因明入正理論疏 2.69

2.69

There are also four alternatives each for the total and partial. In the four total alternatives: There is contradiction of one's own doctrine and not the other's, as stated in the treatise. There is contradiction of the other's doctrine and not one's own, as when a disciple of the Buddha posits against a Śabda theorist, "Sound is impermanent." There is contradiction of common doctrine, as when a Vaiśeṣika posits against a disciple of the Buddha, "Sound is permanent." In the four partial alternatives: There is contradiction of one's own partial doctrine and not the other's, as when a Mahīśāsaka posits against a Sarvāstivādin, "The three times do not exist," which contradicts their own school's stance that the present exists. There is contradiction of the other's partial doctrine and not one's own, as when a Mahīśāsaka posits against a Mahāyāna master, "The nine unconditioned phenomena all have real substance," which contradicts the Mahāyāna master's view that none except Suchness (tathatā) has real substance. There is contradiction of common partial doctrine, as when a Sautrāntika posits against the Sarvāstivāda, "The forms of the form-base (rūpāyatana) are all not real entities"; gross and subtle not being real could establish a thesis against them, but that school commonly accepts that subtle atoms are real entities, so it contradicts a common part, or contradicts the other totally while being partial to oneself. Among the above two sets of four alternatives, the alternative of contradicting only the other is not subsumed under fallacies. Contradicting oneself and contradicting both are subsumed under fallacies, for the reason stated earlier. Although contradicting common doctrine is also subsumed under fallacies, taking the partial contradiction of oneself alone constitutes the fault; therefore, the treatise only says "contradiction with one's own doctrine." If one cites one's own [doctrine] as evidence, the other has not yet believed or followed it, for the means of proof must be mutually recognized. Setting forth a proposition against an opponent must involve a divergence in debate; contradicting one's own basis immediately constitutes a fault, because turning one's back on one's master leaves one with no school to uphold. If neither is contradicted, although it is not this fallacy, it must entail the fault of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana).