因明入正理論疏 1.129

1.129

問：「言定有性，已顯有因，宗必隨逐，何須言同品？既云同品，即顯有宗，因必隨逐，何須復云定有性也？」答：「但言定有、不言同品，乃顯此因成義不定，非定成宗。但言同品、不言定有，亦顯此因成相違法等，非本宗義。今顯定成宗及非成異品，故說同品決定有性。由此應為四句分別：有同品非定有，謂宗同品非定有因，即九句中中三句是，第四、第六相違過收，第五句者不共不定。有定有非同品，謂定有因非宗同品，於九句中除二、五、八，餘六句是，第四、第六是相違因，餘之四句不定過攝，第一句共、第三句者異品一分轉、同品遍轉，第七句者同品一分轉、異品遍轉。第九句者俱品一分轉。有亦定有亦同品，謂是宗同品亦定有因，於九句中除中三句，初後三是。實若無過，唯取第二、第八正因；若通有過，即通六句，二正因、四不定。有非同品亦非定有，謂非宗同品亦非定有因，即異品遍無性，於九句中第二、五、八三句所攝，二、八正因，第五不定，此初三句內唯第三句少分正因，餘皆有過，為簡過句顯自無過，故說同品定有性也。」

Question: 'Saying "definitely present nature" already shows that where the reason exists, the probandum must necessarily follow it; why is it necessary to say "sapakṣa"? Since one has said "sapakṣa", this already shows that where the probandum exists, the reason must necessarily follow it; why say "definitely present nature" again?' Answer: 'If one only says "definitely present" and does not say "sapakṣa", it would merely show that this reason proves an inconclusive meaning and does not definitely prove the probandum. If one only says "sapakṣa" and does not say "definitely present", it would also show that this reason proves a contradictory property, etc., and not the original intended thesis. Now, in order to show that it definitely proves the probandum and does not prove the vipakṣa, one says "definitely present nature in the sapakṣa" (sapakṣe sattvam eva). From this, a fourfold analysis should be made: There is that which is sapakṣa but not definitely present: that is, the probandum's sapakṣa where the reason is not definitely present; namely, the middle three statements among the nine statements, where the fourth and sixth are included under contradictory faults, and the fifth statement is the uncommonly inconclusive. There is that which is definitely present but not sapakṣa: that is, where the reason is definitely present in what is not the probandum's sapakṣa; among the nine statements, excluding the second, fifth, and eighth, the remaining six statements are such, where the fourth and sixth are contradictory reasons, and the remaining four statements are subsumed under inconclusive faults—the first statement is common, the third occurs in a portion of the vipakṣa and pervades the sapakṣa, the seventh occurs in a portion of the sapakṣa and pervades the vipakṣa, and the ninth occurs in a portion of both. There is that which is both definitely present and sapakṣa: that is, what is the probandum's sapakṣa and where the reason is also definitely present; among the nine statements, excluding the middle three statements, the first and last three are such. If, in fact, it is faultless, it takes only the second and eighth valid reasons; if it admits of faults, it extends to six statements: two valid reasons and four inconclusive ones. There is that which is neither sapakṣa nor definitely present: that is, what is neither the probandum's sapakṣa nor where the reason is definitely present; namely, the nature of pervasive absence in the vipakṣa, which is subsumed under the second, fifth, and eighth statements among the nine statements—the second and eighth being valid reasons, and the fifth being inconclusive. Among the former three alternatives, only a small portion of the third alternative is a valid reason, while all the rest have faults. In order to eliminate the faulty statements and reveal one's own faultlessness, it is said that it is "definitely present nature in the sapakṣa".'