因明入正理論疏 3.20

3.20

First, citing the preceding reason as establishing the property's own nature to be proved, he says: Just as the previously stated reason, 'because of being composite,' can establish the thesis that the subject, the eyes and so forth, as posited by the Sāṃkhya, are definitely for the use of another—and 'the property's own nature' refers precisely to this reason—it can also establish the thesis of 'being for the use of a composite other,' which is the contradictory of the intended specific property on the property's own nature to be proved in the thesis. Because 'being for the use of another' is the property's own nature, and what is intended upon this own nature is 'being for the use of a composite other.' 'Being for the use of a non-composite other' is the specific property. That reason of 'being composite' is now left unchanged, and precisely by means of it one conversely establishes the intended specific property of the property: 'being for the use of a composite other.' Since beddings and the like are composite, they are primarily used by a composite nominal self; and since the eyes and so forth are also composite, like beddings, they should also be primarily used by a composite nominal self. If one does not formulate this objection in terms of primary use, then the thesis will suffer from proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana), because the other school also accepts that the eyes and so forth are used by a composite nominal other. One may only object that 'the use by a nominal other is primary'; one must not object that 'the use by the real self is secondary,' for that would contradict one's own school, and in a shared inference (ubhayānumāna) there would be no homologous example. If it were an inference for the other (parānumāna), there would be no restriction whatsoever. Some unskillful masters in the Western Regions directly stated the fault of contradicting the specific property in this way: 'The eyes and so forth must be for the use of a composite other; reason and example are as before.' The Sāṃkhya objected: 'Your thesis proves what is already accepted! Who says the composite other does not use the eyes and so forth?' The Western masters also explained: 'According to the Sāṃkhya, the eyes and so forth are used exclusively by a non-composite other, whereas seats and beds serve the use of both others; therefore, by drawing an analogy with beddings, we compel the eyes and so forth to be also used by a composite other, so there is no fault of proving what is already accepted.' The Sāṃkhya objected: 'Diṅnāga's disciples do not understand our school! The spiritual self enjoys the twenty-three principles produced from the three qualities (guṇas); how could it have no capacity to enjoy the eyes and so forth?' The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi also states: 'They grasp the self as consciousness, which enjoys the twenty-three phenomena, mahat and the rest, produced from sattva, rajas, and tamas.' For this reason, the real self also uses the eyes and so forth. Therefore, one should only distinguish it as explained before, and one should not conceive the different notion: that the eyes and so forth are exclusively for the enjoyment of the real other and beddings for the nominal [other], or that the eyes and so forth serve both while beddings serve exclusively the nominal [other]. The Paramārthasaptatikā, in response to the Sāṃkhyasaptati, also questioned them thus: '"Must be for the use of another"—what is this other? If you mean a composite other, you commit the fault of proving what is already accepted. If you mean a non-composite other, the qualifier is not established (viśeṣaṇāsiddha), it lacks a homologous example, and with beddings as the example the probandum is unestablished.' This is precisely the fault regarding the specific property of the predicate here.