因明入正理論疏 1.41

1.41

次解能破中，諸論但有顯敵過破，無立量破，立量即顯彼之過故。顯過破中，古師有說八為能立，闕一有八、闕二有二十八，乃至闕七有八，闕八有一。亦有說四以為能立，闕一有四、闕二有六、闕三有四、闕四有一。世親菩薩缺減過性，宗、因、喻中闕一有三、闕二有三、闕三有一。世親已後，皆除第七，以宗、因、喻三為能立，總闕便非，既本無體，何成能立？有何所闕而得似名？陳那菩薩因一喻二，說有六過，則因三相六過是也。闕一有三、闕二有三、無闕三者，大師至彼六十年前，施無厭寺有一論師，名為賢愛，精確慈悲，特以貫世，因明一論時無敵者，亦除第七。自餘諸師不肯除之。因一喻二，則因三相雖有申宗，不申因、喻。如數論者執我為思，不申因、喻，豈非過也？又雖有言，而三相並闕，如聲論師，對佛法者立聲為常，德所依故，猶如擇滅；諸非常者皆非德依，如四大種。此德依因雖有所說，三相並闕，何得非似？由此第七亦缺減過。

Next, in explaining the valid refutation (dūṣaṇa): The treatises only have refutations that disclose the opponent's faults, not refutations by formulating an independent syllogism (prayoga), because formulating a syllogism itself exposes their fault. Within refutations that disclose faults, some ancient masters said there are eight valid proofs, so that lacking one yields eight [faults], lacking two yields twenty-eight, up to lacking seven yielding eight, and lacking eight yielding one. There were also those who spoke of four as valid proofs, so that lacking one yields four, lacking two yields six, lacking three yields four, and lacking four yields one. Bodhisattva Vasubandhu's faults of deficiency (nyūnatā) among proposition, reason, and example are: lacking one yields three, lacking two yields three, and lacking three yields one. After Vasubandhu, all eliminated the seventh [fault], taking proposition, reason, and example as the three valid proofs: if all are lacking, it is simply invalid; since there was originally no substance, how could it become a valid proof? What deficiency could there be that it would receive the name of a semblance (ābhāsa)? Bodhisattva Diṅnāga, taking one reason and two examples, stated six faults—which are precisely the six faults of the three characteristics of the reason: lacking one yields three, lacking two yields three, and there is no case of lacking three. Sixty years before the Master [Xuanzang] arrived there, at the Nālandā Monastery (Śīlāditya's Vihāra/Nirgrantha Vihāra) there was a treatise master named Bhadraruci, whose precision and compassion were celebrated throughout the age, peerless in the treatise of hetuvidyā at the time; he also eliminated the seventh. The other masters refused to eliminate it. With one reason and two examples, that is, the three characteristics of the reason, even if one puts forward a proposition without putting forward a reason or an example—as when the Sāṃkhya holds the self to be conscious without putting forward a reason or an example—how is that not a fault? Furthermore, even if there are words, if all three characteristics are lacking—as when a grammarian (Śabdika), against a Buddhist, establishes sound as eternal, 'because it is the locus of qualities, like space (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha); whatever is not eternal is not the locus of qualities, like the great elements'—although this reason of being a locus of qualities has been stated, all three characteristics are lacking; how could it not be a semblance? On this basis, the seventh is also a fault of deficiency.