因明入正理論疏 2.69

2.69

亦有全分、一分四句。全四句者，有違自教非他，如論說是。有違他教非自，如佛弟子對聲論師立「聲無常」。有違共教，如勝論師對佛弟子立「聲為常」。一分四句者，有違自一分教非他，如化地部對薩婆多立「三世非有」，違自所宗現世有故。有違他一分教非自，如化地部對大乘師立「九無為皆有實體」，違大乘師除真如外無實體故。有違共一分教，如經部師對一切有立「色處色皆非實有」，麁微非實，可對成宗，彼宗共許極微實有，違共一分，或違他全自成一分。上二四句唯違他句，非是過攝。違自及共皆是過收，理如前說。雖共違教亦是過收，但取一分違自為失，故論但說自教相違。引自為證，他未信從，能立之法必極成故。對敵申宗必乖競故，違自憑據即便為失，毀背所師無宗稟故。若俱不違，雖非此過，必有相符極成之失。

There are also four alternatives each for the total and partial. In the four total alternatives: There is contradiction of one's own doctrine and not the other's, as stated in the treatise. There is contradiction of the other's doctrine and not one's own, as when a disciple of the Buddha posits against a Śabda theorist, "Sound is impermanent." There is contradiction of common doctrine, as when a Vaiśeṣika posits against a disciple of the Buddha, "Sound is permanent." In the four partial alternatives: There is contradiction of one's own partial doctrine and not the other's, as when a Mahīśāsaka posits against a Sarvāstivādin, "The three times do not exist," which contradicts their own school's stance that the present exists. There is contradiction of the other's partial doctrine and not one's own, as when a Mahīśāsaka posits against a Mahāyāna master, "The nine unconditioned phenomena all have real substance," which contradicts the Mahāyāna master's view that none except Suchness (tathatā) has real substance. There is contradiction of common partial doctrine, as when a Sautrāntika posits against the Sarvāstivāda, "The forms of the form-base (rūpāyatana) are all not real entities"; gross and subtle not being real could establish a thesis against them, but that school commonly accepts that subtle atoms are real entities, so it contradicts a common part, or contradicts the other totally while being partial to oneself. Among the above two sets of four alternatives, the alternative of contradicting only the other is not subsumed under fallacies. Contradicting oneself and contradicting both are subsumed under fallacies, for the reason stated earlier. Although contradicting common doctrine is also subsumed under fallacies, taking the partial contradiction of oneself alone constitutes the fault; therefore, the treatise only says "contradiction with one's own doctrine." If one cites one's own [doctrine] as evidence, the other has not yet believed or followed it, for the means of proof must be mutually recognized. Setting forth a proposition against an opponent must involve a divergence in debate; contradicting one's own basis immediately constitutes a fault, because turning one's back on one's master leaves one with no school to uphold. If neither is contradicted, although it is not this fallacy, it must entail the fault of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana).