因明入正理論疏 1.41

1.41

Next, in explaining the valid refutation (dūṣaṇa): The treatises only have refutations that disclose the opponent's faults, not refutations by formulating an independent syllogism (prayoga), because formulating a syllogism itself exposes their fault. Within refutations that disclose faults, some ancient masters said there are eight valid proofs, so that lacking one yields eight [faults], lacking two yields twenty-eight, up to lacking seven yielding eight, and lacking eight yielding one. There were also those who spoke of four as valid proofs, so that lacking one yields four, lacking two yields six, lacking three yields four, and lacking four yields one. Bodhisattva Vasubandhu's faults of deficiency (nyūnatā) among proposition, reason, and example are: lacking one yields three, lacking two yields three, and lacking three yields one. After Vasubandhu, all eliminated the seventh [fault], taking proposition, reason, and example as the three valid proofs: if all are lacking, it is simply invalid; since there was originally no substance, how could it become a valid proof? What deficiency could there be that it would receive the name of a semblance (ābhāsa)? Bodhisattva Diṅnāga, taking one reason and two examples, stated six faults—which are precisely the six faults of the three characteristics of the reason: lacking one yields three, lacking two yields three, and there is no case of lacking three. Sixty years before the Master [Xuanzang] arrived there, at the Nālandā Monastery (Śīlāditya's Vihāra/Nirgrantha Vihāra) there was a treatise master named Bhadraruci, whose precision and compassion were celebrated throughout the age, peerless in the treatise of hetuvidyā at the time; he also eliminated the seventh. The other masters refused to eliminate it. With one reason and two examples, that is, the three characteristics of the reason, even if one puts forward a proposition without putting forward a reason or an example—as when the Sāṃkhya holds the self to be conscious without putting forward a reason or an example—how is that not a fault? Furthermore, even if there are words, if all three characteristics are lacking—as when a grammarian (Śabdika), against a Buddhist, establishes sound as eternal, 'because it is the locus of qualities, like space (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha); whatever is not eternal is not the locus of qualities, like the great elements'—although this reason of being a locus of qualities has been stated, all three characteristics are lacking; how could it not be a semblance? On this basis, the seventh is also a fault of deficiency.