因明入正理論疏 1.40

1.40

立論者現量等三，疎有悟他，故名能立。敵論者現量等三，親唯自悟，故非能立。今者陳那因喻為能立，宗為所立，自性差別二並極成，但是宗依，未成所諍，合以成宗不相離性，方為所諍，何成能立？故能立中定除其宗。問：「然依聲明，一言云婆達喃，二言云婆達泥，多言云婆達。今此能立婆達聲說，既並多言，云何但說因、喻二法以為能立？」答：「陳那釋云：因有三相，一因二喻，豈非多言？非要三體，由是定說宗是所立。陳那以後，略有三釋：一云：宗言所詮義為所立，故《瑜伽論》第十五云：『所成立義有二種：一自性、二差別。能成立法有八種。』其宗能詮之言及因等言義，皆名能立。其宗言因喻成故，雖亦所立，彼於論說，何故先立宗耶？為先顯示自所愛樂宗義，故亦所立，非定所立能成義故。猶如於因、喻所成故，但名能立。宗所詮義，定唯所立，獨名所成。二云：諸法總集，自性差別，若教若理，俱是所立，論俱名義，隨應有故。總中一分對敵所申，若言若義自性差別，俱名為宗，即名能立。雖此對宗亦是所立，能立總故，得能立名。故陳那等宗名所立，與《瑜伽》等理不相違，《瑜伽》等不說宗非一向唯能立故。三云：自性差別合所依義名為所立，能依合宗說為能立，總立別故。非此總宗定唯能立，對敵合申，因喻成故，亦是所立。由非定所立，故得能立名。陳那但以共許因、喻，成他未許。他未許者，唯是合宗，宗為所立，自性差別但是宗依，非是所立。所立之具，所望義殊，不相違也。不爾，慈氏、無著、天親豈不解因明，說所為能立？」

Direct perception and the other two [epistemic instruments] of the proponent (vādin) have an indirect [capacity] to enlighten another, and hence are called valid proofs (sādhana). Direct perception and the other two of the opponent (prativādin) directly only enlighten oneself, and hence are not valid proofs. Now, Diṅnāga takes the reason and the example as valid proofs and the proposition as that which is to be proved (sādhya). The intrinsic nature and the specific distinction are both thoroughly established (prasiddha); they are merely the bases of the proposition (pakṣa-adhikaraṇa) and do not constitute that which is in dispute. Only when combined to form the inseparable nature of the proposition do they become that which is in dispute; how could [the proposition] constitute a valid proof? Therefore, from among the valid proofs, the proposition is definitively excluded. Question: 'However, according to śabdavidyā, a singular term is called sādhanam, a dual term is called sādhane, and a plural term is called sādhanāni. Now, this valid proof is expressed with the word sādhanāni; since it is plural, why state only the two factors of the reason and the example as valid proof?' Answer: 'Diṅnāga explains: The reason has three characteristics (trairūpya)—one reason and two examples; how is that not plural? It is not necessary to have three distinct substances; on this basis, it is definitively said that the proposition is that which is to be proved.' After Diṅnāga, there are roughly three explanations: One says: The referent expressed by the words of the proposition is that which is to be proved; thus the fifteenth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'The thesis to be established is of two kinds: first, the intrinsic nature; second, the specific distinction. The factors that establish it are of eight kinds.' Both the words that express the proposition and the words and referents of the reason and so forth are all called valid proof. Because the words of the proposition are established by the reason and the example, though it is also that which is to be proved, why is the proposition stated first in treatises? In order to display first the thesis favoured by oneself, it is also that which is to be proved, but not definitively so, because it has the function of establishing. Just as, because it is established by the reason and the example, it is called valid proof, so the referent expressed by the proposition is definitively only that which is to be proved, uniquely named the thesis to be established. The second says: The totality of all phenomena—their intrinsic nature and specific distinction, whether in teaching or in principle—are all that which is to be proved; treatises call both of them 'meaning' (artha), present according to circumstance. A single portion within the totality put forward against an opponent, whether words or referents, whether intrinsic nature or specific distinction, is collectively called the proposition, which is immediately called valid proof. Although this proposition put to the opponent is also that which is to be proved, because it can establish the totality, it receives the name valid proof. Therefore, when Diṅnāga and others call the proposition that which is to be proved, this does not contradict the principles of the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts, because the Yogācārabhūmi and others do not say that the proposition is exclusively and unreservedly a valid proof. The third says: The referent which is the combined substratum of the intrinsic nature and specific distinction is called that which is to be proved, while the combined proposition that is supported is called valid proof, because the whole establishes the parts. It is not that this combined proposition is definitively only a valid proof; when put forward as a combination against an opponent, because it is established by the reason and example, it is also that which is to be proved. Because it is not definitively that which is to be proved, it receives the name valid proof. Diṅnāga merely uses commonly accepted reasons and examples to establish what the other has not accepted. What the other has not accepted is solely the combined proposition; the proposition is that which is to be proved, while intrinsic nature and specific distinction are merely bases of the proposition, not that which is to be proved. The instruments of proof and the points of view regarding meaning are different, so they do not contradict each other. Otherwise, could it be that Maitreya, Asanga, and Vasubandhu did not understand hetuvidyā, that they spoke of what is proved as a valid proof?