因明入正理論疏 2.30

2.30

《理門論》中於此二喻而設難言：「復以何緣第一說因宗所隨逐，第二說宗無因不有，不說因無宗不有耶？」此中難意：前頌所言「說因宗所隨，宗無因不有，此二名譬喻。」何不以同例異，先宗後因，說無常者皆是所作，而言諸所作者皆是無常，說有因處宗所隨逐？何不以異例同，先因後宗，說非所作皆見是常，而言若有是常見非所作，說宗無處因亦隨無？彼論答云：「由如是說能顯示因，同品定有、異品遍無，非顛倒說。」即彼頌言「應以非作證其常，或以無常成所作，若爾應成非所說，不遍非樂等合離。」初三句答所作遍因，後一句答勤勇狹因。第一同喻先宗後因，第二異喻先因後宗，返覆相例，俱為不可。若以離類合先因後宗，而云非所作者皆是常住，即應以非所作因自證常住，非離先立，先宗後因。若許爾者，亦應成立非本所說無常之宗。又空常住，立敵本成，若今更立，犯相符過。既非本諍，翻乃立常。由此故言：若爾應成非本所說。若以合類離，先宗後因，而云「諸無常者皆是所作」，即應以無常成所作性，非以所作成宗無常。若許爾者，即應成立非本所諍無常宗義。又聲無常非兩所許，聲上所作兩本許成，若以不共許無常，成共許之所作，宗既相符，因亦隨一。故云「若爾即應成立非本所諍。」

In the Nyāyamukha, an objection was raised concerning these two examples: "Furthermore, for what reason does the first state that the hetu is followed by the thesis, while the second states that where the thesis is absent the hetu does not exist, rather than saying that where the hetu is absent the thesis does not exist?" The meaning of the objection here is: The preceding verse states: "Stating that the hetu is followed by the thesis, and that where the thesis is absent the hetu does not exist—these two are called examples." Why not analogize the dissimilar by the similar, putting the thesis first and the hetu second, saying that whatever is impermanent is produced, instead of saying that all that is produced is impermanent, stating that where the hetu is present the thesis follows? Why not analogize the similar by the dissimilar, putting the hetu first and the thesis second, saying that whatever is non-produced is seen to be eternal, instead of saying that if anything is eternal it is seen to be non-produced, stating that where the thesis is absent the hetu is likewise absent? That treatise answers: "Because stating it in this way can demonstrate that the hetu is definitely present in the similar class and completely absent in the dissimilar class, and it is not a reversed statement." That is the verse saying: "One would then prove its eternality by non-productness, / Or establish being produced by impermanence; / If so, it would establish what was not stated, / Because of non-pervasion and an undesired [thesis], etc., in the application and negative exclusion." The first three lines answer the pervasive hetu of "being produced"; the last line answers the narrow hetu of "arising from effort." Putting the thesis first and the hetu second in the first similar example, and putting the hetu first and the thesis second in the second dissimilar example—analogizing them reversely in either case is inadmissible. If one analogizes the negative exclusion to the application, putting the hetu first and the thesis second, and says that all that is non-produced is eternal, then one would be using the hetu of non-produced to self-prove eternality, rather than negatively excluding what was previously established by putting the thesis first and the hetu second. If one permits this, one would also be establishing an eternal thesis that was not originally stated. Moreover, that space is eternal is originally established by both the proponent and opponent; if one establishes it again now, it commits the fault of establishing what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). Since it was not originally in dispute, one would conversely establish eternality. Therefore it is said: "If so, it would establish what was not originally stated." If one analogizes the application to the negative exclusion, putting the thesis first and the hetu second, and says: "Whatever is impermanent is produced," then one would be establishing productness by impermanence, rather than establishing the thesis of impermanence by productness. If one permits this, then one would be establishing the thesis of impermanence which was not originally in dispute. Furthermore, the impermanence of sound is not accepted by both sides, whereas the productness of sound was originally accepted by both sides; if one uses the unshared impermanence to establish the shared productness, then the thesis would be already accepted, and the hetu would also be unestablished for one side (anyatarāsiddha). Thus it is said: "If so, one would establish what was not originally in dispute."