因明入正理論疏 3.19

3.19

初文有二：此因如能成立眼等必為他用，此牒前因能立所立法之自相；如是亦能下，又顯此因亦能與彼法差別為相違因。其數論師，眼等五法即五知根。臥具床座，即五唯量所集成法。不積聚他，謂實神我，體常本有。其積聚他，即依眼等所立假我，無常轉變。然眼等根不積聚他，實我用勝，親用於此受五唯量故。由依眼等方立假我，故積聚我用眼等劣。其臥具等，必其神我須思量受用，故從大等次第成之。若以所思，實我用勝，假我用劣。然以假我安處所須，方受床座，故於臥具假他用勝，實我用劣。今者陳那即以彼因與所立法勝劣差別而作相違，非法自相，亦非法上一切差別皆作相違，故論但言與所立法差別相違。

The first text has two parts: 'Just as this reason can establish that the eyes and so forth are necessarily for the use of another'—this cites the former reason's capacity to establish the own-nature of the property to be established. 'So too it can...' onward further shows that this reason can also serve as a contradictory reason against that particular property of the property. For the Sāṃkhya master, the five things such as the eyes are the five sense faculties (buddhīndriya). Bedding and seats are things compounded from the five subtle elements (tanmātra). The 'incomposite other' refers to the real spiritual self (puruṣa), whose substance is permanent and inherently existent. The 'composite other' is the conventional self established based on the eyes and so forth, which is impermanent and undergoes transformation. However, for the faculties such as the eyes, the incomposite other—the real self—has superior utility, directly using them to experience the five subtle elements. Because the conventional self is only established based on the eyes and so forth, the composite self's use of the eyes and so forth is inferior. As for bedding and the like, the spiritual self must necessarily deliberate and experience them, so they are sequentially produced starting from the Great (mahat). If judged by what is deliberated upon, the real self's use is superior, and the conventional self's use is inferior. But because the conventional self requires a resting place and only then receives the bed and seat, for bedding the conventional other's use is superior, and the real self's use is inferior. Now, Diṅnāga uses that very reason to contradict the superior versus inferior particular properties of the property to be established, not the own-nature of the property, nor all particular properties upon the property; therefore the treatise merely says that it is contradictory to the particular property of the property to be established.