因明入正理論疏 2.74

2.74

The reason stating 'subsumed under the first three' shows that it is subsumed under the first triad among the six triads of the eighteen elements (dhātus). Otherwise, there would be the faults of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika) and contradicting the thesis: that is, if one did not say 'subsumed under the first three' but only said 'because not subsumed under the eye[-faculty],' there would be the inconclusive objection: 'Is commonly recognized form, because it is not subsumed under the eye[-faculty], definitely not separate from eye-consciousness like eye-consciousness? Or, because it is not subsumed under the eye[-faculty] like the other five triads, is commonly recognized form definitely separate from eye-consciousness?' If one were to accept that, because they are not subsumed under the eye[-faculty] like the other five triads, they are also not separate from eye-consciousness, that would contradict one's own thesis. To eliminate this fault, it says 'subsumed under the first three.' The phrase 'not subsumed under the eye[-faculty]' also eliminates inconclusiveness and the self-contradictory decisive reason (viruddhadharmāviśeṣaprayukta / svabhāvaviruddha). That is, if one did not say 'not subsumed under the eye[-faculty]' but only said 'because subsumed under the first three,' one could formulate an inconclusive objection: 'Is commonly recognized form, because it is subsumed under the first three, definitely not separate from eye-consciousness like eye-consciousness? Or, because it is subsumed under the first three, is it not definitely unseparated from eye-consciousness like the eye-faculty?' Since the Mahāyāna masters say that the eye-faculty is not definitively, exclusively said to be separate from eye-consciousness, this inconclusive objection says 'not definitely unseparated from eye-consciousness,' and one cannot say 'definitely separate from eye-consciousness.' Formulating the contradiction with the property's own nature (dharmasvabhāva-viruddha): 'Ultimately, commonly recognized form is not unseparated from eye-consciousness, because it is subsumed under the first three, just like the eye-faculty'—thus there would also be a decisive contradiction (viruddha). To eliminate these three faults, it says 'because not subsumed under the eye[-faculty].' If so, why is the phrase 'accepted by oneself' needed? To avert the fault of contradicting the specification of the subject (dharmiviśeṣa-viruddha), it says 'accepted by oneself.' It does not mean that the fact that commonly recognized form is subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye[-faculty] is unestablished for the opponent and accepted only by oneself. That is: 'ultimately, commonly recognized form' is the own nature of the subject (dharmisvabhāva); 'not separate from eye-consciousness' is the own nature of the property (dharmasvabhāva); and 'form definitely separate from eye-consciousness' versus 'form not definitely separate from eye-consciousness' are the specifications of the subject (dharmiviśeṣa). The proponent's intention is that it is form not separate from eye-consciousness. The opponent could then formulate a contradiction of the specification: 'Commonly recognized form is not form that is not separate from eye-consciousness, because it is subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye[-faculty], just like eye-consciousness.' To avert this fault, he says 'accepted by oneself.' Formulating an inconclusive objection against that opponent's inference: 'Is commonly recognized form, because it is subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye[-faculty], not form that is not separate from eye-consciousness, like eye-consciousness? Or is it form not separate from eye-consciousness, like the forms of the Buddhas of other realms accepted by oneself, because it is subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye[-faculty]?' If the reason did not say 'accepted by oneself,' one could not use the forms of the Buddhas of other realms to formulate the inconclusiveness, because this statement would have the fault of being unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha). Since the inference you formulated has this fault, it is not a genuine inconclusive reason. Whenever one exposes another's fault, one's own [reasoning] must be free of fault; to establish a genuine proof, it must be free of fallacies. To show that the earlier formulation has no contradiction of the specification of the subject, he says 'accepted by oneself.'