因明入正理論疏 2.129

2.129

問：「諸兩俱不成，皆隨一不成耶？乃至諸猶預不成，皆所依不成耶？」答：「此四皆別，兩俱必非隨一，二一相違故。亦非猶預，定疑相返故。亦非所依，兩俱所依有，此所依無故。隨一不成亦非餘二，定疑異故，二種所依有、無異故。猶預不成亦非後一，疑決異故。此依陳那四不成說。若依古師外道因明，不成唯二，但立兩俱及隨一過。依彼所說兩俱、隨一因通疑定，所依通無。然彼兩俱不成，全分、一分、若疑、若定合有九句。隨一不成，若自、若他、全分、一分、若疑、若定合十八句。由四不成，一切合有二十七。故陳那以前唯二大略，差別難知，所以開之，故今四因體性無亂。因三相中，初遍宗法總成三句：一、宗法而非遍，四不成中皆一分攝，合攝十二句。非遍非宗法，四不成中皆是全分，合攝十五句，如前已說。然上但說因於宗不成理，理實此因於同、異喻隨應亦有四種不成，故《理門論》解不成已云：『於其同品有非有等，亦隨所應，當如是說。』至下當知。然名不定及名相違，不名不成。」

Question: "Are all both-unaccepted (ubhayāsiddha) also one-sided unestablished (anyatarāsiddha), and so on, up to: are all doubtful unestablished (saṃdigdhāsiddha) also lacking a substratum (āśrayāsiddha)?" Answer: "These four are all distinct. Both-unaccepted is definitely not one-sided, because two and one are mutually contradictory. Nor is it doubtful, because certainty and doubt are opposites. Nor is it lacking a substratum, because in both-unaccepted the substratum is present, whereas in this [latter] the substratum is absent. The one-sided unestablished is also not the other two, because certainty and doubt differ, and the presence and absence of the two kinds of substrata differ. The doubtful unestablished is also not the last one, because doubt and decision differ. This is stated according to Diṅnāga's four kinds of asiddha. According to ancient masters and non-Buddhist hetuvidyā, there are only two kinds of asiddha, establishing only the fallacies of both-unaccepted and one-sided. According to their explanation, the reason in both-unaccepted and one-sided ranges over doubt and certainty, and the substratum ranges over nonexistence. However, their both-unaccepted includes all-inclusive, one-part, doubtful, and certain, making nine propositions in all; their one-sided unestablished includes self-accepted, other-accepted, all-inclusive, one-part, doubtful, and certain, making eighteen propositions in all. Across the four kinds of asiddha, there are twenty-seven in all. Thus, before Diṅnāga, there were only two general categories whose distinctions were difficult to know; hence he expanded them, so that now the natures of the four reasons are kept distinct without confusion. Among the three characteristics of the reason, the first—pervasion of the thesis property (pakṣadharmatva)—comprises three propositions in total: (1) it is a property of the thesis but not pervasive, which among the four asiddhas is subsumed under one-part, encompassing twelve propositions in all; (2) it is neither pervasive nor a property of the thesis, which among the four asiddhas is all-inclusive, encompassing fifteen propositions in all, as has been said before. However, the above only explains the principle of the reason being unestablished in the thesis; in truth, this reason also has four kinds of asiddha with respect to the similar and dissimilar examples as appropriate. Thus, after explaining asiddha, the Nyāyamukha states: 'With respect to presence, nonexistence, etc., in the sapakṣa, it should also be stated according to what is appropriate.' This will be understood below. However, [in those cases] they are named indeterminate (anaikāntika) and contradictory (viruddha), and are not called unestablished (asiddha)."