因明入正理論疏 2.127

2.127

問：「如前所說無為無因，今因既隨一無，依隨一無有法，何故說因無所依過？」答：「宗、因不極，須置簡言，不簡立以為宗，所別便成不極，說因依立，即成因過，況俱不極？無因更依不極有法，許是宗過非因過耶？雖說無為無因，不說兩皆無過，豈以有為有因，宗、因有俱非失？如宗能別不成，因成有法自相相違，同喻亦有所立不成，異喻亦有所立不遣，何妨宗有所別不成，因是所依不成之過？然今此過所依必無，能依之因有無不定。由此總有二類差別：一、兩俱所依不成有三：一有體全分，如薩婆多對大乘師立『我者常住，識所緣故』，所依我無，能依因有；二無體全分，如數論師對佛弟子立『我實有，德所依故』；三有體一分，如勝論師對大乘者立『我業實，有動作故』，此於業有，於我無故。二、隨一所依不成有六：一有體他隨一，如數論師對佛弟子立『自性有，生死因故』；二有體自隨一，如數論師對大乘者立『藏識常，生死因故』；三無體他隨一，《理門論》說：『或於是處有法不成，如成立我其體周遍，於一切處生樂等故。』數論雖立，大乘不許，亦如此論所說者是；四無體自隨一，如經部師立此論義；五有體他一分隨一，如數論師對大乘者立『五大常，能生果故』，四大生果二俱可成，空大生果大乘不許故；六有體自一分隨一，如大乘者對數論立『五大非常，能生果故』。上來所說兩俱、隨一二種不成，所依唯有，因通有無，然皆決定兩、隨一無，所以並得能依有無以為諸句。猶預不成，所依、能依雖復皆有，因不決定，故總為句，不分有無。所依不成，所依唯無，能依通有，但兩俱、隨一所依不成為句，故無他、自無體隨一一分所依不成。若許自、他少分因於宗有，必非一分隨一所依不成。亦無猶預所依不成，後二不成，二種所依有、無別故，二種能依疑、定異故，所依若無，不猶預故。時或有釋：亦有猶預所依不成。疏既盛行，人多信學，依文誦習，未曾輒改。所作之法有法皆有，何名此過？請審詳之。」

Question: "As was said before that the unconditioned lacks causes, now since the reason is nonexistent for one party and depends on a dharmin that is nonexistent for one party, why is it said that the reason incurs the fallacy of lacking a substratum (āśrayāsiddha)?" Answer: "When the thesis and reason are not mutually accepted, one must supply qualification phrases. If one puts forward a thesis without qualifying it, the qualificand will not be mutually accepted; and if one states a reason that relies upon it, the reason incurs a fallacy. How much more so when both are not mutually accepted! When a non-existent reason further relies on a dharmin that is not mutually accepted, would you concede that this is only a fallacy of the thesis and not of the reason? Although it was said that the unconditioned lacks causes, it was not said that both are without fallacy; could one say that just because the conditioned has causes, neither the thesis nor the reason is flawed? Just as when the predicate of a thesis is unestablished (aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇa), the reason becomes contrary to the essential nature of the dharmin (dharmisvarūpa-viparītasādhana), the similar example also incurs the unestablished thesis property (sādhyavikala), and the dissimilar example also incurs the failure to exclude the thesis property (sādhyāvyāvṛtta), what prevents the thesis from having the qualificand unestablished (aprasiddha-viśeṣya) while the reason incurs the fallacy of lacking a substratum? However, in this fallacy here, the substratum must be nonexistent, whereas the reason supported by it may be existent or nonexistent. On this basis, there are in total two classes of distinctions. First, ubhaya-āśrayāsiddha has three [varieties]: (1) all-inclusive with an existent entity, as when a Sarvāstivādin sets up against a Mahāyāna master: 'The self is permanent, because it is an object of consciousness'—here the substratum, the self, is nonexistent, while the dependent reason is existent; (2) all-inclusive with a nonexistent entity, as when a Sāṃkhya sets up against a Buddhist disciple: 'The self is real, because it is the substratum of qualities'; (3) one-part with an existent entity, as when a Vaiśeṣika sets up against a Mahāyāna proponent: 'The self's action is real, because it possesses activity'—this is present in action but absent in the self. Second, anyatara-āśrayāsiddha has six [varieties]: (1) other-accepted with an existent entity, as when a Sāṃkhya sets up against a Buddhist disciple: 'Primordial Nature (prakṛti) exists, because it is the cause of transmigration'; (2) self-accepted with an existent entity, as when a Sāṃkhya sets up against a Mahāyāna proponent: 'The storehouse consciousness is permanent, because it is the cause of transmigration'; (3) other-accepted with a nonexistent entity, as the Nyāyamukha states: 'Or in cases where the dharmin is unestablished, as when establishing that the self is all-pervading in its nature, because it gives rise to pleasure and the like everywhere'—although the Sāṃkhya sets this up, the Mahāyāna does not accept it, and it is also what is explained in this treatise; (4) self-accepted with a nonexistent entity, as when a Sautrāntika sets up this thesis; (5) other-accepted one-part with an existent entity, as when a Sāṃkhya sets up against a Mahāyāna proponent: 'The five great elements are permanent, because they are capable of producing effects'—the four elements producing effects can be established by both, but the element of space producing effects is not accepted by the Mahāyāna; (6) self-accepted one-part with an existent entity, as when a Mahāyāna proponent sets up against a Sāṃkhya: 'The five great elements are impermanent, because they are capable of producing effects.' In the two kinds of asiddha explained above—both-unaccepted (ubhaya) and one-sided (anyatara)—the substratum is only existent, while the reason can be existent or nonexistent; yet they are definitely absent for both or one, and therefore both the presence and absence of the dependent [reason] can be used to form permutations. In the doubtful unestablished (saṃdigdhāsiddha), although both the substratum and the dependent are present, the reason is not decisive; hence they are taken collectively as a proposition without distinguishing presence and absence. In the lack of a substratum (āśrayāsiddha), the substratum is strictly nonexistent while the dependent can be existent; only both-unaccepted and one-sided āśrayāsiddha form propositions, so there is no other-accepted or self-accepted nonexistent-entity one-part āśrayāsiddha. If one accepts that a small portion of the reason is present in the thesis for oneself or the other, it cannot be a one-part anyatara-āśrayāsiddha. Nor is there a doubtful āśrayāsiddha, because in the latter two kinds of asiddha, the two kinds of substratum differ as to presence and absence, and the two kinds of dependent differ as to doubt and certainty; when the substratum is nonexistent, there is no doubt. At times, some commentaries explain that there is also a doubtful āśrayāsiddha. As those commentaries are widely circulated and many people trust and study them, reciting and practicing according to the text without ever venturing to correct it. When both the property and the dharmin are existent, how could this fallacy be designated? Please examine this carefully."