因明入正理論疏 3.161

3.161

乘斯義便，明自共相。諸外道等計一切名言得法自相，如說召火，但取於火，明得火之自相。佛法名言但得共相，彼即難言：「若得共相，喚火應得於水。」大乘解云：「一切名言有遮有表，言火遮非火，非得火自相；而得火來者，名言有表，故得於火。」有救難外云：「汝若名言得火自相，說及心緣，應燒心口，以得自相故。」若他反難云：「汝定心緣火既得自相，應亦燒心，心此不燒，假智及詮，雖得自相而不被燒，如何難我？」即有解云：「境有離合殊，緣合境者被燒，定心離取故不被燒。」由此前難但應難名言，言依語表，表即依身，是合中知。若得自相，即合被燒。今問：「此難為難因明自相？為經中自相耶？」答云：「依因明自相。」若爾，此難並不應理。因明自相，非要如火熱為自相，如何難彼合火燒心等？設縱依經自共相難，即不得言假智及詮得自相救。彼假智詮，論自誠說得共相故。若據外宗，彼非假智詮，俱得自相故，可依此智以難於彼。彼返難曰：「定心得自相，應定心被燒，亦不得以離合取救，誰言定心唯離取境？《瑜伽》說通離合取故。又若離取即不被燒，亦應離取不得自相，火以熱觸為自相故。又於極熱捺落迦中，意與身識同取於火，既不被燒，應不悶絕，不與苦俱。彼既悶絕及與苦俱，明得彼火熱自相故。」前救及難，二並成非。今且自共相，外道未必皆有此二，佛法之中有此義故。彼外道等但言火等，即得火體，火體為自相而不立共相。不能分別經之與論，故總難之。若如說火，得火自相，即應燒口，此據言火在於口中，言得自相，自相亦不離口，故應燒口。或可抑難，非正難彼。合口被燒，口是發語之緣，非正語故。正難於彼尋名取境之心，亦得自相，得自相者心應覺熱。若他返難言：令我尋名緣火之心亦被燒者，自是被屈，非預我宗，尋名假智不得彼火之自相故。若覺熱觸，即非假智，稱境知故。設定心中尋名緣火等亦是假智，不同比量，假立一法貫在餘法。名得自相，各附體故，名得自相，是現量收。不得熱等相，故假智攝。如假想定變水、火等，身雖在中，而無燒、濕等用。如上定心緣下界火，雖是現量，所帶相分亦無燒、濕等用。

Taking advantage of this topic, we clarify svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa. Various non-Buddhists hold that all verbal designations apprehend the svalakṣaṇa of dharmas; for example, when one speaks to summon fire, one takes only fire, clearly grasping the svalakṣaṇa of fire. In the Buddhadharma, verbal designations apprehend only the sāmānyalakṣaṇa. They then object: "If they apprehend the sāmānyalakṣaṇa, then calling for fire ought to fetch water." The Mahāyāna explains: "All verbal designations have exclusion (apoha) and positive designation. The word 'fire' excludes non-fire; it does not apprehend the svalakṣaṇa of fire. Yet when fire is brought, because verbal designation has a positive designation, one therefore obtains fire." Someone rescued this by objecting against the externalists: "If your verbal designation apprehends the svalakṣaṇa of fire, then speaking it and conceiving it in the mind ought to burn the mind and mouth, because of apprehending the svalakṣaṇa." If the other counters: "Since your meditative mind apprehending fire grasps the svalakṣaṇa, it should also burn your mind. Since this mind is not burned, though conventional cognition and verbal expression grasp the svalakṣaṇa, they are not burned—how can you challenge me?" Then someone explains: "Objects differ in being in contact or separate: one who cognizes an object in contact is burned, whereas the meditative mind grasps at a distance and is therefore not burned." Due to this, the former objection should only challenge verbal designations: speech depends on verbal representation, representation depends on the body, and this is knowing through contact. If it apprehends the svalakṣaṇa, it should be burned upon contact. Now we ask: "Does this objection challenge the svalakṣaṇa of hetuvidyā, or the svalakṣaṇa in the sūtras?" The answer is: "It relies on the svalakṣaṇa of hetuvidyā." If so, this objection is not reasonable at all. The svalakṣaṇa of hetuvidyā does not necessarily have the heat of fire as its svalakṣaṇa; how can one object that contact with fire burns the mind and so forth? Even if one objects based on the svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa of the sūtras, one cannot defend it by saying that conventional cognition and verbal expression grasp the svalakṣaṇa. For the treatises themselves explicitly state that those conventional cognitions and expressions grasp the sāmānyalakṣaṇa. If according to the external tenets, for them it is not conventional cognition or expression, and both grasp the svalakṣaṇa, one could rely on this cognition to object against them. They would counter: "The meditative mind grasps the svalakṣaṇa, so the meditative mind should be burned; nor can one defend this by claiming grasping in contact versus at a distance. Who says the meditative mind only grasps objects at a distance? The Yogācārabhūmi says it applies to both contact and separated grasping. Moreover, if grasping at a distance means not being burned, grasping at a distance should also mean not grasping the svalakṣaṇa, because fire has hot tangibility as its svalakṣaṇa. Furthermore, in the intensely hot Naraka hells, the mental consciousness and the body consciousness together grasp fire: since it is not burned, one should not faint or be accompanied by suffering. Since they do faint and are accompanied by suffering, it is clear that they grasp the svalakṣaṇa of the fire's heat." Both the previous defense and the objection turn out to be flawed. Now, as for svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa, non-Buddhists do not necessarily possess both of these; this distinction exists within the Buddhadharma. Those non-Buddhists merely say that [saying] "fire" and so on grasps the entity of fire, taking the entity of fire as the svalakṣaṇa without establishing a sāmānyalakṣaṇa. Unable to distinguish the sūtras from the treatises, one objected against them indiscriminately. If, as in speaking of fire, one grasped the svalakṣaṇa of fire, it should burn the mouth; this is based on the word "fire" being in the mouth—if the word grasps the svalakṣaṇa, the svalakṣaṇa would not be separate from the mouth, and therefore it should burn the mouth. Or it could be a pressuring challenge, not a proper refutation of them. The mouth being burned upon contact is because the mouth is the condition for producing speech, not speech itself. The proper refutation is against their mind that pursues names and takes objects, which also supposedly grasps the svalakṣaṇa: if it grasps the svalakṣaṇa, the mind should feel heat. If the other counters: "Making my mind that pursues names and cognizes fire also be burned," they themselves are defeated, and it does not affect our tenet, because the conventional cognition that pursues names does not grasp the svalakṣaṇa of that fire. If it felt hot tangibility, then it would not be conventional cognition, because it would know the object as it is. Even if in a meditative state the pursuit of names to cognize fire is also conventional cognition, it is not like anumāna, which conventionally establishes a single dharma running through other dharmas. It is called grasping the svalakṣaṇa because each adheres to its own entity; being called grasping the svalakṣaṇa, it is subsumed under pratyakṣa. Because it does not grasp characteristics such as heat, it is subsumed under conventional cognition. Just as in the samādhi of creative visualization, one transforms water, fire, and the like: although the body is within it, there are no functions of burning, moistening, and so forth. Just as when a higher-realm meditative mind cognizes fire of a lower realm, although it is pratyakṣa, the objective aspect (nimittabhāga) it carries also lacks the functions of burning, moistening, and so forth.