因明入正理論疏 3.49

3.49

此論所說法自相因唯違於一，故顯示因，同無、異有。自餘三因，乍觀他立，皆似其因，同有、異無。彼此所諍宗上餘三，以理窮之，皆無同品，其因亦是異有、同無。如法差別不積聚他用，有法自相離實等有性，有法差別作大有有緣性，皆無同喻，彼因但於異品上有。由彼矯立以異為同，故今違之，以彼異為同，成相違義。論中示法各各不同，法自相相違，改他同喻為異，改他異喻為同。後之三違，以他同為同，以他異為異，欲顯相違，因必仍舊，喻或改新。其不定因，立順因正，破乃相違，因雖不改，通二品轉，不生決智，立不定名。此相違因隨應所成，立必同無、異有，破必同有、異無。決智既生，故與前別。若立因正，破者相違，因通二品，豈非不定？故此四因不違四、六。

The reason contradicting the property's svabhāva stated in this treatise contradicts only one; therefore, displaying the reason, it is absent from the sapakṣa and present in the vipakṣa. The remaining three reasons, when observed at first glance in the other's formulation, all resemble valid reasons, being present in the sapakṣa and absent from the vipakṣa. But when the remaining three upon the thesis disputed between both parties are plumbed by principle, none has a sapakṣa, and the reason is also present in the vipakṣa and absent from the sapakṣa. For instance, the property's viśeṣa 'not serving the use of another that is composite', the subject's svabhāva 'an existence apart from substances and the like', and the subject's viśeṣa 'acting as an object-condition for Great Existence' all lack a concordant example, and their reasons are present only on the vipakṣa. Because of his disingenuous formulation taking the vipakṣa as sapakṣa, now contradicting it, one takes his vipakṣa as sapakṣa, establishing the meaning of contradiction. The demonstrations in the treatise are each different: in contradiction of the property's svabhāva, one turns his concordant example into a discordant one, and turns his discordant example into a concordant one. In the latter three contradictions, one takes his concordant as concordant and his discordant as discordant; wishing to reveal contradiction, the reason must remain as before, while the example may be newly altered. In the inconclusive (anaikāntika) reason, when formulated progressively the reason is valid, but in refutation it is contradictory; though the reason is not altered, it operates across both classes, failing to produce decisive cognition, and is given the name 'inconclusive'. These contradictory reasons, according to what they establish, are necessarily absent from the sapakṣa and present in the vipakṣa when formulated, and present in the sapakṣa and absent from the vipakṣa in refutation. Since decisive cognition is produced, they are distinct from the former. If the formulated reason were valid and the refutation contradictory, the reason operating across both classes, would it not be inconclusive? Therefore, these four reasons do not contradict the fourth and sixth [clauses of the wheel of reasons].