因明入正理論疏 2.29

2.29

The Commentary says: Fearing that in explaining the dissimilar example, the meaning of exclusion (vyatireka) might not be clear, he points to a fact as an instance. There are two interpretations of this. The first says: As the Vaiśeṣikas, for the sake of the Pañcaśikha who did not believe that existence-ness (bhāva) exists outside substance and the rest, thereupon formulated the inference: "Existence-ness is neither substance, nor quality, nor action, because it possesses one substance, and because it possesses qualities and actions, like the universal-particular (sāmānya-viśeṣa)." Diṅnāga refuted this, saying: "This hetu contradicts the very essence of the subject (dharmin)." That is to say, existence-ness should be non-existent, because it possesses one substance, and because it possesses qualities and actions, like the universal-particular. This cites Diṅnāga's phrase "nonexistence of existence." How could the statement "non-existent" point to some separate object? It exclusively excludes existence, and hence is called "non-existent"; "eternal" and the like are also like this: they exclusively exclude impermanence and productness, and thus do not point to anything existent. The second says: This statement "nonexistence" is not a quotation of Diṅnāga's "nonexistence." In general, speaking of nonexistence has broadly two meanings: First, for the Vaiśeṣika, excluding the category of existence, the other five categories are all nonexistence; this is affirmative designation (vidhi). Second, "nonexistence" simply negates existence, and does not point to an object. If one wishes to show that the similar example establishes an existent thesis, it can be like affirming the five [categories]; if the dissimilar example precludes overextension, it can be like excluding existence. However, in the Great Vehicle of the Middle Way, the nature of all dharmas is free from conceptual cognition and verbal designation; both words and conceptual cognition fail to attain reality; they are exclusively negative exclusions (apoha) and do not affirmatively designate anything at all, operating solely upon the common characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of dharmas. The method of hetuvidyā is not identical to that; however, within the common characteristics, there can be the sense of affirmative designation. The similar example establishes the two dharmas of existence and nonexistence: when establishing existence by existence, affirmation may be accepted; when establishing nonexistence by nonexistence, it is just exclusion. The dissimilar example must be exclusionary, and therefore it is said that this exclusion does not affirmatively designate anything. That the dissimilar differs from the similar is justified as explained before.