因明入正理論疏 3.50

3.50

又將法自相因，同無、異有，就後三種，同有、異無，與三合說，一往觀文，必無是理，初以異為同，後以同為同故。今將後三以就初一，以異為同，便有合者，改他能立之同喻故。如勝論立所說有性，離實等外有別自性，許非無故，如同異性。乍觀此因是共不定，二皆有故。然彼五頂諍五句外無別有性，故立有性離實等五有別自性，闕宗同品。其同異性，既是異品所離之外，由彼勝論方便矯立，舉異為同，許非無因；唯於異品實等上有，同遍非有。亦如論說聲常之宗法自相因，對無空論闕無同喻，所作等因，望於異品瓶等上有，同上遍無，許成相違，今此亦爾。依此比量，後三從初，一因違四。法自相相違者，所說有性離實等外無別自性，許非無故，如實、德等。同異入宗所等之中，故無不定。彼所立量離實等有性是法自相，能有實、德、業離實等有性，不能有實、德、業離實等有性，是法差別。彼意本欲成能有實、德、業離實等有性，故今與彼法差別為相違，云：所說有性應非能有實、德、業離實等有性，許非無故，如實、德等。為有法自相相違，云：所說有性應非有性，許非無故，如實、德、業。彼說離實等有性，今隨難言陳而非有性，故違自相，不違自教、自語之宗。同喻亦無，所立不成。有性既為有法自相，作有性有緣性、作非有性有緣性，是有法差別。彼意本成作有性有緣性，故今與彼有法差別為相違，云：所說有性非作有性有緣性，許非無故，如實、德等。不改故因，即為違量，故成四因。

Furthermore, if one took the reason contradicting the property's svabhāva—absent from sapakṣa and present in vipakṣa—and combined it with the latter three—present in sapakṣa and absent from vipakṣa—and spoke of combining them with the three, looking casually at the text there could certainly be no such principle, because the former takes the discordant as concordant while the latter takes the concordant as concordant. Now, taking the latter three to conform with the first one, taking the discordant as concordant, there are indeed combinations, because one alters the concordant example of his proof. For instance, the Vaiśeṣika posits: 'The asserted existence has a distinct intrinsic nature apart from substance and the rest; because it is accepted to be non-nonexistent; like the universal-particular (sāmānya-viśeṣa).' At first glance this reason is common inconclusive (sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika), because it is present in both. However, that Five-Crested one (Pañcaśikha) disputes that outside the five categories there is no distinct existence; hence positing that existence has a distinct intrinsic nature apart from the five [categories] such as substance lacks a thesis sapakṣa. That universal-particular is outside what is excluded as the vipakṣa; yet because that Vaiśeṣika expediently and disingenuously formulates it, adducing the discordant as concordant, the reason 'accepted to be non-nonexistent' is present only on the vipakṣa of substance and the rest, and is completely absent on the sapakṣa. This is also like the treatise's reason contradicting the property's svabhāva in the thesis 'sound is permanent': against one who asserts no ether, it lacks a concordant example, and reasons such as 'being produced' are present on the vipakṣa of the jar and the like, and completely absent on the sapakṣa, accepted as constituting contradiction; here it is also like this. Relying on this inference, the latter three follow the first: one reason contradicts four. Contradiction of the property's svabhāva is: 'The asserted existence has no distinct intrinsic nature apart from substance and the rest; because it is accepted to be non-nonexistent; like substance, quality, and the rest.' The universal-particular is subsumed under what is equal to the thesis; hence there is no fault of inconclusiveness. In his formulated inference, 'existence apart from substance and the rest' is the property's svabhāva; 'capable of possessing substance, quality, and action while being an existence apart from substance and the rest' versus 'incapable of possessing substance, quality, and action while being an existence apart from substance and the rest' is the property's viśeṣa. His intention originally was to establish being capable of possessing substance, quality, and action while being an existence apart from substance and the rest; therefore, now contradicting his property's viśeṣa, one says: 'The asserted existence should be incapable of possessing substance, quality, and action while being an existence apart from substance and the rest; because it is accepted to be non-nonexistent; like substance, quality, and the rest.' As contradiction of the subject's svabhāva, one says: 'The asserted existence should be non-existence; because it is accepted to be non-nonexistent; like substance, quality, and action.' He asserts an existence apart from substance and the rest; now following and refuting the explicit statement as non-existence, it therefore contradicts the svabhāva, without contradicting one's own doctrine or one's own thesis. The concordant example also lacks what is to be established (sādhya-vikala). Since existence is the subject's svabhāva, 'acting as an object-condition for existence' versus 'acting as an object-condition for non-existence' is the subject's viśeṣa. His intention originally was to establish acting as an object-condition for existence; therefore, now contradicting his subject's viśeṣa, one says: 'The asserted existence does not act as an object-condition for existence; because it is accepted to be non-nonexistent; like substance, quality, and the rest.' Without altering the original reason, it becomes a contradictory inference; thus it constitutes four reasons.