因明入正理論疏 3.20

3.20

先牒前因能成所立法自相，云：此前所說積聚性因如能成立，數論所立眼等有法必為他用，法之自相即指此因，如是亦能成立所立宗法自相，意許差別相違之義積聚他用宗。由他用是法自相，此自相上意之所許，積聚他用。不積聚他用是法差別，彼積聚因今更不改，還即以彼成立意許法之差別積聚他用。其臥具等積聚性故，既為積聚假我用勝，眼等亦是積聚性故，應如臥具亦為積聚假我用勝。若不作此勝用難者，其宗即有相符極成，他宗眼等亦許積聚假他用故，但可難言假他用勝，不得難言實我用劣，違自宗故，共比量中無同喻故。若他比量，一切無遮，西域諸師有不善者，此直申差別相違過云：「眼等應為積聚他用，因、喻同前。」數論難云：「汝宗相符，誰說眼等積聚他不用？」西域又釋：「數論眼等唯為不積聚他用，床座通二他用，故今以臥具例，令眼等亦為積聚他用，無相符失。」數論難云：「陳那弟子非善我宗，神我受用三德所成二十三諦，豈於眼等無能受用？」《唯識》亦云：「執我是思，受用薩埵、剌闍、答摩所成大等二十三法。」由此眼等實我亦用，故但應如前所分別，不應於中生異覺云：眼等唯為實他受用，臥具假用，或眼等通二，臥具唯假用。《勝義七十》對《金七十》亦徵彼云：「必為他用，是何他也？若說積聚他，犯相符過。若不積聚他，能別不成，闕無同喻，臥具為喻所立不成。」亦即此中法差別過。

First, citing the preceding reason as establishing the property's own nature to be proved, he says: Just as the previously stated reason, 'because of being composite,' can establish the thesis that the subject, the eyes and so forth, as posited by the Sāṃkhya, are definitely for the use of another—and 'the property's own nature' refers precisely to this reason—it can also establish the thesis of 'being for the use of a composite other,' which is the contradictory of the intended specific property on the property's own nature to be proved in the thesis. Because 'being for the use of another' is the property's own nature, and what is intended upon this own nature is 'being for the use of a composite other.' 'Being for the use of a non-composite other' is the specific property. That reason of 'being composite' is now left unchanged, and precisely by means of it one conversely establishes the intended specific property of the property: 'being for the use of a composite other.' Since beddings and the like are composite, they are primarily used by a composite nominal self; and since the eyes and so forth are also composite, like beddings, they should also be primarily used by a composite nominal self. If one does not formulate this objection in terms of primary use, then the thesis will suffer from proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana), because the other school also accepts that the eyes and so forth are used by a composite nominal other. One may only object that 'the use by a nominal other is primary'; one must not object that 'the use by the real self is secondary,' for that would contradict one's own school, and in a shared inference (ubhayānumāna) there would be no homologous example. If it were an inference for the other (parānumāna), there would be no restriction whatsoever. Some unskillful masters in the Western Regions directly stated the fault of contradicting the specific property in this way: 'The eyes and so forth must be for the use of a composite other; reason and example are as before.' The Sāṃkhya objected: 'Your thesis proves what is already accepted! Who says the composite other does not use the eyes and so forth?' The Western masters also explained: 'According to the Sāṃkhya, the eyes and so forth are used exclusively by a non-composite other, whereas seats and beds serve the use of both others; therefore, by drawing an analogy with beddings, we compel the eyes and so forth to be also used by a composite other, so there is no fault of proving what is already accepted.' The Sāṃkhya objected: 'Diṅnāga's disciples do not understand our school! The spiritual self enjoys the twenty-three principles produced from the three qualities (guṇas); how could it have no capacity to enjoy the eyes and so forth?' The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi also states: 'They grasp the self as consciousness, which enjoys the twenty-three phenomena, mahat and the rest, produced from sattva, rajas, and tamas.' For this reason, the real self also uses the eyes and so forth. Therefore, one should only distinguish it as explained before, and one should not conceive the different notion: that the eyes and so forth are exclusively for the enjoyment of the real other and beddings for the nominal [other], or that the eyes and so forth serve both while beddings serve exclusively the nominal [other]. The Paramārthasaptatikā, in response to the Sāṃkhyasaptati, also questioned them thus: '"Must be for the use of another"—what is this other? If you mean a composite other, you commit the fault of proving what is already accepted. If you mean a non-composite other, the qualifier is not established (viśeṣaṇāsiddha), it lacks a homologous example, and with beddings as the example the probandum is unestablished.' This is precisely the fault regarding the specific property of the predicate here.