因明入正理論疏 3.19

3.19

The first text has two parts: 'Just as this reason can establish that the eyes and so forth are necessarily for the use of another'—this cites the former reason's capacity to establish the own-nature of the property to be established. 'So too it can...' onward further shows that this reason can also serve as a contradictory reason against that particular property of the property. For the Sāṃkhya master, the five things such as the eyes are the five sense faculties (buddhīndriya). Bedding and seats are things compounded from the five subtle elements (tanmātra). The 'incomposite other' refers to the real spiritual self (puruṣa), whose substance is permanent and inherently existent. The 'composite other' is the conventional self established based on the eyes and so forth, which is impermanent and undergoes transformation. However, for the faculties such as the eyes, the incomposite other—the real self—has superior utility, directly using them to experience the five subtle elements. Because the conventional self is only established based on the eyes and so forth, the composite self's use of the eyes and so forth is inferior. As for bedding and the like, the spiritual self must necessarily deliberate and experience them, so they are sequentially produced starting from the Great (mahat). If judged by what is deliberated upon, the real self's use is superior, and the conventional self's use is inferior. But because the conventional self requires a resting place and only then receives the bed and seat, for bedding the conventional other's use is superior, and the real self's use is inferior. Now, Diṅnāga uses that very reason to contradict the superior versus inferior particular properties of the property to be established, not the own-nature of the property, nor all particular properties upon the property; therefore the treatise merely says that it is contradictory to the particular property of the property to be established.