因明入正理論疏 1.60

1.60

宗是何義？所尊、所崇、所主、所立之義。等者，等取因之與喻。世親以前，宗為能立。陳那但以因之三相、同異喻而為能立，以能立者必多言故。今言宗等名能立者，略有二釋：一云：宗是所立，因等能立，若不舉宗以顯能立，不知因、喻誰之能立。恐謂同古自性、差別二之能立，今標其宗，顯是所立。能立因、喻是此所立宗之能立，雖舉其宗，意取所等一因二喻為能立體。若不爾者，即有所立濫於古釋，能立亦濫彼能立過。為簡彼失，故舉宗等。二云：陳那等意，先古皆以宗為能立，自性、差別二為所立。陳那遂以二為宗依，非所乖諍，說非所立。所立即宗，有許不許，所諍義故。《理門論》云：「以所成立性，說是名為宗。」此論亦言：「隨自樂為所成立性，是名為宗。」因及二喻成此宗故，而為能立。今論若言因、喻多言名為能立，不但義旨見乖古師，文亦相違，遂成乖競。陳那、天主二意皆同，既稟先賢而為後論，文不乖古，舉宗為能等，義別先師。取所等因、喻為能立性，故能立中舉其宗等。

What is the meaning of 'thesis' (pratijñā)? It has the meanings of what is respected, what is revered, what is principal, and what is to be established. 'And so on' (ādi) takes in the reason and the example. Before Vasubandhu, the thesis was [regarded as] proof. Diṅnāga, however, took only the three characteristics of the reason and the similar and dissimilar examples as proof, because that which proves must consist of multiple statements. Now, regarding the statement that 'the thesis and so on are called proof', there are briefly two explanations. The first says: The thesis is what is to be proved (sādhya), and the reason and so on are that which proves (sādhana). If one does not adduce the thesis to reveal what proves, one would not know of what the reason and example are the proof. For fear that it might be thought to be, as in the ancient view, the proof of the two—intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and specific difference (viśeṣa)—it now marks the thesis to show that it is what is to be proved. The proving reason and example are the proof of this thesis to be proved. Although it adduces the thesis, the intention is to take what is included under 'and so on'—the one reason and two examples—as the essence of proof. Were it not so, then what is to be proved would be confused with the ancient explanation, and that which proves would also fall into the fault of their proof. To eliminate their defect, it therefore adduces 'the thesis and so on'. The second says: Regarding the intention of Diṅnāga and others, the ancients all took the thesis as that which proves, and the two—intrinsic nature and specific difference—as what is to be proved. Diṅnāga then took the two as the basis of the thesis (pakṣa-dharmin and pakṣa-dharma), which are not what is disputed, and said they are not what is to be proved. What is to be proved is the thesis, because there is acceptance and non-acceptance, and it is the matter in dispute. The Nyāyamukha says: 'Because it has the nature of being what is to be established, this is said to be the thesis.' This treatise also states: 'That which by one's own intention is desired to have the nature of being what is to be established is called the thesis.' Because the reason and the two examples accomplish this thesis, they are that which proves. If the present treatise were to say that multiple statements of the reason and example are called proof, not only would its doctrinal purport visibly contradict the ancient masters, but its text would also be contradictory, and thus dispute would arise. The intentions of both Diṅnāga and Śaṅkarasvāmin are identical: having inherited [the teachings of] earlier sages to compose a later treatise, their text does not contradict antiquity, adducing the thesis as that which includes the rest, yet their meaning differs from previous masters. Taking the included reason and examples as the nature of that which proves, they therefore adduce 'the thesis and so on' within proof.