因明入正理論疏 2.29

2.29

述曰：恐說異喻，遮義不明，指事為例。此有二釋：一云：如勝論師，為其五頂不信有性實等外有，遂立量云：有性非實、非德、非業，有一實故，有德、業故，如同異性。陳那破云：「此因有有法，自相相違。」謂有性應非有，有一實故，有德、業故，如同異性。此引陳那有非有言，豈言非有別有所目？一向遮有，故言非有；常等亦爾，一向遮無常及所作性故，非有所目。二云：此言非有，非引陳那所說非有。汎言非有，略有二義：一者勝論，除有五句，皆是非有，此即表詮。二者非有但非於有，非有所目。欲顯同喻，成有體宗，可如表五，異喻止濫，可如遮有。然中道大乘，一切法性皆離假智及言詮表，言與假智俱不得真，一向遮詮都無所表，唯於諸法共相而轉。因明之法即不同彼，然共相中可有詮表義。同喻成立有、無二法，有成於有，可許詮也；無成於無，即可遮也。異喻必遮，故言此遮非有所表。異不同同，理如前說。

The Commentary says: Fearing that in explaining the dissimilar example, the meaning of exclusion (vyatireka) might not be clear, he points to a fact as an instance. There are two interpretations of this. The first says: As the Vaiśeṣikas, for the sake of the Pañcaśikha who did not believe that existence-ness (bhāva) exists outside substance and the rest, thereupon formulated the inference: "Existence-ness is neither substance, nor quality, nor action, because it possesses one substance, and because it possesses qualities and actions, like the universal-particular (sāmānya-viśeṣa)." Diṅnāga refuted this, saying: "This hetu contradicts the very essence of the subject (dharmin)." That is to say, existence-ness should be non-existent, because it possesses one substance, and because it possesses qualities and actions, like the universal-particular. This cites Diṅnāga's phrase "nonexistence of existence." How could the statement "non-existent" point to some separate object? It exclusively excludes existence, and hence is called "non-existent"; "eternal" and the like are also like this: they exclusively exclude impermanence and productness, and thus do not point to anything existent. The second says: This statement "nonexistence" is not a quotation of Diṅnāga's "nonexistence." In general, speaking of nonexistence has broadly two meanings: First, for the Vaiśeṣika, excluding the category of existence, the other five categories are all nonexistence; this is affirmative designation (vidhi). Second, "nonexistence" simply negates existence, and does not point to an object. If one wishes to show that the similar example establishes an existent thesis, it can be like affirming the five [categories]; if the dissimilar example precludes overextension, it can be like excluding existence. However, in the Great Vehicle of the Middle Way, the nature of all dharmas is free from conceptual cognition and verbal designation; both words and conceptual cognition fail to attain reality; they are exclusively negative exclusions (apoha) and do not affirmatively designate anything at all, operating solely upon the common characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of dharmas. The method of hetuvidyā is not identical to that; however, within the common characteristics, there can be the sense of affirmative designation. The similar example establishes the two dharmas of existence and nonexistence: when establishing existence by existence, affirmation may be accepted; when establishing nonexistence by nonexistence, it is just exclusion. The dissimilar example must be exclusionary, and therefore it is said that this exclusion does not affirmatively designate anything. That the dissimilar differs from the similar is justified as explained before.