因明入正理論疏 2.74

2.74

因云初三攝者，顯十八界六三之中初三所攝。不爾，便有不定、違宗，謂若不言初三所攝，但言眼所不攝故，便有不定言：極成之色為如眼識，眼所不攝故，定不離眼識？為如五三眼所不攝故，極成之色定離眼識？若許五三眼所不攝故，亦不離眼識，便違自宗。為簡此過，言初三攝。其眼所不攝言，亦簡不定及法自相決定相違。謂若不言眼所不攝，但言初三所攝故，作不定言：極成之色為如眼識，初三攝故，定不離眼識？為如眼根，初三攝故，非定不離眼識？由大乘師說彼眼根非定一向說離眼識，故此不定云非定不離眼識，不得說言定離眼識。作法自相相違言：真故極成色非不離眼識，初三攝故，猶如眼根，由此復有決定相違。為簡此三過，故言眼所不攝故。若爾，何須自許言耶？為遮有法差別相違過，故言自許。非顯極成色初三所攝，眼所不攝，他所不成，唯自所許。謂真故極成色，是有法自相；不離於眼識，是法自相；定離眼識色、非定離眼識色，是有法差別。立者意許是不離眼識色，外人遂作差別相違言：極成之色非是不離眼識色，初三所攝，眼所不攝故，猶如眼識。為遮此過，故言自許。與彼比量作不定言：極成之色，為如眼識，初三所攝，眼所不攝故，非不離眼識色，為如自許他方佛等色。初三所攝，眼所不攝故，是不離眼識色。若因不言自許，即不得以他方佛色而為不定，此言便有隨一過故。汝立比量既有此過，非真不定。凡顯他過，必自無過；成真能立，必無似故。明前所立無有有法差別相違，故言自許。

The reason stating 'subsumed under the first three' shows that it is subsumed under the first triad among the six triads of the eighteen elements (dhātus). Otherwise, there would be the faults of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika) and contradicting the thesis: that is, if one did not say 'subsumed under the first three' but only said 'because not subsumed under the eye[-faculty],' there would be the inconclusive objection: 'Is commonly recognized form, because it is not subsumed under the eye[-faculty], definitely not separate from eye-consciousness like eye-consciousness? Or, because it is not subsumed under the eye[-faculty] like the other five triads, is commonly recognized form definitely separate from eye-consciousness?' If one were to accept that, because they are not subsumed under the eye[-faculty] like the other five triads, they are also not separate from eye-consciousness, that would contradict one's own thesis. To eliminate this fault, it says 'subsumed under the first three.' The phrase 'not subsumed under the eye[-faculty]' also eliminates inconclusiveness and the self-contradictory decisive reason (viruddhadharmāviśeṣaprayukta / svabhāvaviruddha). That is, if one did not say 'not subsumed under the eye[-faculty]' but only said 'because subsumed under the first three,' one could formulate an inconclusive objection: 'Is commonly recognized form, because it is subsumed under the first three, definitely not separate from eye-consciousness like eye-consciousness? Or, because it is subsumed under the first three, is it not definitely unseparated from eye-consciousness like the eye-faculty?' Since the Mahāyāna masters say that the eye-faculty is not definitively, exclusively said to be separate from eye-consciousness, this inconclusive objection says 'not definitely unseparated from eye-consciousness,' and one cannot say 'definitely separate from eye-consciousness.' Formulating the contradiction with the property's own nature (dharmasvabhāva-viruddha): 'Ultimately, commonly recognized form is not unseparated from eye-consciousness, because it is subsumed under the first three, just like the eye-faculty'—thus there would also be a decisive contradiction (viruddha). To eliminate these three faults, it says 'because not subsumed under the eye[-faculty].' If so, why is the phrase 'accepted by oneself' needed? To avert the fault of contradicting the specification of the subject (dharmiviśeṣa-viruddha), it says 'accepted by oneself.' It does not mean that the fact that commonly recognized form is subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye[-faculty] is unestablished for the opponent and accepted only by oneself. That is: 'ultimately, commonly recognized form' is the own nature of the subject (dharmisvabhāva); 'not separate from eye-consciousness' is the own nature of the property (dharmasvabhāva); and 'form definitely separate from eye-consciousness' versus 'form not definitely separate from eye-consciousness' are the specifications of the subject (dharmiviśeṣa). The proponent's intention is that it is form not separate from eye-consciousness. The opponent could then formulate a contradiction of the specification: 'Commonly recognized form is not form that is not separate from eye-consciousness, because it is subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye[-faculty], just like eye-consciousness.' To avert this fault, he says 'accepted by oneself.' Formulating an inconclusive objection against that opponent's inference: 'Is commonly recognized form, because it is subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye[-faculty], not form that is not separate from eye-consciousness, like eye-consciousness? Or is it form not separate from eye-consciousness, like the forms of the Buddhas of other realms accepted by oneself, because it is subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye[-faculty]?' If the reason did not say 'accepted by oneself,' one could not use the forms of the Buddhas of other realms to formulate the inconclusiveness, because this statement would have the fault of being unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha). Since the inference you formulated has this fault, it is not a genuine inconclusive reason. Whenever one exposes another's fault, one's own [reasoning] must be free of fault; to establish a genuine proof, it must be free of fallacies. To show that the earlier formulation has no contradiction of the specification of the subject, he says 'accepted by oneself.'