因明入正理論疏 2.75

2.75

然有新羅順憬法師者，聲振唐蕃，學苞大小，業崇迦葉，每稟行於杜多，心務薄俱，恒馳誡於小欲。既而蘊藝西夏，傳照東夷，名道日新，緇素欽挹。雖彼龍象不少，海外時稱獨步。於此比量作決定相違，乾封之歲，寄請師釋云：「真故極成色，定離於眼識，自許初三攝，眼識不攝故，猶如眼根。」時為釋言：「凡因明法，若自比量，宗、因、喻中皆須依自，他共亦爾。立依自、他、共，敵對亦須然，名善因明，無疎謬矣。」前云唯識依共比量，今依自立，即一切量皆有此違。如佛弟子對聲生論，立聲無常，所作性故，譬如瓶等。聲生論言：聲是其常，所聞性故。如自許聲性，應是前量決定相違。彼既不成，故依自比，不可對共而為比量。

However, there was Dharma Master Sun-gyeong of Silla, whose fame shook Tang and Tibet, whose learning embraced both the Great and Small Vehicles, whose practice venerated Kāśyapa—always adhering in practice to the dhūtas—and whose mind was devoted to Vakkula, constantly instilling the admonition of few desires. Having amassed his art in the Western Xia, he transmitted the light to the Eastern Barbarians; his name and path grew daily renewed, and monks and laity alike held him in veneration. Although there was no lack of 'dragons and elephants' there, he was celebrated across the seas as peerless in his time. He constructed a decisive contradiction against this inference, and in the Qianfeng era (666–668 CE), he sent a message requesting the Master to explain it: 'Ultimately, commonly recognized form is definitely separate from eye-consciousness, because of being subsumed under the first three accepted by oneself and not subsumed under eye-consciousness, just like the eye-faculty.' At that time, the explanation given was: 'In the method of hetuvidyā, in an inference for oneself (svānumāna), the thesis, reason, and example must all rely on one's own [perspective]; the same applies to inferences for another (parānumāna) and inferences for both (ubhayānumāna). When establishing [an argument] based on oneself, another, or both, the opponent's counter must also be likewise; only then is it called good hetuvidyā, free of divergence and error.' Earlier, it was said that the mere-consciousness [argument] relied on an inference for both, but now you establish [a counter-argument] relying on oneself; in that case, all inferences would be subject to such contradictions. For instance, when a Buddhist disciple, debating a proponent of the production of sound (Śabdakāryavādin), establishes that sound is impermanent because it is produced, like a pot, the Śabdakāryavādin might say: 'Sound is permanent, because it is audible, like the sound-nature (śabdatva) accepted by myself'—which would be a decisive contradiction against the previous inference. Since that is invalid, one cannot counter an inference for both with an inference relying on oneself.