanskrit manuscripts and checking the title, it should not be present at all; if it is called the Viṃśikā on Vijñapti-mātra, how could it be present? Bodhiruci added the first verse and the twenty-first verse; Guṇarata added the first three verses. Thus we know that the remaining twenty-one verses are present in all three treatises, being the fundamental text. Because it clearly unfolds vijñapti-mātra in twenty verses, it is therefore called the Viṃśikā on Vijñapti-mātra; the final verse concludes with praise and attributes capacity to the Buddha, rather than clarifying the tenet. Because of this, within it there are two general divisions: first, correctly distinguishing the fundamental tenet, refuting imputations, and explaining objections; second, concluding with what he has composed, praising the depth [of the Dharma], and deferring to the Buddha.

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Within the first section, there are two major parts: first, establishing the treatise's tenet that the Mahāyāna [teaching of] the three realms is vijñapti-mātra without external objects; second, regarding this meaning, an objection is raised; below, it resolves external challenges and broadly refutes divergent attachments.

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Within the establishment of the tenet, the text has four parts: first, establishing the treatise's tenet that all dharmas are vijñapti-mātra; second, showing that it stems from what the sūtras teach, using the sūtras as proof—now in clarifying vijñapti-mātra, it merely establishes the Mahāyāna meaning of vijñapti-mātra, or shows that what the treatise clarifies is to fulfill the meaning of the sūtras, establishing that the Mahāyāna was spoken by the Buddha and that vijñapti-mātra is not false; third, explaining hidden objections from outsiders and distinguishing the word 'only'; fourth, clarifying the meaning of vijñapti-mātra, citing an analogy to reveal it.

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Alternatively, it is divided into three: first, establishing the treatise's tenet; second, establishing the reason (hetu), using the sūtras to establish the treatise; third, adducing an analogy. The third gate from before is subsumed under establishing the tenet, so that distinguishing them incurs no error. Now, what is stated here—'Establishing the Mahāyāna [teaching that] the three realms are vijñapti-mātra'—is the establishment of the tenet. In all, it has three meanings:

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First, it establishes the teaching of vijñapti-mātra within the Mahāyāna. Because the various schools do not believe what the Buddha taught, extensive citations of teachings and reasoning are provided, as in the Cheng weishi lun, which is not what is explained here. An anumāna states: 'The Mahāyāna spoken of by me is spoken by the Buddha; because it is agreed to be subsumed within the sūtras that possess the three seals of the Dharma; just like the Ekottarika, etc.' What is spoken of here as 'the three realms are vijñapti-mātra' thus reveals the teaching that expresses vijñapti-mātra.

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Second, it establishes the principle that the three realms are vijñapti-mātra as taught in the Mahāyāna. Because the various schools assert that there are objects external to the mind, they do not believe the principle that the three realms are mind-only; hence it is now established. The present statement that 'the three realms in the Mahāyāna are vijñapti-mātra' thus reveals the principle of vijñapti-mātra that is expressed.

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Third, it establishes both the various Mahāyāna teachings and the principle of vijñapti-mātra. Because [opponents] disbelieve both the teaching and the principle, they are correlated according to the text. 'Establishment' means the sense of proving. That is, in this treatise, proving that the three realms in the Mahāyāna are vijñapti-mātra—namely, establishing the thesis by means of the reason and the example—is called 'establishment'. Furthermore, 'establishment' has the sense of positing: positing vijñapti-mātra through extensive principles, because the underlying meaning is concise. Or, 'establishment' has the sense of expounding: expounding now what had not yet been spoken is called 'instituting' (li); expanding now upon what had already been spoken is called 'establishing' (an). Furthermore, 'an' means fitting, [where] teaching and principle correspond to each other; 'li' means erecting: the nature of dharmas transcends words, yet it is now expressed in words, hence called 'erecting'. Conforming to reason is why it is called 'fitting' (an). Dignāga explained: proof and refutation are collectively called establishment; that is, being able to prove one's own [thesis of] Mahāyāna vijñapti-mātra, and being able to refute the other schools' [thesis of] existing objects; hence it is called establishment.

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As for the word 'Mahāyāna', the 'Unsurpassable Vehicle Chapter' of the Madhyāntavibhāga says that it is called the unsurpassable vehicle by virtue of three meanings: first, unsurpassable practice; second, unsurpassable cognitive object; third, unsurpassable cultivation and realization. Unsurpassable practice is of six kinds: supreme, attention, conformity to dharma, freedom from the two extremes, difference, and non-difference; each of these contains multiple aspects. Cognitive objects are twelve: positing, the realm of dharmas, what is proved and what proves, sustaining, seal, internal, retention, realization, increase, verification, conveyance, and supreme. Cultivation and realization are of ten kinds: non-deficiency, non-destruction, movement, fullness, arising, firmness and pliancy, non-abiding, absence of the two obscurations, and non-cessation. Precisely because this teaching distinguishes these three meanings, it is called the Great Vehicle (Mahāyāna).

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Alternatively, the eleventh fascicle of the Samuccayavyākhyā says: seven kinds of greatness correspond to the meaning of the Great Vehicle: 1. object; 2. practice; 3. knowledge; 4. vigor; 5. skill in means; 6. attainment; 7. greatness of activity. Greatness of object is because it takes the vast teaching as its cognitive object; greatness of practice is because it benefits both self and others; greatness of knowledge is because of the knowledge of the two kinds of selflessness; greatness of vigor is because across three great kalpas it cultivates countless kinds of difficult practices; greatness of skill in means is because it attains the non-abiding path; greatness of attainment is because it attains all the virtues such as the ten powers; greatness of activity is because it exhausts the bounds of saṃsāra in establishing the Buddha's work. Also, because this teaching distinguishes these seven meanings, it is called the Great Vehicle.

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Furthermore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: either 'vehicle of great nature', which is a bahuvrīhi compound, or 'both a vehicle and great', which is a karmadhāraya compound, it is called the Great Vehicle. As for 'the three realms', they are the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm. Vasubandhu explained: 'Because it can sustain its own characteristic, it is called a realm (dhātu).' Alternatively, realm means 'lineage/category'. Desire refers to the craving and desire induced by morsel food, sleep, and sexual intercourse; the realm to which desire belongs is therefore called the desire realm. That which transforms, obstructs, and manifests is called form; the realm to which form belongs is therefore called the form realm. In that realm, form does not exist, so it is called formless; its substantial nature is not form, so the name formless is established—it is not that it merely takes the absence of form as its substantial nature; the realm to which the formless belongs is called the formless realm. The middle word is omitted, hence it is stated in this way, just like 'black pepper drink' or 'diamond ring'. Furthermore, the realm of desire is called the desire realm because this realm can sustain desire. The form and formless realms should be understood likewise. Their substantial nature encompasses the five aggregates, and all are tatpuruṣa compounds. Asvabhāva explained: 'It means associated with fetters of craving such as desire, falling within the three realms.'

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As for 'vijñapti-mātra', Master Gopa said: because it possesses three virtues, it is now established: 1. original virtue, because original nature is pure, meaning the nature of consciousness; 2. intermediate virtue, namely relying on vijñapti-mātra to practice the myriad practices, being able to sever all gross heaviness of skin, flesh, hide, etc., over three kalpas; 3. virtue not yet possessed, namely reaching the Buddha stage, where merit and wisdom are completely fulfilled and luminous, rare to encounter and peerless. 'Mātra' has the meaning of sole and only; 'vijñapti' has the meaning of cognition/discernment, its substantial nature being the five dharmas of mind, mental factors, etc. Why is this? Generally speaking, all phenomena have briefly three natures: namely, the imaginary nature, which is false vijñapti-mātra; the dependent nature, non-existent yet appearing as existent, produced by causes and conditions, which is causal vijñapti-mātra, namely the aspect (lakṣaṇa) of consciousness; and the consummate nature, the principle of the emptiness and non-existence of the imaginary upon the dependent, which is true vijñapti-mātra, namely the nature (svabhāva) of consciousness. Ordinary beings, confused about the consummate nature, grasp the dependent, etc., as one or different, claiming that there are definitely real phenomena existing outside the mind that are grasped by the mind; obscured by ignorance, correct knowledge does not arise. Now, in order to reveal that the real phenomena imagined apart from the mind as spoken by them do not exist, being mere appearances of false consciousness, and that there are only the conditioned dependent aspects of consciousness (causal vijñapti-mātra) and the unconditioned consummate nature of consciousness (true vijñapti-mātra), it is now stated generally that all phenomena are vijñapti-mātra, causing them to know existence and non-existence and to realize the fruit of transformation of the basis. These are spoken of with respect to the distinct substantial entities of aspect and nature.

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If subsuming all objects under the mind is called 'vijñapti-mātra', since tathatā is the true nature of consciousness, it is also called 'vijñapti-mātra'. This is according to the three natures. If explained according to the two truths, there are also distinctions, four distinct levels: 1. consciousness of emptiness and existence; 2. consciousness of phenomena and principle; 3. consciousness of specific and general; 4. consciousness of expression and purport, as explained in the Cheng weishi lun shuji.

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Regarding the assertion that within the dependent nature there is only consciousness, there is an explanation that says: there is only the single self-verifying part of the consciousness-entity, without the seeing and image parts; because the holy teaching states that the grasper and the grasped are imagined, both are non-existent in nature, which is called 'vijñapti-mātra'. This master's intention states: the eight defiled consciousnesses, as well as all pure minds of bodhisattvas in the stage of learning and the two vehicles, all possess seeing and image [parts]; because they possess seeing and image, they all possess grasping at dharmas; but the Buddha is not so, as will be known below.

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Alternatively, it is said that there are only the self-verifying [part], the seeing part, and its own image part, and without the two imagined graspings apart from these, it is called 'vijñapti-mātra'. This is because these seeing and image parts are not separate from consciousness. This master's intention states: only the sixth and seventh [consciousnesses] can give rise to grasping at dharmas, not the remaining consciousnesses, etc., as will be distinguished extensively in the example below.

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The intention here is: namely, that this treatise posits that the phenomena of the three realms established in the Mahāyāna are all consciousness-only. Question: Are unconditioned phenomena also vijñapti-mātra or not? Answer: These are also vijñapti-mātra. Question: Why is it that here only 'the three realms' are mentioned? Answer: Temporarily citing the principle that the false phenomena formed by ordinary beings are consciousness-only, it merely speaks of 'the three realms'; it is not that pure phenomena lack the meaning of vijñapti-mātra. This is understood through principle, or by virtue of the teaching.

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Treatise: Because the sūtras state that the three realms are mind-only.

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Commentary: This is the second [section], revealing that it is spoken by the sūtras. Now, in explaining vijñapti-mātra, using the sūtras to establish the treatise causes faith to arise easily. The fifth case ending (ablative) is equivalent to the word 'because'. That is, sūtras such as the Avataṃsaka state: because the phenomena of the three realms are mind-only; this is spoken in the sixth ground in the eighth fascicle of the Daśabhūmika-śāstra, and now the meaning that there is only consciousness is established. In Sanskrit it is sūtra, here translated as qijing. Qi means to accord; jing is explained as usual: the sutra accords with correct principle and matches the capacities of beings, hence called qijing (accordant sutra). Because the Buddha's sūtras state 'mind-only', this explanation of vijñapti-mātra establishes the treatise by means of the sūtras. Alternatively, what is explained here as only consciousness is because the sūtras state mind-only; therefore, this treatise now establishes the principle to substantiate the sūtra. Or: what serves as proof for the statement now that there is only consciousness? Because the sūtras state that there is only mind.

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Question: Why do the sūtras only state that 'the three realms are mind-only'?

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Answer: The Sautrāntikas and others [hold that] when mind cognizes non-existence it arises as merely having mind, but not in all cases. Now, to exclude their [view], it is stated that the three realms are consciousness-only. Asvabhāva explained: 'This statement of vijñapti-mātra establishes that there are only minds and mental factors, and there are no arbitrarily imagined cognitive objects of the three realms.' This statement does not eliminate the cognitive object of tathatā, nor the dependent cognitive object subsumed under the truth of the path. The two kinds of cognitive objects—fundamental and subsequently attained—because they are not grasped by craving, are not what is to be eliminated, and are not deluded confusion, are not subsumed under the three realms, yet they are not separate from consciousness, hence need not be mentioned. Since within the cognizing [subjects] of the three realms there is the imaginer, and within the cognized [objects] there is what is imagined, and within the defiled aggregate there is arbitrary imagination, in order to exclude this grasping it merely says mind-only; it is not that pure phenomena are not vijñapti-mātra, as will be explained extensively below.

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Question: The desire and form realms have form; to exclude this it states mind-only. In the formless realm form does not exist, so it should not say vijñapti-mātra. [Answer:] This objection is incorrect. What is grasped is entirely non-existent; to exclude this is called vijñapti-mātra, not merely to exclude the existence of form; therefore it says the three realms are mind-only, because all objects such as imagined vijñapti-mātra and other empty space phenomena are also absent. Furthermore, the Sautrāntikas state: the minds and mental factors in the formless realm lack form-aspects, lack substantial entity, lack real grasped object-meanings, and are the basis of manifestation; fearing that they would grasp them as non-minds and non-mental factors, it states that the three realms are all mind-only.

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Question: Is only that sūtra taken as proof?

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Answer: There are still others. The Saṃdhinirmocana says: 'Manifested by vijñapti-mātra.' It also says: 'All dharmas are not separate from mind.' It also says: 'Sentient beings become defiled or pure according to the mind.' It also says: 'Accomplishing four knowledges, a bodhisattva can successively awaken to and enter vijñapti-mātra without external objects,' and so on extensively, as stated in the fourth fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the seventh fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun. Furthermore, the ninth fascicle of the Avataṃsaka-sūtra says: 'Mind is like a master painter, / painting the various five aggregates; / in all the worlds, / there is no dharma that it does not make. / As the mind is, so is the Buddha; / as the Buddha is, so are sentient beings; / mind, Buddha, and sentient beings— / these three have no difference.'

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Question: Why does this treatise cite only one sūtra?

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Answer: It temporarily cites one sūtra to establish the teaching and establish the principle; why must there be many sūtras before the principle can be revealed?

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Question: Why does the treatise say 'vijñapti-mātra' while the various sūtras speak of 'mind-only'? How is the meaning established by citing 'mind' to prove 'consciousness'?

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Treatise: 'Mind', 'mentality', 'consciousness', and 'cognition' are differences in name.

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The Commentary states: Below is the third [section], resolving implicit objections from outsiders and clarifying the word "only" (mātra). Within this there are two parts: first, resolving the implicit objection by explaining the word "consciousness" (vijñāna); second, explaining the word "only". This is the first part. The objection is as stated before, and this is the reply. That is to say: the four terms—citta, manas, vijñāna, and vijñapti (discernment)—spoken of in the sūtras and śāstras are not different in essence; they differ only in name. "Citta" has the meaning of accumulation; "manas" has the meaning of cogitation; "vijñāna" has the meaning of discernment. In the sense of discerning and apprehending, it should properly be called "discernment" (vijñapti). Here the phrasing is abbreviated, mentioning only "discernment" (vijñapti). The older translation used the word "etc.", because it included this discernment.

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Accumulation has two aspects: first, accumulating cognitive aspects (ākāra); second, accumulating seeds (bīja). The first applies generally to all consciousnesses; the second applies only to the eighth [consciousness]. Cogitation has two aspects: first, uninterrupted awareness; second, active cogitation. The first applies generally to all consciousnesses; the second applies only to the seventh [consciousness]. Discernment has two aspects: first, subtle; second, coarse. The first applies generally to all consciousnesses; the second applies only to the first six. Thus all eight consciousnesses possess these four names. If one says "etc." out of fear of not being exhaustive, then since it is not a name common to all eight, why would one need to say "etc."? Therefore, according to the Sanskrit text, it should say "discernment" (vijñapti). As Asamāhita (Wu-xing) explains: "Citta and vijñāna are one." Because none of the eight consciousnesses has an object separate from mind, each is termed vijñapti-mātra; therefore, the sūtras speaking of citta does not contradict the śāstra's statement, because they are synonymous. There are further alternative explanations, as in the 'Chapter on Vijñapti-mātra'.

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Question: If all eight consciousnesses here may be called citta, manas, and vijñāna, why is it stated in various places that the eighth consciousness is named citta, the seventh is named manas, and the remaining six are named vijñāna?

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Answer: The fifth fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun states: "Although these three meanings apply generally to all eight consciousnesses, yet according to what is predominant and manifest: the eighth is named citta because it accumulates the seeds of all dharmas and gives rise to all dharmas; the seventh is named manas because it constantly and reflectively cogitates [the eighth] as self, and so forth; the remaining six are named vijñāna because they operate as coarse, active, and intermittent discernments." Each receives a distinct name according to what is predominant and manifest; yet strictly speaking, all [names] may be used generally for all [consciousnesses]. Here it is discussed in terms of general application, and so there is no contradiction.

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Question: If the substance of each of the eight consciousnesses is called "only" [mind], why then is it spoken of as being made by "one mind"?

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Answer: According to the Sanskrit text, there is also no word "one"; it merely says "only mind" (citta-mātra). Now, interpreting the meaning: "only" (mātra) has the sense of sole or exclusive; "one" has the sense of having no second; their names differ but their meaning is the same. That is, because there are no external objects and there is only mind, it is termed "one mind," not that the substance of mind is merely a single entity.

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Question: Strictly speaking, is the substance of consciousness one, or is the substance of consciousness manifold?

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Answer: As the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: one group of bodhisattvas asserts that the substance of the eight consciousnesses is only a single entity, while another group of masters asserts that they have manifold substances. Now we rely on the latter meaning. The seventh fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun states: "The intrinsic nature of the eight consciousnesses cannot be said to be definitely one, because their cognitive aspects, supports, objects, and associates differ; furthermore, when one ceases, the others do not cease; and their aspects such as perfumer and perfumed are distinct. Nor are they definitely different, because the sūtras state that the eight consciousnesses are without distinction, like water and waves; because if they were definitely different, they could not have the nature of cause and effect; and because, like illusory creations, they lack a fixed nature. In accordance with rational conventional truth, eight distinct [consciousnesses] are spoken of, but not in true ultimate truth. In true ultimate truth, mind and speech are severed." This shows that the substance of the eight consciousnesses is neither identical nor separate. A gāthā in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra says: "The eight kinds of citta, manas, and vijñāna are distinct in characteristics conventionally, but without distinction in characteristics ultimately, because characteristics and that which is characterized are non-existent." If one relies on the view that their substance is solely one, then even in conventional truth their substance is not manifold. The statement that "they are distinct in characteristics conventionally" is made in terms of function. The distinctions among the eight consciousnesses according to various categories here are as in the second and third fascicles of the Cheng weishi lun, etc.; the eighth consciousness is analyzed by ten categories, as in the fourth and fifth fascicles, etc.; the seventh consciousness is also analyzed by ten categories, as in the fifth and sixth fascicles, etc.; the remaining six consciousnesses are analyzed by nine categories.

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The Sautrāntikas and others ask: Since you say "consciousness-only," should there not be no mental factors (caitta), because "only" was not stated [of them]?

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Śāstra: Here, the mention of mind (citta) implicitly includes mental factors (caitta).

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The Commentary states: Below is the second [part], clarifying the word "only". When the sūtra cited in the treatise speaks of "mind-only," although the words say only mind, the intention also includes solely the mental factors. For there are only mental factors, and no real grasped objects.

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Question: Why are they not mentioned?

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Answer: Asamāhita explains: "The word 'only' is for the purpose of removing grasped objects." Because those [objects] do not exist, the grasper also does not exist; it does not exclude mental factors, because they are not separate from the mind. As it is said: if there were no dharmas that are mental factors, mind would never operate. The Sautrāntikas in their shifting tenets and the Sthaviras say: If so, why is the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti) only mind? That is a flaw in their school. In our Mahāyāna, wherever there is mind, there must be associated dharmas that are mental factors; if there are no associated dharmas of mental factors, mind also definitely does not exist. The Cheng weishi lun states: Because mind is predominant, it merely says "mind-only." Because mental factors arise through the power of mind, they are provisionally omitted for brevity. Gopa explains: The word "only" here is to reveal the predominant meaning, not to reveal capacity. Because mind is most predominant within the three realms, as a sūtra says: "The path is only guarding the sense faculties; moral discipline is called the śramaṇa," and so forth. Since the three realms arise due to consciousness, it is termed predominant. Then he cites a verse: "Mind precedes all dharmas; / It is predominant and luminous. / If a person with a pure mind / Speaks or acts, / Happiness arises from the three wholesome deeds, / Following along like a shadow. / Mind precedes all dharmas; / It is predominant and luminous. / If a person with a defiled mind / Speaks or acts, / Suffering arises from the three unwholesome deeds, / Like the wheel following the ox's hoof." Because they are associated with mind, the statement "mind-only" also includes mental factors.

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Question: What is meant by "mental factor" (caitta)?

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Answer: Belonging to the mind, constantly arising in dependence on the mind, associated with the mind, and bound to the mind, it is therefore called a mental factor—just as a king has ministers, or a person has wealth, and so forth.

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Question: Are mental factors and mind one, or are they different?

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Answer: According to the Sarvāstivāda and others, they are definitely different from mind. According to the Sautrāntika and others, they are not different from mind. Now according to the Mahāyāna, as extensively debated with questions and answers distinguishing their oneness and difference in the seventh fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun: the general purport is that in accordance with conventional truth, they are said to be distinct, unlike the Sautrāntikas; in accordance with ultimate truth, mental factors and mind are neither separate nor identical, like the sun and its light, unlike the Sarvāstivādins.

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Question: If, according to conventional truth, they are different from mind, when they apprehend an object, how do they differ from mind?

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Answer: The fifth fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun states: "Mind, regarding its object, grasps only the general characteristics, while mental factors, regarding it, also grasp specific characteristics. Assisting in accomplishing the work of the mind, they receive the name 'mental factor'—just as a painter and his apprentice make the outline and fill in the colors." The first verse of the Madhyāntavibhāga says: "Mind and mental factors in the three realms / Are false conceptualization; / Comprehending the object in general is called mind, / And [grasping it] specifically is also called mental factors." That is, mental factors grasp general and specific characteristics, while the king of mind grasps only the general, and so forth at length.

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Question: Now, how many mental factors are there? Which mind is associated with which mental factors? What objects do they apprehend? And so on, through all categorical analyses?

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Answer: As they are distinguished in detail in the Cheng weishi lun and in separate treatises, they cannot be cited extensively here.

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Question: The sūtras only speak of mind; how is it known that there are mental factors?

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Śāstra: It only excludes external objects; it does not dismiss associated [mental factors].

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The Commentary states: Because foolish worldlings do not know that there are no real objective aspects outside the mind, they cling to them as real and generate evil karma, the two heavy obscurations, and so on. The sūtras speak of "mind-only" to exclude the existence of real objects conceptualized by imaginary construction outside the mind. It is not to eliminate the dharmas of mental factors that are of dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva) and not separate from the mind. Because mind is principal, it says there is only mind; in truth there are also solely mental factors.

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Question: What is meant by "associated" (samprayukta)?

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Answer: The third fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun states: Although the cognitive aspects of mind and mental factors differ, their time and support are the same, and their objects and entities are equal, hence they are called "associated." That is, having these four meanings, with the exclusion of having the identical cognitive aspect, they are then called associated. That this differs from the Yogācārabhūmi and from other logical views is all as explained there.

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Question: If external objects are excluded, does it also exclude what is transformed by the various consciousnesses of one's own stream?

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Answer: It now also excludes these consciousnesses from taking one another as objects by directly apprehending them; it does not exclude their substantive existence. Regarding external objects separate from oneself, it is also not a wholesale denial of their substantive existence altogether; it merely says that one's own mind cannot directly apprehend them. What is directly apprehended by the mind is definitely not separate from the mind; if it were separate from one's own mind, it could definitely not be directly apprehended.

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Question: Since mental factors are not excluded by "only," and the nature of tathatā is not mentioned in the sūtra, should it not also fail to be vijñapti-mātra?

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Answer: The Cheng weishi lun states: Because the real nature of consciousness is not separate from consciousness, it is called vijñapti-mātra; it is not like mental factors, which are called "only mental factors" and not called vijñapti-mātra. Tathatā is also the real nature of mental factors, and may also be called "only mental factors," because this principle applies throughout. In this place, the older translations gave a separate verse to establish the thesis of the treatise. Paramārtha's verse says: "There are truly no external dusts, / Because consciousness arises resembling dust, / Just like a person with cataracts / Sees hairs, two moons, and so forth." Bodhiruci says: "Consciousness-only has no sensory objects, / Because there is no false seeing, / Just as a person whose eyes have cataracts / Sees things like hairs and the moon." Although their principle is not in contradiction, upon checking three Sanskrit manuscripts, none contains this verse; it was merely an addition by the translators.

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Śāstra: When internal consciousness arises, it appears resembling an external object, just as one with cataracts sees hairs, flies, and so forth; in this there is no real object whatsoever.

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The Commentary says: From here below is the fourth [section], which reveals the meaning of vijñapti-mātra and adduces an analogy to establish it. In the older translation, a question from an opponent was posed at this point before clarifying the correct principle; this was added by the translator and is not present in the Sanskrit text. "When internal consciousness arises, it manifests resembling external objects, yet in this there is not the slightest real referent": this reveals the meaning of vijñapti-mātra. "Just as one with cataracts sees hairs, flies, and so forth, yet in this there is not the slightest real referent": this adduces an analogy to establish it. Or alternatively, although the scriptures were cited previously, it is now established through logical reasoning.

According to earlier masters such as Sthiramati, regarding the statement that this internal consciousness arises resembling external objects, it means that there is only consciousness's paratantra-svabhāva, a single svasaṃvitti-bhāga, which manifests resembling the external parikalpita-svabhāva objects of the two graspers—the seeing and the object-aspect. Although the imputed does not exist, deluded perception considers it to exist; because it resembles deluded perception, it is called resembling the apprehended object. The Cheng weishi lun, fascicle one, states: "Or again, internal consciousness transforms, resembling external objects." Fascicle seven states: "What is called 'transformation' refers to the various internal consciousnesses transforming and manifesting the semblances of the external objects of self and phenomena." This master's intended meaning is: the two divisions of seeing and object-aspect are the imputed non-existent; only the svasaṃvitti-bhāga is paratantra existence. As the Madhyāntavibhāga and other texts say, the grasper and the grasped are both the imputed. Because deluded perfuming serves as the direct causal condition for the svasaṃvitti-bhāga, when its own entity arises, it manifests resembling the images of external objects of grasper and grasped. In this, the two graspers have not the slightest reality; there is only the svasaṃvitti that arises resembling them, which apprehends only its own entity. Thus, not the slightest dharma can apprehend the slightest dharma. Fools, not understanding this, suppose that apart from the entity of consciousness there are real two divisions; therefore, vijñapti-mātra is taught to make them comprehend it.

According to later masters such as Dharmapāla, regarding the statement that internal consciousness arises resembling external objects, it means that the paratantra svasaṃvitti, seeing, and object-aspect arise as three divisions. Because they are not apart from consciousness, it is called vijñapti-mātra. Fools, relying on these dharmas that are not apart from consciousness, grasp them as real objective images existing apart from the mind. These real apprehended objects, the two graspers external to the mind, completely lack essential nature. The Madhyāntavibhāga and other texts state that the two graspers are non-existent, [which means] the paratantra two graspers are not without an entity. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other texts state: "There are only two," and so on; if there were no paratantra seeing and object divisions, that would contradict the Ghanavyūha and the teachings of various noble ones on "only measure, only two," the entanglement of grasper and grasped, seeing various kinds, and so forth. Therefore, now there are only non-existent [grasped forms] that resemble existents, arising as the three divisions of paratantra internal consciousness, and there is not the slightest manifestation of real two graspers of parikalpita-svabhāva apart from the mind. Thus, not the slightest dharma can apprehend the slightest dharma; the term "vijñapti-mātra" is taught to cause them to understand thoroughly and not give rise to foolish delusion, supposing those to exist. The Cheng weishi lun, fascicle one, states: "The entity of internal consciousness transforms, resembling two divisions; because the object-aspect and the seeing-aspect both arise relying on svasaṃvitti, self and phenomena are posited based on these two divisions, for those two would have nothing to rely on apart from these." Fascicle seven states: "The three transformative consciousnesses and their mental factors are all capable of transforming, resembling the two divisions of seeing and object-aspect." This is the explanation of this master.

Although the ontological reality is such, the reasoning is not yet apparent; therefore, an analogy is adduced next to establish this thesis. Just as someone in the world whose eyes have cataracts and floaters consequently sees hairs, flies, and so forth in the sky by means of mental consciousness. "And so forth" includes space-flowers, yellow color, a second moon, and so forth. Dizziness is an ailment of confusion, and cataracts are a disease of obstruction. With the eye disease as condition, the mind sees hairs and so forth, yet in this there is not the slightest real referent. Because the eyes are diseased, taking the eyes as the doorway, the mind sees flies and so forth; it is not that the visual consciousness itself can see hairs and flies. Just as when pressing an eye with one's hand or the like, the mental consciousness then sees a second moon manifest; it is not that the visual consciousness itself sees a second moon. The sixth mental consciousness, taking the eye as the doorway, is simultaneously clear, appearing as if seen by the eye, but in reality it is not seen by the eye, because there is no discernment or grasping within the five consciousnesses. The Cheng weishi lun states: "When directly experiencing in direct perception, it does not grasp [the object] as external; later, the mind discriminates and falsely gives rise to the conception of externality. Therefore, one's own object-aspect, being transformed by consciousness, is also said to exist; what is grasped by the mental consciousness, being falsely conceptualized, is said to be non-existent." This is the interpretation of Dharmapāla and others who state that grasping exists only in the sixth and seventh [consciousnesses]. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that what is capable of conceptualizing is the mental consciousness. It also states: "There are only two divisions; the internal consciousness transforms its image, which is not apart from consciousness, manifesting resembling external objects; in this, there is no real entity apart from consciousness at all, just as someone with cataracts sees hairs, flies, and so forth."

If we turn to Sthiramati and others who state that there is grasping in all eight consciousnesses, they take the passages of these various treatises as evidence: when the eyes have cataracts and see a second moon, the eye itself can see it; therefore, the seeing and object divisions of the visual consciousness and so on are all parikalpita, and in this there is not the slightest real referent. Who says that the mental consciousness sees based on the eye? As for the statement that only the mental consciousness can conceptualize, that treatise's intent is that conceptualizing with respect to all objects can only be done by the mental consciousness. Who says that the five consciousnesses have no parikalpa? If it were not so, why does it say here that the eye has dizziness and sees hairs, flies, and so forth? These debates are detailed extensively in the Cheng weishi lun.

Master Gopa agrees with Dharmapāla's explanation: taking the eye as the doorway, the mental consciousness is capable of grasping. There is no principle whereby the five consciousnesses take non-existence as an object; because they are non-conceptual, they invariably take real entities as objects. As stated in a verse of the Abhidharma-sūtra: "There is no visual or other consciousness that arises without taking a real object as its condition; mental consciousness is of two kinds, taking real or unreal objects as its conditions." Sthiramati explains this text by saying: when the five consciousnesses give rise to grasping, they must rely on real dharmas that resemble objects to arise, because they resemble the function of form; unlike the mental consciousness taking a tortoise's hair and so forth as object, where even what is fundamentally non-existent also arises because it lacks resembling functions, he does not say that the five consciousnesses do not give rise to grasping of dharmas, but only that they take real objects as conditions while deluded perfuming serves as internal condition. The external objects seen are all not truly existent, just like hairs and flies; the seen flies and snakes serve as an analogy in the same way. Therefore, the Cheng weishi lun states: "Like one afflicted by dreams, due to the force of the dream-affliction, the mind manifests resembling the forms of various external objects, and conditioned by these, grasps them as truly existent external objects."

Although there is this analogy, the principle is still not fully revealed, so inferences should be further formulated. The inference is formulated: [Thesis:] The widely accepted visual consciousness / [Probandum:] definitely does not directly take as object a form-realm separated from itself; / [Reason:] because it is subsumed under any one among the five consciousnesses; / [Example:] like the remaining four consciousnesses. The remaining mental consciousness likewise does not directly take as object dharmas separated from itself, because it is of the nature of consciousness, like the visual consciousness and so on. The intermediate four consciousnesses are to be inferred accordingly. This establishes that objects external to the mind are not objects cognized by the internal mind. Next, to establish that objects internal to the mind are definitely not apart from consciousness, the inference is: [Thesis:] This direct object / [Probandum:] is definitely not apart from this [cognizing consciousness]; / [Reason:] because it is one of the two; / [Example:] like that cognizing consciousness. Furthermore, [Thesis:] The direct object / [Probandum:] is definitely not apart from the mind and mental factors; / [Reason:] because it is an objective phenomenon; / [Example:] like associated phenomena. Again, the second [formulation] states: [Thesis:] Other grasped dharmas distinct from the mind and mental factors / [Probandum:] are not truly existent in nature; / [Reason:] because they are apprehended; / [Example:] like the mind and mental factors. The awareness that can grasp them also does not take them as object, because it is a grasping [awareness], like the awareness taking this [internal object] as its object.

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唯識二十論述記 — Classical Chinese